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In October 2006 a colloquium was arranged in Göteborg where a small number of 
experienced researchers were invited to discuss the impact of activation policies in 
three different countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden). Those in-
vited represented a variety of disciplines such as law, sociology and sociology of 
law. All participants made their own presentations of papers and these papers were 
the first drafts to the empirical chapters presented below. The discussions around 
the papers were very inspiring and vital and the idea of a book took form in its af-
termath.  
Work, and increased access to work for as many as possible, has become a mod-
ern mantra in welfare policies. It is the primacy of work, as the proposed key-aspect 
of welfare sustainability, which has created notions such as work-first welfare. 
Since the 1980s, the issue of how to ensure that more individuals become self-
supporting through wage labour has been high on the political agenda. Explanations 
for this development can be found in predictions of demographic shifts, in the 
breaking up of traditional family structures as well as in an increasingly competi-
tive global economy – all examples of processes which challenge the present distri-
bution of social security in the different welfare regimes of Europe. It has become a 
main political concern to develop strategies that will increase the level of active la-
bour market participation of the workforce. The European Work-First Welfare 
State provides a comparative account of how different welfare states and legal sys-
tems in Europe have responded to this challenge.  
We would like to thank the authors who have contributed chapters to this collec-
tion for their sincere commitment to the topic as well as for the professional joy 
their participation in this project has given us. Special thanks also to professor 
Kerstin Ekberg, Dr. Wolfgang Schulz-Weidner, professor Bjørn Hvinden and Dr. 
Håkan Johansson for their presentations and participation in the discussions at the 
colloquium. In addition we would especially like to thank Stamatia Devetzi for her 
sharp and stimulating work as a co-editor. Without the help of Birgitta Jännebring 
at CERGU the book would not have gone through the necessary transformation that 
somehow magically turns a manuscript into a book – thank you. We would finally 
also like to thank FAS for generous economic support and the Centre for European 
Research at Göteborg University for publishing the book. 
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A European Work-First Welfare State? 
Introductory remarks 
Sara Stendal, Thomas Erhag, Stamatia De-
vetzi 
Increasing employability through activation policies 
It has become a concern for most – if not all – European countries to increase the 
level of labour market participation within the population aged 16-65. In some 
countries, like the Nordic countries, this is a concern embedded in a familiar nor-
mative environment where the primacy of work has a long tradition; in other coun-
tries the perspective is more innovative from a historical perspective. What all 
European countries have in common, though, is a future where the sustainability of 
the welfare state (as we know it) is at stake as a decreasing share of the population 
face the challenge of financing the increasing costs of welfare. It is in this context 
that the elaboration of different activation policies has worked its way into most 
social policy agendas across Europe. It is also in this context that the European Un-
ion launched the Employment Strategy (EES) eleven years ago, in 1997. 
The concept of “activation” in the narrow sense – as often used in the literature 
– involves developing tighter links between unemployment protection policies and 
active labour market policies. More broadly, activation is about increasing labour 
market entry and participation, and phasing out temporary labour market exit op-
tions for working age claimants (early retirement, disability and long-term sickness 
benefits).1 In this volume, and for comparative reasons, the notion of “activation” is 
used in its broad sense. 
The framing of this volume is strongly influenced by the awareness that the no-
tion of “employability” and the demarcation between who is assessed to be sick, 
disabled or unemployed easily creates communication problems cross-nationally. 
For the purpose of the present project we approached this dilemma by disregarding 
these demarcations as functional boundaries and instead we choose a broader 
framework for our discussion: Activation policies in general - increasing the em-
ployability of the sick, the disabled and the unemployed.  
                                           
1 Clasen/Clegg, Beyond Activation: Reforming European unemployment protection systems in post-industrial 
labour markets, European Societies 2006: 527-553. 




In the notion of activation policies we include such measures that have as an 
aim to turn recipients of social security cash benefits, through strategies for in-
creased employability, into participants on the (open) labour market. We describe it 
more broadly as “employment support”, as this notion appears to more comprehen-
sive than the word “activation”, which usually implies a conditionality of welfare 
rights on job seeking efforts. Examples for such activation policies in the broad 
sense/“employment support” are: quota-systems, vocational rehabilitation, anti-
discrimination legislation, adaptation of workplaces and other different systems of 
incentives/disincentives focusing on employers as well as potential employees. The 
measures we are interested in could be aimed at increasing the employability of an 
individual or groups of individuals and they should be aimed at increasing employ-
ability through diminishing causes of incapacity and inability (be they internal or 
external in relation to the individual concerned).  
The contributions made in this volume are describing and discussing legal 
strategies used to increase labour market participation from a national perspective. 
By legal strategies we refer to the legislator’s choice of method to implement a 
specific policy, e.g. the creation of rights, the choice between using hard law/soft 
law, public/private law, statutory law/collective bargaining etc.2 The national 
analyses thus include reflections on legal strategies for implementing activation 
policies for persons being sick, disabled or unemployed. 
The research question – activation and rehabilitation of 
whom? - Targeting the need for employment support in a 
cross national setting 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a short introduction to the subject of the Göte-
borg-colloquium and hence the nexus of the questions, around which the chapters 
in this book circles. A main question was: Are different legal strategies for activat-
ing the sick or unemployed an attempt to solve the same problem? 
The notion of activation/employment support used in this book includes, as 
mentioned above, such measures that have as an aim to turn recipients of social se-
curity cash benefits into participants on the (open) labour market, through strategies 
for increased employability. One of these measures is rehabilitation. Here, the focus 
is on “work-focused rehabilitation”. This notion, coming originally from the Swed-
                                           
2 The concept of legal strategies is thus used to capture the way legal constructs (rules, principles, practises) are 
functioning as building blocs in the implementation of social policies, and how the different usage and combina-
tion of these will determine different modes of governance. Legal strategies are worked out and determined on 
different levels – locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Thus, although national legislation (statutory 
law) would be a prime example of where to look for legal constructs, this is not an exclusive source. In the area of 
welfare law there is increasing awareness of the pluralistic elements of legal systems and the notion of legal 
strategies does not exclude such a perspective. Thus, legal strategies are not always coherent, they do not neces-
sarily point in the same direction, not even on the ideal, normative, level. 





ish social security system3, is used in our comparison to generally describe legal 
strategies with the aim to safeguard labour market participation for individuals 
who, if not working, would be dependent on some kind of health-related social se-
curity benefit. Defined this way, the “work-focused rehabilitation” is to be distin-
guished from the “rehabilitation” in a broad sense, where the primary aim is to re-
spond to the medical or social needs of the individual. The desired outcome of 
“work-focused rehabilitation” is the (re-)integration to the labour market. 
As regards Sweden, the long-term sick make up a considerable proportion of 
Swedens potentially employable population and they are needed on the labour mar-
ket. Statistics in Sweden show that every day, 14 % of the population of working 
age (20-64 years) are either on sick leave or recipients of sickness compensation.4 
This has been identified as a national problem and there is a political will to solve 
this. One strategy to be used in this process is work-focused rehabilitation, aiming 
to bring recipients of sickness benefits back to employment. 
In other European countries the situation is often somewhat different and unem-
ployment is instead identified as the main problem from where people should be 
“activated” or “rehabilitated”. There, the focus is rather on turning the unemployed 
to “active” members of the labour market instead of them being “passive” recipi-
ents of benefits. 
In both cases, though, it is generally accepted that there is a need for some kind 
of “activation” or “employment support” in order to move the recipients of cash 
benefits into paid work again. The question here is if some normative patterns, 
common to all different measures of “employment support” can be identified. 
Taking these considerations into account, an overarching question within the 
framework of this book concerns the normative impact of different legal strategies 
in the field of “employment support”. In this book the authors describe and evaluate 
different strategies in Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom. These countries 
represent different welfare regimes5 as well as different legal families in currently 
used typologies. The intention is to explore the subject from a legal perspective, 
searching for knowledge in the legal traditions of Sweden, Germany and the United 
Kingdom that will allow us to further understand the role of “law” in the field of 
“employment support”. 
Another important question dealt with at the colloquium was about the possible 
effects of the interplay between national and EU employment and welfare legisla-
                                           
3 Arbetslivsinriktad rehabilitering 
4 Sw. sjukersättning, formerly disability pension. 
5 Germany belongs to the conservative model according to the typology created by Esping-Anderson. The United 
Kingdom belongs to the liberal regime while Sweden belongs to the social democratic. The two latter are antipo-
des in the regime debate However, it has been noted that Britain and Sweden at one time were quite similar in 
their welfare attributes. If comparing the British (Beveridge) system of the 50’s with the yet undeveloped Scandi-
navian models – similarities seems to have been more striking than differences, see Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.87 
and p. 173. Still, research made by Powell and Barrientos, taking into account the developments of the 1990s and 
adding new variables (in particular active labour market policies) to Esping-Andersen’s typology, confirms the 
notion that Sweden and the United Kingdom have created different types of welfare systems. (Powell and Barri-
entos, 2004, European Journal of political Research, pp 83-105). 




tion in Europe. Employment and re-employment has been identified as a key Euro-
pean problem and also since Amsterdam mentioned in the EC-treaty chapter VI on 
Employment (art 125 ff) and art 136-137.6 However, (almost) all law-making 
power in the area of social security takes place within the framework of a national 
legal environment. Reform in the area of employability, activation and rehabilita-
tion is often concerned with national solutions. 
Despite how different the solutions may be, the goals are common at the European 
level. During the Portuguese (2000) and Swedish presidency (2001) in the EU, the 
employment field was made an important part of the Lisbon process. The employment 
guidelines have fixed overarching and complementary objectives: One is the so-called 
full employment (70 % overall, more than 60 % for women, 50 % for older people, to 
be accomplished by 2010). Other objectives are quality and productivity at work, and 
social cohesion and inclusion. It is quite obvious that full employment and social in-
clusion are seen as complementary – employment is seen as the key element for social 
inclusion. The over-arching goals of Lisbon focus on employment as a pre-condition 
for welfare. Thus, it is important to look at the different national legal strategies under 
a European perspective, in order to see if (and how) different paths may lead to the 
same goal. 
When looking at comparative statistics of labour market participation one is struck 
by the different patterns shown in different European countries. Only five countries 
have reached the goal of an employment rate over 70 %.7 Sweden is an example of a 
member state with high labour market participation (73,1 % in 2006), low unemploy-
ment (7,1)8 but high figures on absence from work due to sickness (appr. 4% of per-
sons between 20-64) and also an increasing number of people standing outside the la-
bour market as disabled, i.e. recipients of invalidity pension (appr. 10% of persons be-
tween 20-64).9 Other European countries have a different structure, e.g. Germany with 
(lower) labour market participation figures of 67,5%, comparatively low figures of 
sickness absence but higher rates of unemployment (9,8).10 This could be an example 
of how different legal strategies may lead to different results – whereas the main ques-
tion still remains the same: how to bring as many people as possible (back) to em-
ployment.  
                                           
6 Full employment and the fight against social exclusion are vital parts of the Lisbon strategy, see e.g. COM 
(2003) 6 final The future of the European Employment Strategy, and COM (2004) 239(01) Strengthening the im-
plementation of the European Employment Strategy Proposal for a Council Decision On guidelines for the em-
ployment policies of the Member States Recommendation for a Council Recommendation On the implementation 
of Member States' employment policies in which Sweden is recommended to deal with its long-term sick in order 
to sustain labour supply. Also Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating more employment in Europe, Report of the employment 
taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, November 2003. Joint report on social inclusion 2004, Employment and Social 
Affairs – Social Security and Social Integration, European Commission.  
7 Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom. Eurostat Yearbook 2008. 
8 Eurostat Yearbook 2008, The Eurostat statistics refer to people between 15-74 years. According to Swedish offi-
cial statistics Swedish labour market participation of the ages 20-64 was 81 % in 2007 and unemployment 5,4 % 
in 2006.  
9 See government bill 2007/08:124, Från sjukersättning till arbete, p. 36 ff.  
10 Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2008. 





The research framework 
Research in the field of “activation” and activation policies in general is both numerous 
and profound. An overview of the most important publications on this field can be 
found at the ASPEN-site (http://aspen.fss.uu.nl/en/index.php). 
Most books on activation policies describe the notion of activation and make 
typologies of the different activation concepts in Europe. Reflexions on the concept 
of “activation” and empirical observations from case studies of different active so-
cial policies in the EU can be found in Van Brekels/Hornemann Mǿllers’ publica-
tion “Active Social Policies in the EU”.11 More recent publications focus on the in-
dividualisation12 – or contractualism”13 – in activation policies in the EU as a new 
form of welfare state governance. Another comparison book undertakes a typology 
of activation regimes in Europe.14 
This book is not just another study on different activation policies in Europe. 
Rather, our focus is on the normative implications of “employment support” and 
the different legal strategies in this field. Moreover, there is a different perspective: 
Despite the fact that “activation” is often broadly defined, the vast majority of 
comparative publications on activation is about the activation of the unemployed 
(or social assistance claimants). The present work, though, analyses the implica-
tions of “employment support” not only for the unemployed, but also for other 
groups of benefit recipients – such as recipients of sick or disablement benefits. 
Thus, rehabilitation measures and, more specifically, “work-focussed rehabilita-
tion” are included here, as well. One could say that we look on the notion of “acti-
vation” from a different angle – encompassing a larger number of welfare recipi-
ents and including all strategies that increase employability diminishing causes of 
inability. 
Outline of the book 
The book consists of 12 chapters. Following on from the introduction, chapters two 
and three are concerned with Europe as a region and the ambitions to create a “So-
cial Europe”. Chapter Two includes a legally based discussion on the impact of soft 
law regulation on national competence. In Chapter Three the European Employ-
ment Strategy, along with the chosen method of implementation (the Open Method 
of Coordination) as the basic European “soft law” instrument dealing with the acti-
vation paradigm, is presented and analysed. 
                                           
11 Rik van Brekel/Iver Hornemann Moller (Eds.), Active Social Policies in the EU, 2002. 
12 Rik van Brekel/Ben Valkenburg (Eds.), Making it personal: Individualising activation services in the EU, 2007. 
13 Els Sol/Mies Westerveld (Eds.), Contractualism in Employment Services, 2005. 
14 Amparo Serrano Pascual/Lars Magnusson (Eds.), Reshaping Welfare States and Activation Regimes in Europe, 
2007. 




The following chapters are devoted to detailed studies of how the aim of in-
creasing employability through activation policies has been approached in Great 
Britain, Germany and Sweden respectively. The account of national strategies has 
been structured into three different sections, and each country is allocated two or 
three chapters.  
The three British chapters provide a comprehensive overview of reforms in the 
field of activation. It is clear that although the calls for a more active welfare state 
now can be heard all over Europe, reforms implemented in Britain are marked by 
their distinctly national and historical characteristics and Europe is hardly men-
tioned. In Chapter Four, Neville Harris explains how the underlying ideologies and 
perceived social and economic imperatives have had impact on the developing le-
gal and policy framework. He also highlights ways in which the policies that have 
been implemented, particularly in recent years, have interacted with long-standing 
principles within social security law, such as the notion of ‘voluntary unemploy-
ment’. In the following chapter, Chapter Five, Simon Rahilly reviews the work ac-
tivation requirements within benefits for people of working age who are unem-
ployed or sick (and in receipt of either jobseeker’s allowance or incapacity benefit). 
Rahilly claims that as many of these work activation provisions are supported by 
sanctions they also have the potential to further intensify the poverty of the benefit 
claimant. In Chapter Six Michael Adler concludes that developments in Great Brit-
ain have made it extremely difficult for anyone who is required to take part in wel-
fare to work programs to complain about the advice and help they are given or 
about the sanctions they are subject to. At the macro level, the chapter explores the 
shift, from a contribution-based approach to a citizenship-based approach. At the 
micro level, the chapter explores the shift from a more bureaucratic and legalistic 
mode of decision making to a more professional and managerial one, and examines 
the implications of this shift for rights of redress.  
The two German chapters both circle around the impact of the Hartz-reform on 
different core social security schemes, what has been gained and what might be at 
risk? In contrast to the British contributions, the analyses from Germany are much 
more profoundly embedded in a European context. In Chapter Seven Eberhard Ei-
chenhofer describes some profound changes in the unemployment insurance and 
assistance scheme of Germany. The reforms were inspired by the ideal of the active 
welfare state, which is conceived as a means for self help to all those who risk so-
cial exclusion. The chapter tries to answer the question of whether the reform 
should be seen as a dismantling of the welfare state or the introduction of a new 
version of welfare. 
In Chapter Eight Felix Welti explores different explanations for why the activa-
tion of disabled unemployed people in Germany often fails. Medical and vocational 
rehabilitation have a long tradition in German social policy and legislation as part 
of a work-focused activation strategy. “Rehabilitation not retirement” is the slogan 
that summarises this orientation. Still, years after the enforcement of SGB IX, there 
is a strong implementation deficit of the Rehabilitation and Participation Law. Vo-
cational rehabilitation, in particular, has faced a crisis during the last years.  





The two Swedish chapters bring to the fore the extensive interest that govern-
ments have shown during the last decades in increasing the employability of the 
sick and disabled. While active labour market policies been a longstanding land-
mark of the Swedish model, activation of new groups of benefit recipients is a more 
recent development. The chapters provide examples of different legal strategies 
evolved for this purpose. 
In Chapter Nine Lotta Vahlne Westerhäll examines the legal position of the in-
dividual insured person and explores the individual’s access to legal rights in con-
nection to the rehabilitation process. The Swedish concept of work-focused reha-
bilitation covers all measures of a medical, psychological, social and occupational 
nature, which may assist those who have been ill or injured to regain maximum 
functional ability and restore the conditions required for a normal life. Different au-
thorities, or principals, are responsible for the various areas. The main target group 
for work-focused rehabilitation is individuals who are sick-listed and receive sick-
ness cash benefit.  
In recent years an unquestionable shift towards disability anti-discrimination 
legislation can be observed in EC-law as well as in national legislation in many 
parts of the world. In Chapter Ten Andreas Inghammar argues that the anti-
discrimination perspective will provide a shift of focus from the disabled as a group 
towards the disabled as individuals, and that this shift might change the perception 
of disability and disabled peoples’ labour market integration, “from a given into a 
task”. Disability anti-discrimination legislation in Great Britain, Sweden and Ger-
many are examples of this development. 
Chapter Eleven constitutes the comparative part of the book, exploring the 
normative implications of “employment support”. It examines the normative impact 
of work-first welfare reforms in the three different European countries using the 
theory on basic normative patterns. 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the legal questions and challenges 
of a “European Work-First Welfare State” and suggests legal strategies as a point 
of departure for future comparative studies. 
 

Activation through law - National Social 
Security Law from a European Perspective 
Thomas Erhag  
Introduction 
Direct activities for the promotion of social welfare at EU level are minimal. There 
are some common activities for fighting poverty and social exclusion but the budg-
ets for direct actions are not comparable to the levels of national welfare budgets. 
The actions taken are also not of supra-national character hence it can be character-
ised as a soft-law or multi-level policy process where the main competence is kept 
on national level.  
With starting-point in 1986 a new discourse was introduced in European policy 
with the Delors-commission introducing the concept of Social Europe. However, 
scrutinising the content of the Social Europe-policies, focus is rather on employ-
ment than on welfare and poverty. This work-line approach was already manifested 
in the preparing stages of the EES where the Council urged the member states to 
also adapt their social protection systems to support employability. The goal of a 
high employment level is after Amsterdam an overarching goal of the European 
Union to be integrated in all common policies (EC art 127). 
Already by its launch the EES received some criticism which in essence pointed 
at the fact that the normative goal of the strategy did not coincide with that of the 
welfare regulation of the Member States’, ie. the fight against social exclusion and 
(re)employment is quite different from the concept of an EU solidarity. Looking at 
the development of the EES within the Lisbon-process, it seems as if the EU has 
retreated from promoting social citizenship and moved towards a narrower work-
line oriented conceptualisation of social security. This would mean that there is an 
expressed common EU normative structure within the OMC governance method, 
with a potential impact on national welfare policies.  
This chapter examines the real and possible impact of the EES/OMC method in 
relation to other methods of Community integration. 




Unpacking the concepts of “Europeanisation” and “Euro-
pean integration” 
The concept “Europeanisation” is predominantly used to describe national adap-
tation and integration due to EU-membership, however there is no shared defini-
tion of the term. Instead, Europeanisation is used in a variety of ways to describe 
different phenomena and processes of change. It is often linked to other terms as 
globalisation and internationalisation aimed at describing an integrative devel-
opment in politics, economy, culture and law.1 Efforts to model its dynamics 
have proven that the term is not used without problems and the empirical evi-
dence is uneven and often contested. Still, it has been argued that with some ef-
fort the term can be useful for the understanding of the evolving European pol-
ity.2  
The term “legal Europeanisation” is also often used as an expression of the 
impact of EU law on the legal systems of the Member States. Shared institutions 
adopt legislation in the forms of directives, regulations (and more) on EU level 
and these legal acts are then implemented on the national level. In a broader per-
spective the term is also used to identify the shift of national policy paradigms 
and instruments to the EU level.3 This implies that the term refers both to the 
study of change at national level (top-down) and the study of how the domestic 
level initiates change at the EU level. Legal Europeanisation is then assumed to 
be a two-way process between the national and European levels. 
“Europeanisation” and “European integration” are often used interchangeably 
although the uses of these two concepts are separated by the political scientists. 
Europeanisation refers to what follows from a process where European integra-
tion to an increasing degree is relevant and useful as a source of change and ad-
aptation in national policy making and in the domestic way of law-making and 
organisation, put very briefly, domestic change caused by European integration.4 
Obviously, the research agenda on Europeanisation relates strongly to the theo-
ries of European integration.  
The meaning that we have given the concept of Europeanisation includes the 
rational adaptation that the EU brings. Thus, we are aware of that this use of the 
concept does not have the analytical precision to isolate it from other integrative 
cooperation. Target for our discussions on Europeanisation are the national reac-
tions and adaptations to EU activities related to activation policies.  
                                           
1 Wallace (2000), pp. 369-82. 
2 Olsen (2001). 
3 Howell (2002). 
4 Ibid. 




In the legal field, the development of European integration is often described 
as a linear progression towards a specified goal,5 often with reference to 
Balassa’s integration “stair-case”,6 where unification of law is the final step. The 
degree of integration is then a measure of to what extent law is unified and the 
concept of integration is then unpacked into separate concepts such as conver-
gence and harmonisation. In the field of social law, focus is both on the way in 
which unification or harmonisation should come about (legal instruments) as 
well as to what extent further harmonisation is possible or wanted.7 
Balassa described European integration as a process driven by the elimina-
tion of discrimination between national economies. The result of integration is 
characterised as a lack of discrimination in a variety of areas. The meaning of 
economic integration is not isolated to total unification but can be referred to 
various degrees or “steps” of integration; 1. free trade; 2. customs union; 3. 
common market; 4. economic union as distinct from the common market in that 
it combines restrictions on commodity movement with a certain degree of har-
monisation of economic, monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies, 
and; 5. total economic integration presupposing a unification of economic, fis-
cal, and social policies which also requires a supra-national authority whose de-
cisions are binding for the member-states. Balassa makes a specific reference to 
social integration, reminding that there is a need for social integration to accom-
plish total integration, but also to some degree necessary to induce labour 
movements already in the stages 2 and 3.8  
In the context of economic integration, harmonisation of economic policy is 
seen as a necessary complement to the liberalisation of trade in order to ensure 
the participants a level playing field. This liberalisation of trade and harmonisa-
tion are thus characterized by two different approaches concerning the order of 
the two elements:9 
a) harmonisation as a consequence of liberalised trade 
b) harmonisation as a condition for liberalised trade. 
With reference to the Treaty of Rome from 1958 it is quite obvious that the a)-
approach was strong during the 1950s.10 This is also reflected in the wording of 
the introductory article of the chapter on social policy in the Treaty. Article 136 
in its modern wording states that harmonisation of fundamental social objectives 
will follow from the functioning of the common market, as a consequence of 
liberalised trade: 
                                           
5 Steiner, Woods, Twigg-Flessner (2006). 
6 Balassa (1961) p. 1-17. 
7 See Eichenhofer (2006) Pennings (2005). See for a discussion on Europeanisation of European Private Law, 
Wilhelmsson (2005). 
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The Community and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social 
rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 
18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, 
improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisa-
tion while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dia-
logue between management and labour, the development of human resources 
with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. 
To this end the Community and the Member States shall implement measures 
which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the 
field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the 
Community economy. 
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of 
the common market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but 
also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation 
of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action. 
My view is that free movement under all circumstances contains a social dimen-
sion. A realisation of the freedoms will therefore also trigger the question and need 
for discussing harmonized measures in the social area. With reference to spill-over 
effects it might be the case that economic integration should come before a com-
mon social policy, but will lead to a common, or at least strong common features 
of, social policy.11  
When promoting the b-strategy, harmonisation as a condition for liberalised 
trade, it might be argued that international differences in wage levels and other so-
cial advantages will be an unfair advantage for certain member states, with the side-
effect that workers there have a lower social standard. Differences in social levels 
will lead to a distortion of competition putting labour cost in focus in order to in-
crease competitiveness. A consequence will be lower wages etc.12 Arguments like 
this are named social dumping and in order to avoid a dumping situation social cir-
cumstances should be harmonised before or together with a liberalisation of trade. 
The promoters of the a-strategy instead claim that differences in wages and social 
protection are reflection of differences in productivity and social preferences. It is 
obvious that the latter approach has been dominant in the development of the EU.13 
No matter the strategy supported, we can note that integration theory provides 
us with a tool for explanation of what is happening in the process of European inte-
gration14 as the EU steadily has been expanding its powers. Neo-functionalists de-
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scribe this as a result of increasing interdependence between member-states.15 It 
will be more effective to solve problems on the supra-national level which means 
that further legislative competences will be transferred to the institutions of the EU 
in a growing number of areas. This phenomenon is called spill-over effect, and 
means in a longer perspective that citizen and policy-maker loyalty gradually will 
be transferred from the nation-state to the EU-level.16 With reference to Balassa we 
have seen an institutionalisation of economic policy via the completion of the inter-
nal market but also the Monetary Union and the Stability Pact introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty. These changes have also been followed by EU competence in 
more policy fields and the development of more sophisticated regulatory proce-
dures. 
However, it must be questioned whether this process is to be considered as in-
evitable or if it can be controlled by policy-makers. Tension has been created be-
tween policy areas where decisions are taken on an EU-level (internal market) and 
other areas where policies are still a matter of national affairs (social security, la-
bour market), a tension that in legal term are of a constitutional character.17 It is 
quite obvious that a “deficit” in competence in the field of social policy threatens 
the democratic legitimacy of the deepened integration project, a “truth” obvious al-
ready for the Delors Commission after presenting the 1985 White paper on the 
completion of the internal market. These conflicts are further complicated by the 
fact that the ECJ has the task of interpreter of the constitutional balance provided in 
the basic treaties. The dynamic and teleological method used by the ECJ in the at-
tempt to fulfil the integrative goals set out in the treaties has meant that national in-
terests have been put aside in favour of other market goals provided for in the EC-
treaty.18  
In general terms it can be said that in the area of the establishment of the inter-
nal market the EU has exclusive competence for law-making. Also the next level of 
integration, with reference to Balassa, was reached when the monetary union was 
made a reality. However, when it comes to the field of social policy and welfare 
there are only a few signs of common policy-making with a hard impact. Regula-
tion of social welfare is still an area in which responsibility lies with each state, at 
the same time we have seen an increasing effect from other policy areas, e.g. the 
internal market, meaning that there is an indirect pressure on national competence 
in the social field. 
Must we then create positive (integration) decision-making in the social field to 
balance this indirect pressure, i.e. EU social law using the traditional legal EU-
method with directives based on a common welfare ideology? A demand for this 
should not be a surprise as most member states have developed welfare regulation 
as a response to the short-comings of the market. This pressure and need for correc-
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tion can be expressed also on the European level. Without positive integration in 
the social field there is a larger risk for increasing conflicts between internal market 
and national social policy.19 The dividing line of law-making competence between 
member-states and the EU, that in theory should exist, is difficult to assess at the 
same time as it is not static. It is changing due to constitutional adjustments in the 
treaties and secondary legislation with an indirect impact (jack-in-the-box) but also 
due to the activities of the ECJ. Leibfried and Pierson in 1995 described the ECJ as 
a “market-police”, upholding the limits for national legislative competences.20  
Up until today the story has been one of steadily expanding powers, by an ex-
pansion of community competence at the cost of the room for exclusive national 
law-making competence. Lenaerts means that the member states have no powers to 
resist this development.21 However, in the areas where decision-making is still 
made with unanimous voting, the veto power makes the integrative forces less 
powerful. This is of course not the case where qualified majority voting has been 
introduced. The problem with indirect effects of integration is that when paving 
way for market integration by means of setting aside national hindrance to free 
movement, there are very small chances of balancing these decisions on the same 
regulatory level.  
By establishing the doctrine of supremacy the ECJ has struck the constitutional 
balance between the EU and the member states.22 This principle regulates the pri-
orities between national law and Community law from a national perspective. A di-
rect consequence of the doctrine of supremacy of Community law is the doctrine of 
pre-emption that is directed towards the law-making powers of the Member 
States.23 
The EC-treaty also contains norms whose direct objective is to regulate the rela-
tionship between Community law and national law. Article 5 EC-treaty is an exam-
ple of concrete action taken by the Member States to clarify the outer limits of the 
competences attributed to the Community. The principles expressed in art 5, legal-
ity, subsidiarity and proportionality, are concerned with the use of the attributed 
competences. The use of these principles can block the exercise of Community 
competence in an individual case. In addition, Member States must be loyal to the 
objectives of the Community by not taking any measures that violate Community 
law. By simplification, the principle of loyal cooperation in TEC art 10 may be un-
derstood as an obligation whereby national lawmakers must not maintain or intro-
duce rules that violate Community law. When attributing new competences to the 
Community, new obligations to which Member States must comply are created. 
The ECJ has used the principle of loyal cooperation to increase Community law ef-
ficiency. The duty to comply has proved to be a general duty and does not depend 
only upon what material area of national law that violates Community law. Na-
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tional lawmaking discretion can be circumscribed in areas where the Community 
has not been attributed competences. 
In understanding the balance between Member State and Community compe-
tences the following picture emerges. There are areas where the Community has no 
competence and hence Member States have exclusive competence, there are areas 
where the Community has been attributed exclusive competence and finally, there 
are areas where the Community and the Member States share competence. Thus, it 
appears that the balance between Community and Member State competence is 
changed when the Treaties are changed. The doctrine of pre-emption answers the 
question under which circumstances that Member State lawmaking is pre-empted 
by the competence given to the Community, it determines when there is an actual 
or potential conflict.24 
When widening Community competences, the effect of Community law on na-
tional law has become more heterogeneous. By subjecting questions of Community 
and Member State relations to the jurisdiction of the ECJ a new institutional struc-
ture with the ECJ at the centre is created. Accordingly, Member States will seek 
new methods of integration that has little or no pre-emptive effect. The expansion 
of the use of soft law and the new techniques for governance can be seen as sym-
bols of this development.25  
To summarise, the main argument in favour of harmonisation in the social field 
has been that harmonisation will prevent the distortion of competition on the com-
mon market; in addition harmonisation is necessary for the completion of the free 
movement of workers. In reality, the sovereignty of the Member States, i.e. hard 
law impact on the legal authority of the Member states, has only been restricted to 
small areas such as social security for migrant workers, health and safety at work 
and in the field of equal treatment. However, there are also indirect effects of Euro-
pean integration irritating the legal authority of the Member States in the field of 
welfare law and the most powerful actions in European Welfare law have been 
non-regulative. It can also be stressed that the hard-law regulation on social secu-
rity, regulation 1408/71, merely co-ordinates and have no further intention of creat-
ing the same technical approach to social security or creating a similar ideology in 
relation to the national regulation of the same area. As a parallel process, the EU 
has since 1989 (Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, 
Council recommendation 92/442/EEC of July 1992 on the convergence of objec-
tives and policies in social protection) worked with formulating legally non-binding 
standards that then have functioned as starting points for further discussion and ac-
tions by the institutions and Member States. The OMC has brought this dimension 
of non-binding norms to a higher level, however these soft procedures have no pre-
emptive effects on Member State legal competence. 
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European framework - Balance between national and Euro-
pean competences in the social field 
Although the welfare area is still described as an area where the member states re-
tain primary competence and the influence from the EU is indirect or minor, the EC 
for many years have had legal competence to regulate aspects of employment. In 
general this has meant that more general welfare questions have been left to the 
Member States while as the question of labour market participation has been an 
area of EU-interest.26 After Treaty revision in Amsterdam the Employment chapter 
of the EC-treaty was inserted, art 125-130. At the same time we saw a widening of 
the Treaty-scope on social policy as the social protocol was signed by the UK and 
moved from the Annex into the Treaty-text. The new wording of art 137, for the 
first in the history of European integration, attributes original legal competences in 
social security to the EU.27 Szyszczak means that social policy has undergone a 
quiet revolution when being reformed in Amsterdam, as the employment strategy 
will have major repercussion for Member State competence in this area.28 Here, I 
will give a short overview of the competences expressed in the employment and 
social policy chapter with focus on the OMC as a “new” governance method.  
The EC treaty contains limited legal basis for the adoption of regulations and di-
rectives in labour law and health and safety at work (art 137), social security for 
migrant workers (art 42 and 137), free movement of workers and services (art 39 
and 49). There also wide competences for providing secondary legislation in the 
field of non-discrimination on the basis of gender (art 141), ethnicity and functional 
incapacity (art 13). Art 137 h) also contains a specific legal basis for the adoption 
on the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. However, the width 
of the legislation adopted, actually or potentially, under this legal basis can by no 
means be compared to the comprehensive welfare state regulation of the Member 
States. As mentioned above, the neo-functionalists argued that negative integration, 
such as the removal of trade hinders for the functioning of the common market, 
would trigger pressure for common policies also in the social area. These measures 
have this far not been so significant that they can be described as creation a com-
mon EU social policy. On the other hand, negative integration has had large impact 
on national social law, “irritating” finely adjusted and comprehensive social regula-
tion of the member states.29 This legal pressure has been most noticeable in the ECJ 
judgments delivered in the area of free movement, although it is obvious that regu-
lation 1408/71 has had much more far reaching consequences than what is ex-
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pressed in the regulation itself.30 The free use of legal argumentation based on non-
discrimination and hindrance to free movement together with the solidarity princi-
ple has led some (Nordic) lawyers to talk about an EC jack-in-the-box effect, mak-
ing it very hard to predict the possible impact of EC law on national law.31  
As mentioned, there were some changes in the Amsterdam Treaty which made 
it clear that social security falls within the framework of the Treaty and there is 
now in art 137 a hard legal basis for the adoption of EU social security law. This 
Treaty change came together with the introduction of the chapter on employment, 
art 125-130, forming Treaty legal basis for the adoption of the “soft” common em-
ployment policy. The turn from scarce instrumental regulation to broader soft gov-
ernance has been characterized as a shift from deepening to widening of EU social 
policy, and it has been pointed out that seen together this also implies a much 
stronger role for the Council vis à vis the Commission and the ECJ in the area of 
social policy.32 The Council thus adopted the EES in 1997 using the open method 
of co-ordination, this was followed by the Social Inclusion Strategy in 2000 and 
Pensions Strategy in 2001.  
The construction of the legal instruments forming the basis of these strategies, 
can be compared to that used in the earlier recommendations 92/441 and 92/442.33 
These recommendations are based on laying down common objectives which are 
measured by reporting social achievement in relation to structural indicators. The 
common objectives are executed through the adoption of national action plans, 
these are scrutinized by the Council and Commission and on the basis of this proc-
ess a common employment report is presented. Finally, country specific recom-
mendations are elaborated by the commission. However, the legal rules adopted are 
not intended to be legally binding and no economic sanctions are connected. Nor-
mal Treaty procedures for non-compliance can thus hardly be used.  
It is important to see the introduction of the EES in 1997 together with the in-
tentions of the negotiations before Maastricht, where the Member States decided to 
take the important integrative step of the Economic and Monetary Union. The 
EMU is such a comprehensive project that hardly any other national policy area can 
avoid being affected. It was apparent that the EMU would and will have effects of 
negative integration.34 
In the Commission report on social security in 1999,35 the demands for consoli-
dation of financial policy in the Growth and Stability pact is pointed out as a factor 
which has had a negative impact on the abilities of national governance of eco-
nomic development together with demographic development, increasing female la-
bour market participation, long-term unemployment, globalisation and technologi-
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cal development. The Commission notes that this will make Member States turn 
focus to social security as representing a large part of public expenditure. The need 
for active policy measures and lower non-wage labour costs was seen as essential 
factors for providing increased labour market participation.36 The EES has come to 
rest upon these two concepts, active labour market measures and the justification of 
certain deregulatory measures.37 But already in 1992 the Commission started to 
show interest in the financing of social security and made normative recommenda-
tions with reference to the EMU. The White Paper on growth, competitiveness and 
employment from 1993 presented the mentioned three policy areas as bound up to-
gether.  
A more concrete example is that the Commission recommended that wage costs 
should be cut by 1-2 % within the EU.38 This question was later discussed at the 
European Council in Essen in 1994 and was made a main question for the combat 
of unemployment. The question of lower non-wage labour costs as a method for in-
creasing employment was then together with an emphasis on active labour market 
policies made central parts of the employment strategy,39 and together serving the 
higher purpose of the Lisbon strategy ‘to make the European union the most com-
petitive knowledge society in the world’.  
Although much of the positive measures that are possible to take on an EU-level 
are soft law, it is apparent that this soft law has developed into less soft structures. 
From notes by the Commission in reports in the early 1990s, to an organised gov-
ernance structure with a firm legal basis in art 128 where both Council and Com-
mission are dominant actors. Additionally, the EC-treaty in art 137 expresses that 
questions on most aspects of working life are questions where the EU has (a lim-
ited) competence to legislate or at least use the OMC-method.40 Seen together with 
the EMU the OMC can be seen as a complement to the traditional EU-method of 
hard law.41 But seen in relation to the diversity of national welfare states, e.g. the 
differences found in the construction of legal instruments (benefit levels, personal 
scope etc.), level of economic development and normative aspirations and institu-
tional structures, there are minimal chances to be successful in harmonisation of 
European social policies. Pochet, when comparing the possible effects of the EES 
and social inclusion OMC, states that they too are different in character and very 
limited as to defining the contents or substance of national policies. The EES seems 
to be more focused towards centralisation but without further debate about the con-
tents (top-down). The social inclusion OMC uses more of an experimental dynamic 
with the involvement of local and regional actors (bottom-up). 42 
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The OMC can thus only reach very limited efficiency and leaves the question of 
asymmetry between market integration and social protection (market-correction) 
unsolved.43 The OMC has also been described as a legitimising discourse for action 
in politically sensitive areas, i.e. welfare and labour market, where use of the ‘clas-
sic’ Community method is not possible.44  
Although the EES OMC has connections to traditional EU-lawmaking it is a 
“neo-voluntary”45 legal method which can be characterized as intergovernmental 
rather than a supranational procedure. There are supranational features in the sense 
that the Commission holds a central position and that the guidelines are decided 
upon with qualified majority voting in the Council. However, the member states 
have the last saying as it is up to them whether they want to follow the guidelines 
or not. This of course effectively limits the possible achievements of the open 
method of coordination. At the same time national policy choices are defined as 
matters of common concern and governments are willing to present their plans for 
joint discussion. Although the system is without sanction the joint discussions on 
national choice with the goal to set common indicators of achievement and objec-
tives mean that the system is exposed to peer-review. This also strengthens the in-
tergovernmental character of the legal procedure.46 However, one should also note 
that the OMC development is joined with a, however modest, development of the 
“hard” Community competences in the field of social law. Substantially, the OMC 
cannot be considered to contribute to the development of a common social policy 
with a direct impact on national social law. But as a procedure it is new and com-
plementary, and receives a position in law-making on the national level.47  
The normative basis of the EES – a “work-line” approach 
What is then the normative message in the European Employment Strategy and 
what kind of impact can it be expected to have on the legal strategies for ‘return-to-
work policies’ in the Member States? 
A fundamental idea with the EES is that it is necessary to take action in several 
policy areas to be successful in activation, the goal to reach “full” employment. Co-
ordination between policy areas is thus needed. Originally the EES was designed to 
assist the member states in efforts to reach higher levels of employment in ways 
that promote competitiveness and economic growth. In order to reach these goals 
the member states are guided by the policy guidelines and legal norms on employ-
ment issues.  
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In art 125 of the Treaty it is expressed that the Member States should “work to-
wards developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for pro-
moting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to 
economic change with a view to achieving the objectives defined in Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union and in Article 2 of this Treaty.” However, in art 126 it is 
stressed that the employment policies should be developed in a way consistent with 
the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the 
Community adopted pursuant to Article 99(2). Full employment should contribute 
to competitiveness and economic growth but “without abandoning the values of 
solidarity, social justice and social right upon which the Union is built.”48 This 
means that the EES should be seen in relation to the broader social and economic 
agenda of the EU, thus it implies that a balance should be sought between eco-
nomic, employment and social policies.  
The Barcelona European Council in March 2002 identified "Active policies to-
wards full employment: more and better jobs" amongst the three areas requiring 
specific attention. It underlined that full employment in the EU is at the core of the 
Lisbon strategy and constitutes the essential goal of both economic and social poli-
cies. In the launch of the “new start” for the Lisbon process it was made further 
clear that the fight against social exclusion means stimulating employment. Flexi-
bility, work incentives in tax and benefit systems, vocational training for the young 
and active ageing combined with active labour market policies are the key fea-
tures.49 
Already in 1997 the EES received some criticism. Spicker (1997) means that 
the fight against social exclusion and (re)employment is quite different from the 
concept of a European Union solidarity, where the latter has been said to be the ba-
sis of the Commission´s white paper on social policy from 1994. The concept of 
poverty has been taken out of the discussion and been replaced by social exclusion. 
(Re)employment is seen as the solution to the problems of social exclusion rather 
than discussing citizenship and solidarity as basic concepts on which welfare are 
built.50 Hervey (1998), also at an early stage of the EES, pointed out that “such an 
employment-centred position may reveal an underpinning of commodification of 
human beings, and may be insufficiently flexible to deal with the complex social 
and economic structures which make those in certain groups more vulnerable to so-
cial exclusion.”51 When following the development of the normative message of the 
EES there are no signs of change in the line of what was asked for by Spicker and 
Hervey. Klosse (2005) argues that one way of coming around the side-effects of 
dominance by economic and financial targets is by using a “solid rights-based ap-
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proach”, referring in particular to the right of equal treatment expressed in the 
Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.52  
A common feature of the critique seem to be that social values such as solidar-
ity, social justice and social rights are not expressed legally in a way that can 
counter-balance EU-hard law impact in the areas of market freedoms and the EMU, 
an imbalance between economic and social objectives that is also reflected in the 
EES.53  
Looking at the development of the EES within the Lisbon-process, it seems as if 
the EU has retreated from promoting social citizenship and moved towards a nar-
rower work-line oriented conceptualisation of social security.54 This would mean 
that there is an expressed common EU normative structure within the OMC gov-
ernance method, having an impact on national welfare policies. Suggestions are 
made for specific action to provide for better integration of young people, immi-
grants and women in the labour market, promoting people to work longer and func-
tional disorders by using active labour market policies. However, it must be 
stressed again that the commitments are free of clearly defined obligations for the 
Member States.  
In non-discrimination law we see another kind of development. On the basis of 
Art 13 TEC55, the EU Council of Ministers agreed on a Directive about equal 
treatment in employment and occupation in November 2000.56 The Directive states 
that both direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability is prohibited 
within the EU and was to be implemented by Member States at the end of 2006. 
However, this is an outcome of the emphasis on individual rights derived from the 
free movement and non-discrimination articles of the Treaty and it is questionable 
whether there is “solidarity” embedded in these Treaty articles.57 
In 2002, the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret) presented 
a first evalutation of the impact of the EES on Swedish policy and politics. The re-
sult was striking as the general opinion among public servants in the Ministry and 
representatives from the labour market parties was that there was no such impact. 
Although they concluded that the basic ideas correspond well with Swedish em-
ployment policy there was no trace of a real impact or that this correspondence 
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sponding to other values than purely economical in the Treaty is the adoption of directive 2004/38/EC, OJ L 158, 
30.4.2004, p. 77; 1st corrigendum OJ L 228, 29.6.2004, p. 35; 2nd corrigendum (only for the English version) in 
OJ L197, 28.7.2005, p. 34. Verschueren (2006) means that the adoption of the latter directive together with the 
ECJ judgments in cases as, Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] 
ECR I-6193, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, Case C-224/98 D’Hoop ECR [2002] ECR I-6191, Case 
C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-270, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, “illustrate the switch in EC law 
from market-based citizenship to social citizenship.” 
57 Compare Paul Schoukens (2007). 




would be a result of the EES.58 The situation seem to be similar at the European 
level. The law professors Pieters and Schoukens have shown scepticism towards 
what can be achieved through using the OMC in the welfare area. When it comes to 
real effects their interviews with social security chief executive officers in Europe 
showed that there was no or very little impact of the OMC on national policy. 59 
In recent Swedish reports and travaux preparatoires, it seems evident that the 
EES-guidelines have the same normative message as is provided in Swedish em-
ployment and social policy.60 However, the same travaux preparatoires do not con-
tain any direct references to the EES or other OMC methods. Still, in order to cre-
ate what is called sustainable welfare systems a central feature for the Swedish 
government has been/is e.g. to increase the employability of people who have been 
sick for a long time.61 This “work-line” approach, which also has been expressed in 
the strategies for employment and social inclusion, has a long tradition in Swedish 
labour market policy and is also clearly expressed in the social security system. To 
this respect, full employment by using active labour market strategies is a well-
known Swedish policy goal.62  
However, when exploring the impact of the EES and OMC more closely, there 
seem to be very little (if any) evidence of real legal impact on national legal re-
forms, even if the policy formation and debate is carried out in an institutionalised 
European context. 
Final remarks 
The EU has launched the Lisbon process in the context of globalisation. The chal-
lenge for Europe is to become more flexible in order to use the opportunities that 
globalisation brings and hence to overcome the threats by strengthening competi-
tiveness on the global markets. Reform of the labour market and social policies is a 
key feature of these reforms. Historically there has been little real achievements in 
the field of European labour market and social law, at least on the European level. 
Since the 1990s several attempts have been introduced to strengthen EU compe-
tences in these fields. The EC-treaty now contains limited possibilities of introduc-
ing traditional hard law, measures also in the area of social security, discrimination 
law has been strengthened in order to promote participation on the labour market 
both by persons with functional disorders and among the ageing population. These 
traditional methods are accompanied by the introduction of new modes of govern-
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59 See Pieters and Schoukens, , www.eiss.be/whatsnew.php  
60 For sickness insurance reforms see regeringens proposition 2007/08:136 En reformerad sjukskrivningsprocess 
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ance communicating a common normative message of full employment and the 
promotion of active labour market policies. Indeed, all these aspects of using dif-
ferent legal methods of European integration provides evidence of that there is 
really something happening in the evolution of Social law on a European level.  
However, there are still four distinct welfare regimes present in Europe and 
even if the EES and OMC are attempts of redefining the social dimension in the EU 
towards a common agenda, the enlargements of the 21st century rather seem to 
have created more diversity in European welfare models. The Swedish, or perhaps 
Nordic model has always promoted both equity and efficiency. High benefit levels 
and a broad personal scope is combined with active labour-market policies and an 
emphasis on the “work-line”. This is however not a result of European integration. 
Additionally, when analysing the presented input of ideas in recent Swedish legal 
reforms a “European model”-impact is not to be found.  
But there is something going on in Europe, where it will lead is however a ques-
tion for the future. Today, we might only be able to conclude that the EES and the 
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The European Employment Strategy 
Stamatia Devetzi 
Since the 1990s’ a new mode of governance differing from the classical community 
method has been at the centre of political developments at EU level. This new mode of 
governance is called “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC). The OMC has (for-
mally) been introduced by the Lisbon European Council of March 2000. It rests on 
soft law mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and the sharing 
of best practice. Meanwhile the OMC has been spreading fast to a large range of pol-
icy sectors such as social inclusion, educational policy, pension reform but also issues 
related to the knowledge economy. Before being baptised as “OMC”, this mode of 
governance had already been introduced in the sector of European Employment policy 
– under the name of European Employment Strategy (EES). The EES could therefore 
be considered as the “mother” of the OMC.1 
The following chapter discusses the EES under two aspects. First, it gives an over-
view of its historical development (A). Secondly, it summarizes briefly the current sci-
entific discussion on its merits and problems (B). 
It is not the aim to review all the blossoming academic literature on the EES2 nor 
to analyse in depth the discussion on “soft vs. hard law” or the notions of “govern-
ance” and “Europeanization”. Nevertheless, it is important to discuss some of the sci-
entific findings in order to be able to answer an overarching question linked to the im-
plementation of the EES: Can we consider the EES to have a normative structure and 
has the EES had an impact on national normative structures? In order to discuss these 
questions on the comparative basis of the national reports, it is useful to have an over-
view of the current scientific analysis on the character of the EES itself. 
The EES from a historical perspective 
The developing of the EES under the shadow of the Economic and Monetary 
Union 
The EES should be analysed within the history of European Economic integration, 
which accelerated in the 1990s with the advent of Economic and Monetary Union 
                                           
1 Smismans, EU Employment Policy: Decentralisation or Centralisation through the Open Method of Coordina-
tion?, EUI Working Paper Law Nr. 2004/1, p. 2. 
2 For that, see for example de la Porte/Pochet, The European Employment Strategy: existing research and remain-
ing questions, Journal of European Social Policy 2004, p. 71-78. 




(EMU).3 Indeed, the completion of the internal market and especially the monetary 
union had considerably reduced the member states’ political margin of manoeuvre. 
For example, in employment, traditional policy tools, such as competitive devalua-
tion, adjustments of national interest rates, public deficit policies, state aid, or wide-
spread hiring in the public sector were mostly invalidated.4 The Delors White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment that was published in 1993 gave birth 
to the very idea of a European employment strategy5 by making explicit reference 
to ensuring that jobs and other social objectives were not ignored. The paper was a 
reflection on the need to revitalise the European project and to counter scepticism 
towards Europe’s monetary integration project.6 The White Paper’s ambition was to 
meet the convergence criteria for the EMU, the implications of which were defla-
tionary, and yet to achieve higher levels of employment in Europe. To meet such a 
challenge, one of the means was to broaden the debate beyond negative flexibility 
to more active labour market policies. The objective was also to integrate employ-
ment policy with other policy issues (fiscal, social protection, environment, equal-
ity of opportunities for men and women, new family patterns, demographic 
changes). 
From the 1993 White Paper a path can be traced to the Essen European Council 
meeting of December 2004. At this meeting the Member States set themselves five 
objectives with respect to employment promotion, making special mention of peo-
ple on the margins of workforce. The five objectives were: a) to invest in voca-
tional training; b) to increase the intensity of employment growth, particularly 
through a more flexible organisation of work and working time and wage restraint; 
c) to reduce non-wage labour costs; d) to develop active labour market policies 
through the reform of employment services, encouraging labour mobility and de-
veloping incentives for the unemployed to return to work; e) to fight youth and 
long-term unemployment. The whole was underpinned by a multilateral monitoring 
procedure. This procedure can be considered as a precursor of the EES. 
The White Paper and the Essen Summit were important catalysts for raising the 
issue of employment on the European Agenda.7 The subsequent European Council 
meetings, notably those of Madrid in December 1995 and Dublin in December 
1996, contributed to the development of the process. The former identified job 
creation as a central objective of the EU. The latter underlined the need to pursue a 
                                           
3 Goetschy, The EES, Multi-Governance and Policy Coordination: Past, Present and Future, in: Zeitlin/Trubek, 
Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy, Oxford 2003, pp. 59-87, p. 60. 
4 Casey, Building social partnership? Strengths and Shortcomings of the European Employment Strategy, Trans-
fer 1/05, pp. 45-63, p. 48; Goetschy, The open method of coordination and the Lisbon strategy: the difficult road 
from potential to results, Transfer 1/05, p. 64-80, p. 66. 
5 Goetschy, The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development, European Journal of Industrial Re-
lations 1999, p. 117-137. 
6 The rise of euro-scepticism after Maastricht reflected widespread belief that economic integration was one cause 
of growing unemployment, and there were also increasing criticisms of the “demographic deficit” at the heart of 
the European Construction; Goetschy, European Journal of Industrial Relations 1999, p. 120. 
7 Pochet, The OMC and the Construction of Social Europe – A Historical Perspective, in: Zeitlin/Pochet, The 
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macroeconomic policy favourable to growth and employment. Based on the Com-
mission’s proposal, the Irish Presidency at the end of 1996 made a first draft of 
what was to become the Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The gestation of the European Employment Strategy was encouraged by the ac-
cession of countries in which explicit or implicit form of social partnership and full 
employment pretensions predominated (Sweden, Finland and Austria) and the ac-
cession to power of center-left governments in existing Member States (France, It-
aly and the UK). Moreover, the director-generalship of Employment and Social Af-
fairs at the Commission had passed to the hands of an official (Allan Larsson) from 
Sweden – a country that had a reputation for utilising “active labour market policy” 
to maintain high levels of employment. Larsson’s argument was that economic, 
monetary and employment policies were to be intricately linked with each other to 
meet mutually supportive goals. 
The EES itself was part of a global deal including the adoption of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The new French Socialist government, led by Lionel Jospin, 
agreed to the Pact in exchange for adding a new Employment Title to the proposed 
Treaty.8 For most of the Member States and in particular Germany, the Pact was 
intended to be a key instrument for fiscal management after the selection of the 
members of the Eurozone. The Council agreed to the French proposal. At that time, 
little attention was paid to the softer side of economic policy coordination, which 
was set out as a complement to fiscal policy co-ordination. The “soft” coordination 
of economic policies was conceived to monitor the consistency of national eco-
nomic policies with the economic objectives of the EU. In case of a deviation from 
the so-called “Broad Economic Policy Guidelines” (BEPGs), the Council could 
adopt a non-binding recommendation directed to the Member State concerned; 
there is no other formal sanction. A guidelines procedure, based on the idea of shar-
ing of experience and reform experimentation – inspired by the idea of benchmark-
ing often used in industry – allowed working towards common goals at European 
level without encroaching on national sovereignty.9 The sanctions for non-
compliance with the BEPGs take “only” the form of peer pressure and public opin-
ion. 
During the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, agreement was eventually reached in 
the form that the employment strategy should take: the multilateral process associ-
ated with the coordination of economic strategy – the guidelines procedure – would 
be adapted to employment policy. An Employment Title was integrated into the 
Treaty. Although the Treaty was ratified by all Member states only in 1999, the 
Employment Title became already fully operational in 1997: A special “jobs sum-
mit” of EU heads of state and government was organised in Luxembourg in No-
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vember 1997; as a result of this summit, the European Employment Strategy was 
launched.10 
The creation of such guidelines procedure was (thus) a compromise between 
two positions: on the one hand, the conviction that European Intervention based on 
the Community method and a real common European employment policy would be 
too intrusive into the member states’ competencies; and on the other hand, the 
awareness that high and rising unemployment represented a major social and eco-
nomic challenge for Europe.11 
The Employment Title in the revised Treaty stipulated that employment was a 
matter of “common concern” to the member states. It laid the basis for an EU role 
in coordinating member states labour market policies – with the BEPGs-procedure 
being a “role model”, as mentioned above. This method subsequently received the 
title “open method of coordination” at the Lisbon summit in 2000. 
The EES Process as designed by the Amsterdam Treaty is the following: Each 
year, following the Commission`s proposal, the Council adopts common European 
Employment Guidelines by a qualified majority vote. Afterwards they have to be 
translated into national employment policies on which each Member State reports 
to the Commission and the Council in their yearly “National Action Plans” (NAPs). 
These are analysed by the Commission, who makes recommendations to the Mem-
ber states. Since 2000 the national recommendations have been integrated in a so-
called “employment package”, along with proposals for new guidelines for the fol-
lowing year. The Employment Guidelines (EGs) are then endorsed by the European 
Council and formally adopted by the Council (of labour ministers). Thus the cycle 
recommences. 
Though the recommendations to individual states, which are deemed not to 
have followed the guidelines, have no binding effect, they could however be politi-
cally powerful. 
The EES from 1997 to 2002 
Between the Luxembourg summit of 1997 and 2002, the annual Employment 
Guidelines were organised under four pillars: 
a) improving employability: aimed at improving the access of the unem-
ployed to the labour market, it focused on the development of a “preventive 
approach” to avoid long-term unemployment as well as on the implementa-
tion of “activation policies”; 
b) developing entrepreneurship: making it easier to start and run a new 
business and to hire people in it by reducing administrative constraints and 
rendering taxation more employment-friendly; 
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c) encouraging adaptability both for employees and businesses: this en-
tailed modernisation of work organisation; 
d) strengthening equal opportunity policies; this involved a gender main-
streaming approach for all four pillars, reducing the gender gap, reconciling 
work and family life, and facilitating re-integration into the labour market. 
About 20 EU guidelines were formulated each year by the Commission under the 
four pillars described above. In practice, the changes made to the Employment 
Guidelines until 2003 were fairly minor. In 2001, six “horizontal objectives” (i.e. 
cross-cutting the four pillars) were added:12 increase the employment rate; improve 
the quality of employment; define a global strategy for life-long learning; involve 
the social partners in all stages of the process; develop relevant social indicators; 
find a balanced approach to the four pillars. Especially the first “horizontal objec-
tive”, to increase the employment rate (rather than simply cutting registered unem-
ployment), became the centre and the main goal of the EES. 
Along with the guidelines, the EES also includes a series of indicators.13 The 
so-called “key indicators” measure progress in relation to the objectives of the 
guidelines. For example, there are indicators that measure the total employment 
rate, the employment rate for people aged 55-64, the share of young adults still un-
employed after six months, the tax rate on low-wage earners, and several dimen-
sions of the gender gap in employment. The resulting tables are made available an-
nually and show the relative position of all Member states on these dimensions. 
In the frame of the EES-development, the Lisbon European Council of 2000 can be 
considered as its climax. The EU launched the “Lisbon process” and a new strategic 
goal – “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater so-
cial cohesion”.14 This process gave the EES a new impetus by creating a ten-year plan 
to reach. Quantified objectives with target dates were agreed for the Union as a whole – 
to increase the European employment rate to 70% by 2010, the female employment rate 
to 60% and the employment rate among older workers (55-64) to 50%. 
The EES from 2002 until today 
Ten years after the Maastricht Treaty and five years after the beginning of the Employ-
ment Strategy much had changed in the European process. Despite the fact that the 
1999-2000 transition to the single currency was a success, the central question at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, regarding which economic and social model in the context of a 
centralised monetary regime is the best, remained unanswered.15 The objectives of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (especially the one not to exceed the ceiling of 3% for the 
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budget deficit) initially were considered to be consensual and accepted by all key actors 
– i.e. the central bankers and the Ministers of Economics and Finance. But after the de-
bate about whether or not to send an early warning to Germany and Portugal (whose 
public deficits were approaching the 3% deficit ceiling), the Pact itself became a much 
more disputed theme, leading the former President of the Commission Romano Prodi to 
call it “stupid”. Recently, proposals from the Commission were put under discussion at 
the Ecofin Council to modify the Stability and Growth Pact and make it more flexible. 
If the Stability and Growth Pact is under revision, the softer side of economic coor-
dination – the BEPGs – has proved to be inefficient in its principal goal of coordinating 
economic (and social) reforms. The real effectiveness of the economic policy coordina-
tion tools has been questioned; a study carried out for the European Parliament showed 
a lack of awareness of the BEPGs nationally and therefore a lack of integration into na-
tional policy processes.16 The (non) compliance by the Member States with the BEPGs 
recommendations seemed to be similar to their response to the European employment 
guidelines. 
In the first half of 2002 Commission and Member States jointly carried out a com-
prehensive evaluation of the EES’ merits and shortcomings. Initially, the evaluation 
process was rather secretive. The national researches regarding the advantages and the 
limits of the method followed no common methodology. On the other hand, it was the 
first time that the Member states evaluated their employment policies at the same time. 
Under the pressure of the Commission’s discourse on openness, all Member states de-
cided to publish the results of the national evaluations on the web. The Commission’s 
synthesis of the results of the evaluation and the policy conclusions it drew from this ex-
ercise were published in two Commission Communications.17 In the first Communica-
tion, the EES was judged a success in terms of both labour market outcomes (reference 
is made to 10 million jobs being created in Europe between 1997 and 2002) and policy-
making: “there have been significant changes in national employment policies with a 
clear convergence towards the common EU objectives set out in the EES policy guide-
lines”. Challenges remained, however, in demographic trends, regional differences, re-
structuring, globalisation and enlargement. In addition, it was noted, though fleetingly, 
that EU unemployment and the number of long-term unemployed remained high.18 
The policy conclusions drawn by the Commission in its second Communication 
were that the EES needed to be focused more clearly on implementation rather than 
procedure. Steps had to be taken to raise awareness of the EES and to improve its visi-
bility and impact. Also, coherence between the various policy processes, and especially 
the BEPGs, needed to be improved. During the Barcelona Council in March 2002 it had 
been decided that the BEPGs and the EEGs should be synchronised in terms of yearly 
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scheduling, rather than having the EES take place in the autumn and the BEPGs in the 
spring. Following this decision the Communication designed a new policy cycle which 
would be built on two blocks: a) the “Guidelines Package” (every April), composed of 
the BEPGs, the Employment Guidelines and the employment recommendations and b) 
the “implementation package” (every January), which included the BEPGs implementa-
tion report, the draft Joint Employment Report and the implementation report on the In-
ternal Market Strategy. This was called the “streamlined Policy Coordination Cycle”. 
An important change was that both BEPGs and EES focus on implementation in a 
longer cycle of three years.19 
Following the 2002 evaluation, the Commission adopted a Communication on the 
future of the EES in January 2003.20 The four-pillar structure (employability, adaptabil-
ity, entrepreneurship and gender equality) which had underpinned the guidelines since 
1997 was replaced by three overarching objectives: 
- full employment 
- quality and productivity at work 
- social cohesion and an inclusive labour market. 
From that point on, all of the Employment Guidelines in the following years were – 
more or less – based on these three objectives. 
Yet, in 2003, a lot of the employment targets the EU had set in the previous 
years turned out to be unmet. For that reason – and also in order to identify specific 
measures geared to helping the Member States implement the revised EES – a 
Taskforce was established in March 2003. The Taskforce was headed by ex Prime 
Minister Wim Kok of the Netherlands. The first report was issued in November 
2003 and had the title “Jobs, jobs, jobs: creating more employment in Europe”. The 
main ingredients of the Taskforce’s recipe were the following: a) increasing 
adaptability of workers and enterprises; b) attracting more people to the labour mar-
ket; c) investing more and more effectively in human capital; and d) ensuring effec-
tive implementations of reforms through better governance. The notions of adaptabil-
ity and flexibility are stressed in the report; particular attention is drawn to the “best 
practices” in Denmark and the Netherlands for creating a balance between flexibility 
and security. The report also stresses the importance of lifelong learning and of “ac-
tive ageing”. 
The Commission welcomed this report and used most of its messages for clearer 
Recommendations in the year 2004.21 In this year, the Member States presented their 
first triennial NAPs and the streamlining process was tested. Also in 2004, another 
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important change took place: The ten new Member States of the EU prepared their 
first NAPs for employment along with the 15 other Member States. 
After the first report, the Taskforce was asked to present a second report on the 
Lisbon strategy as a whole. It was published in November 2004 under the title “Fac-
ing the challenge”. It should not be swept under the carpet that the reason to establish 
the task force in the first place was the underperformance of national policies in re-
spect to the Lisbon targets. Concerning policy priorities, the report highlights im-
proved economic growth, increased employment and productivity. Other priorities, 
which concern especially the labour market, include (again) strategies for investment 
in human capital formation, lifelong learning, active ageing as well as improving the 
adaptability of workers and enterprises. 
Inspired by the second Taskforce report, in February 2005 the Commission made a 
proposal for a revamp of the Lisbon strategy. This proposal was based on a very critical 
evaluation of the first five years.22 It was stated that without further action, the 2010 tar-
get of a 70% overall employment rate would not be achieved. Labour productivity 
growth has continued to slow down and quality of work and inclusive labour markets 
remain important challenges in many Member States. The Commission observes very 
critically that the poor progress made was “not just a question of difficult economic 
conditions since Lisbon was launched, it also results from a policy agenda which has 
become overloaded, failing co-ordination and sometimes conflicting priorities”. From 
now on, focus should be put on delivering stronger, lasting growth and more and better 
jobs. 
The Lisbon strategy revamp has led to a complete revision of the EES.23 Its guide-
lines will from now on be presented in conjunction with the macroeconomic and micro-
economic guidelines and for a period of three years.24 This new EES covers a three year 
period, from 2005 to 2008. In this frame, the former NAPs are now called “National Re-
form Programmes” (NRPs). 
The Employment Guidelines – as part of the integrated package of EGs and 
BEPGs – are as follows (for the period 2005-2008):25 
- Guideline No 17: Implement employment policies aimed at achieving full 
employment, improving quality and productivity at work and strengthening so-
cial and territorial cohesion, 
- Guideline No 18: Promote a lifecycle approach to work, 
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- Guideline No 19: Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractive-
ness, and make work pay for job-seekers, including disadvantaged people, and 
the inactive, 
- Guideline No 20: Improve matching of labour market needs, 
- Guideline No 21: Promote flexibility combined with employment security and 
reduce labour market segmentation,  
- Guideline No 22: Ensure employment-friendly labour costs developments and 
wage-setting mechanisms, 
- Guideline No 23: Expand and improve investment in human capital, 
- Guideline No 24: Adapt education and training systems in response to new 
competence requirements. 
Some authors see the new phase after 2005 as the beginning of “realistic co-
operation” between Member States and the EU.26 As the limits of the EES had be-
come obvious (the implementation, especially of the employment goals, was far 
behind the targets), the Commission now seems to accept the “national ownership” 
of the OMC process. This implies that the performances of the Member States will 
not be ranked even if the Taskforce had demanded such a ranking as a prerequisite 
for “naming, shaming and faming”. 
Throughout the next cycle of the Employment Guidelines (2008-2010) the EES 
will focus especially on “flexicurity”, which strikes a balance between flexibility 
and security on the labour market.27 Member States will be invited to use their Na-
tional Reform Programmes to report explicitly on their flexicurity strategies and the 
Commission will report on the progress made at the end of the Lisbon Cycle.28 
The discussion on the EES 
The scientific discussion on the EES is part of the overall discussion on the OMC 
as a new mode of governance in the European Union.29 Literature on the OMC in 
general – and the EES in specific –wavers between excessive enthusiasm and 
doubts.30 There are many different aspects that have been discussed, like issues of 
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democracy in general (in the sense of participation, transparency and openness)31, 
the participation of the social partners in the EES32 or the OMC as a new form of 
governance.33 For the purposes of our comparative project, it should be useful to 
focus on the discussion on the aspects of “soft versus hard law” and on the impact 
the EES might have on the Member States’ policies: if we want to find out more 
about the normative character of the EES, then we should ask under what premises 
it can influence national normative structures. 
The discussion on “soft” and “hard” law 
Much of the controversy on the EES/OMC concerns the respective merits of “hard” 
and “soft” law in the construction of Social Europe.34 A shift from “integration by 
law” to “Europeanization by figures” via benchmarking seems to have taken 
place.35 Both those who favour the OMC as a mode of governance and those who 
question its desirability compare the OMC, implicitly or explicitly, with the Com-
munity Method. The Community Method is thought of as “hard law” because it 
creates uniform rules that Member States must adopt, provides sanctions if they fail 
to do so, and allows challenges for non-compliance to be brought in court. In con-
trast, the OMC, which has general and open-ended guidelines rather than rules, 
provides no formal sanctions for Member States that do not follow the guidelines, 
and is thought of as “soft law”. Proponents of the OMC argue that it can be effec-
tive despite – or rather because of – its open-ended, non-binding, non-justiciable 
qualities. Opponents question that conclusion. They not only argue that the OMC 
cannot do what is needed to construct Social Europe but also that “hard law” is es-
sential. They also fear that the OMC might become the dominant method of regula-
                                           
31 Cohen/Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in: Zeitlin/Trubek (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare 
in a New Economy: European and American Experiments, Oxford 2003, pp. 345-375; Borrás/Jacobsson, The 
open method of co-ordination and new governance patterns in the EU, Journal of European Public Policy (11) 
2004, pp. 185-208. 
32 Casey, Building social partnership? Strengths and shortcomings of the European Employment Strategy, Trans-
fer 1/2005, pp. 45-63; Watt, Reform of the EES after five years: A change of course or merely of presentation, 
European Journal of industrial relations 2004, pp. 117-137. 
33 See Borrás/Jacobsson, The open method of co-ordination and new governance patterns in the EU, Journal of 
European Public Policy 11:2 2004, pp. 185-208; de la Porte/Nanz, The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of 
governance? The cases of employment and pensions, Journal of European Public Policy 11:2 2004, pp. 267-288; 
Mosher/Trubek, Alternative Approaches to Governance in the EU: EU Social Policy and the European Employ-
ment Strategy, JCMS 2003 Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 63-88; Eberlein/Kerwer, New Governance in the European Union: 
A Theoretical Perspective, JCMS 2004, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 121-142. 
34 Trubek, D./Trubek, L., Hard and Soft Law in Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of 
Coordination, European Law Journal 2005, Vol 11., No 3 pp. 343-364; Trubek/Trubek, The Open Method of Co-
ordination and the Debate over “Hard” and “Soft” Law, in: Zeitlin/Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of Co-
ordination in action – The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels, 2005, pp. 83-103. 
35 Bruno/Jacquot/Mandin, Europeanization through its instrumentation: benchmarking, mainstreaming and the 
open method of co-ordination … toolbox or Pandora’s box?, Journal of European Public Policy 13:4 2006, pp. 
519-536. 




tion on issues which are subject to little or no EU competence and, more seriously, 
on issues which are subject to hard law, thus demoting the Community Method.36 
Some authors37 point out that – in drawing the dichotomy between hard law and 
soft law – it is often forgotten that the EC has used a combination of these meas-
ures, not only in social law, but also in areas such as environmental law. They ar-
gue that hard and soft law should not necessarily exclude each other. Instead they 
underline the possible utility of hybrid solutions.38 Some others argue that, if in its 
ideal-typical format the OMC can deliver “better governance”, then it is not a sec-
ond-best option to hard legislation: it is a better way forward, because it fosters 
learning and provides flexibility to the policy process.39 
Regardless of what advantages or disadvantages soft law might have, a unanim-
ity on the character of the OMC (and the EES as a prominent example of it) as “soft 
law” surely exists. Consequently – and beyond the theoretical discussion on what is 
better for the European Integration – the next step is to ask what kind of impact soft 
law might really have in practice on the Member States’ policies and legislation. 
The discussion on the impact of EES on Member States’ policies 
Did the EES influence the employment policies of the Member States? And if yes 
to what extent? This is an important question in the current scientific debate on the 
EES. The key-words are the “European Social Model” and “policy learning”. 
A good deal of policy-makers and academics look at the OMC (and the EES as 
part of it ) as an instrument to build “Social Europe”. From a reform perspective, 
the EES can be seen as an additional instrument with which to enhance the social 
dimension to the European Union. Others, however, remain sceptical of its real 
added value to compensate the European Social Model for the liberal bias of EU 
integration.40 Again others question how one can speak of one “European social 
model” when evidence from employment policy points to a conflict upon models, 
to such an extend that the real politics of the EES is all about finding out which 
models are under pressure. This question becomes even more complex if one takes 
research into account which demonstrates that: (a) The EU “social model” is more 
a discourse sponsored by some political elites in some countries than reality; and 
(b) EU social policy has been so far more “American” in style than “European”, in 
the sense that the US style approaches (by way of the British government) have 
greatly influenced the social and employment policy (keywords: workfare and la-
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bour market flexibility).41 Also it has been argued that the EES is characterised by 
Third Way type ideas, including equity and activation.42 The guidelines on em-
ployment reflect the political options of New Labour;43 as such they are not neces-
sarily adapted to the macro-economic reality of other countries. Other authors dif-
ferentiate more. They conclude that the employment policy model behind the EES 
is a compromise between the liberal and the Nordic models: on the labour demand 
side the EES, with its attention for entrepreneurship and adaptability, is inspired by 
the liberal model emphasising labour market deregulation and tax reductions; 
whereas on the labour supply side the EES is inspired by the Nordic model focus-
ing on employability via training and active labour market policies.44 In any case, it 
can be affirmed that most of the pressure to converge towards the EU’s objectives 
under the EES – of which activation is an important component – is on countries 
with Continental and Southern European welfare state arrangements, with domi-
nance of “passive” policies.45 
When it comes to the notions of “policy learning” and “policy transfer”, almost 
all authors agree that an assessment is difficult to make. One reason is that, when 
measuring the national impact of the EES, it is not easy to disentangle the effects of 
EU structural reforms from national structural reforms which would have been car-
ried out anyway. Also, it is not easy to evaluate the respective merits of structural 
reforms and the macroeconomic situation when trying to explain, for example, the 
improving or worsening employment results.46 Some authors state that “there is (..) 
some evidence that (…) OMC processes have contributed to specific changes in in-
dividual Member States’ policies. Such evidence is most abundant for the EES”.47 
But on the other hand, they agree that “the possibilities for mutual learning on be-
half of the Member States seem to be rather limited; there are relative few examples 
of direct policy learning and cross-national policy transfer”.48 Critics of the “change 
has happened because of the EES”-position claim that “we only know that some 
change took place but there is no empirical data which proves that the change really 
happened as a result of the EES”.49 
It has also been stated that the OMC process has transformed from a discursive 
operation to learn from each others’ best practices and to implement change, to a 
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sort of “beauty contest” showing one’s successes but omitting one’s failures.50 Ex-
aminations of the peer review procedure – as one component of the EES – show 
that, whilst a learning process has been established, its impact has been limited. Al-
though the EES has established labour market targets, the evidence reveals that 
Member States will rely on home-grown means – administrative, institutional and 
legal – to meet them. The peer review procedure was, at best, a learning process for 
a limited community of labour market technicians and experts. There were no sig-
nificant efforts at emulation.51 
Empirical evidence for a subtle, but nevertheless quite effective influence of the 
EES on the employment strategies of Germany52 and France has also been pre-
sented. Yet learning does not mean a transfer of concepts. In the German case 
learning consisted more of a mutual “irritation” of European and national patterns 
of perception and behaviour; and the French case is characterised by a mostly sym-
bolic conformity to the European objectives..53 
Other researchers argue that the EES has been acting as a framer of employ-
ment policy in the Member States.54 By doing so, the supranational level has re-
strained several dimensions of employment policy and labour market policies in the 
Member States mainly by: (a) defining and (reinforcing) what problems domestic 
policy-makers should attack to increase member state competitiveness; (b) pointing 
out and/or reinforcing the idea that a policy line is good or bad; (c) restricting and 
limiting the policy options and courses of action that domestic policy-makers 
should develop and (d) providing courses of action that allow policy makers to 
“learn” about ways to solve the problem in question. Under the influence of the 
EES, member states have been experiencing a “Europeanisation of labour market 
problems and solutions”.55 
The impact of the EES from a comparative law perspective: an outlook 
Almost all of the above cited literature on the impact or influence of the EES/OMC 
on the Member States belongs to the field of political science or social policy. In 
fact, the concept of policy transfer or policy learning is well established in the po-
litical science literature. Lawyers have been slow to argue that the OMC is capable 
of offering a normative dimension to European integration processes or even to na-
tional structures. It has been seen as a pre-legal process or an alternative or as a 
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complementary political process.56 Yet the role of the EES should not be underes-
timated: the framing of a policy through Guidelines, Indicators and Benchmarking 
is (as discussed) not a soft or neutral process, but rather it shapes – and restricts – 
the framework within which national actors work. As a prominent Belgian politi-
cian put it: “The open method of coordination” is both a cognitive and a normative 
tool. (…) It is a normative tool because, necessarily, common objectives embody 
substantive views on social justice”.57 Member States are no longer free to deter-
mine national policy but must act within officially recognised Community Guide-
lines which have taken a normative status..58 
In a comparative welfare law approach, it will be certainly interesting to see to 
what extend the EES really has had an impact on national normative structures; or, 
in other words, to see to what extend “soft” law at the European level might prove 
to be “harder” at the national level. For that purpose, the comparative analysis of a 
specified aspect of the EES – such as the activation policies – certainly promises to 
be fruitful. Instead of asking in general what impact the EES might have on na-
tional employment policies or on reducing unemployment, it seems more rewarding 
to single out concrete laws, legal practices and questions in the Member States and 
compare them with each other. Even if we should come to the conclusion that the 
normative impact of the EES is not that significant in practice, the comparison itself 
may lead us to more “learning from each other”. It is exactly this goal that has been 
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From Unemployment to Active Jobseek-
ing: Changes and Continuities in Social 
Security Law in the United Kingdom 
Neville Harris 
Introduction 
The notion that worklessness is immoral was inherent in the English Poor Law’s 
tradition of setting the poor to work. While the causes of unemployment are no 
longer regarded as confined to or even primarily derived from personal moral fail-
ure – since structural factors to do with economic changes and the demand for la-
bour, particularly diversely skilled labour, are acknowledged to be the principal 
causes – the idea that being in employment is a personal responsibility retains a 
continuing influence over social security provision for the unemployed. Indeed, it is 
reflected in the growing individualisation of the relationship between the state and 
unemployed citizen, as part of the managerialistic governance of welfare that places 
an emphasis on strict controls with contractual underpinnings.  
This is certainly true of the principal benefit for those out of work in the UK to-
day, the jobseeker’s allowance (JSA). In essence JSA is a simple benefit, providing 
contribution-based entitlement during the first six months of unemployment and 
thereafter (or from the first day, if the insurance contribution record is inadequate) 
means-tested entitlement of unlimited duration. This benefit replaced unemploy-
ment benefit (UB) in 1996. Like UB and the benefits that preceded it, dating back 
to the National Insurance Act 1911, one of the principal conditions of entitlement is 
that of being “available for employment”. Since 1989 claimants have also had to be 
“actively seeking employment”, but there is a basic continuity in the principles of 
social security law relating to this area. However, over the past two decades the 
conditionality of this benefit has increased, in two main areas: first, in the require-
ments concerned with worksearch, some of which are now linked to specific gov-
ernment schemes for arranged work and training (under various “New Deal” pro-
grammes); and secondly, in the sanctions that must or may be applied to those who 
do not take up employment or participate in activation measures, which are under-
scored by the terms of an express agreement between jobseeker and government 
agency.  




These developments are part of a broader “welfare to work” strategy that the 
UK Government has been pursuing over the past 10 years and which is now tar-
geted not only at those claiming JSA but also those perceived to have a looser at-
tachment to the labour market due to sickness, disability or family responsibilities. 
It is linked to a wider employment policy which is based around the aim of achiev-
ing an 80% employment rate – in other words, that 80% of the population of work-
ing age should be in employment and that the 20% who are not should made up ex-
clusively of “those who have a good reason to be outside the labour market”, 
namely people who have retired early, have full-time caring responsibilities or who 
have a severe disability or illness that makes them incapable of work (HCWPC: 
paras 19 and 20). Since 1971, the social security system has also tried to incentivize 
the take-up of employment through the provision of means-tested in-work benefits 
or, since 1999, tax credits, so that the prospect of low wages does not deter people 
from moving from benefit to work.  
This chapter examines the continuities and changes in social security law that 
have shaped the current system of benefits for the unemployed. It explains how the 
underlying ideologies and perceived social and economic imperatives have im-
pacted upon the developing legal and policy framework. It highlights ways in 
which the policies that have been implemented, particularly in recent years, have 
interacted with long-standing principles within social security law, such as the no-
tion of ‘voluntary unemployment’.  
From Poor Relief to the ‘Labour Exchange’ and Unemploy-
ment Insurance 
Activation strategies have a long history in the UK. They can be traced back to the 
Elizabeth Poor Law, which adopted the principle of setting the poor to work as a 
condition for relief. As early as the Poor Relief Act 1576 there was a local duty to 
provide materials for the able-bodied poor to work (Fraser 1984, 32). The Poor 
Law Act of 1601 continued the principle of providing and requiring work for the 
able bodied within each parish, including children whose parents could not support 
them, while maintaining a harsh regime of accommodating the incapable poor in 
almshouses or “poor-houses” and sending those considered to be capable of work 
but unwilling to engage in it to “houses of correction”, a form of punishment. 
While it is not necessary to recount the history of the Poor Law, it is important to 
reflect on the underlying philosophy of self-support and the deterrence of idleness 
that underpinned it, since it has had a continuing influence on social security and is 
even reflected in many of the central provisions of the modern law. 
The Poor Law still offered the principal form of poverty relief for the unem-
ployed by the turn of the 20th Century, a time when unemployment was growing. 
In London, “distress committees” provided assistance to unemployed workers 
(Beveridge 1930). Bureaucratic control had been and remained a feature of the 




Poor Law administration, but by registering and classifying the unemployed and 
investigating their circumstances the distress committees of early 20th Century 
London were perhaps a precursor to the strict administrative controls of later years. 
The distress committees were established under the Unemployed Workmen Act of 
1905, a year which also marked the establishment of the Royal Commission on the 
Poor Law. When this Commission reported in 1909 there were Majority and Mi-
nority Reports. While they disagreed on the subject of how much state involvement 
in welfare provision was desirable or needed, the reports agreed on two fundamen-
tal mechanisms: the introduction of a national scheme of unemployment insurance 
and the establishment of labour exchanges, which were places where the unem-
ployed could register their interest in employment and might be found work. The 
exchanges in fact preceded the unemployment insurance scheme, although they be-
came inextricably linked. The Labour Exchanges Act 1909 gave the Board of 
Trade, a government ministry, a power to establish and maintain labour exchanges 
in locations where they were needed and empowered the making of regulations 
concerning the management of exchanges, which were later known as employment 
exchanges. The exchanges maintained separate registers for adult and juveniles. 
The numbers registering doubled once the unemployment insurance scheme which 
was introduced in 1912 under the National Insurance Act 1911 made registration 
for work at an exchange a necessary condition of entitlement for unemployment 
benefit (Gilbert 1966, 262). However, only unemployment from a limited number 
of prescribed trades was covered by the scheme (see below). 
Two particular features of the scheme of unemployment benefit under the 1911 
Act have come to represent continuities in this area of social security law. These 
elements were not only present in the unemployment insurance scheme, which was 
a contributory scheme, but were later to also become features of the principal social 
assistance scheme, known as unemployment assistance. The first of the features 
was a basic test as to whether or not continuing unemployment was preventable – a 
work-test condition. The second comprised a penalty for those whose unemploy-
ment was avoidable. Under the work test condition (in section 86(3) of the National 
Insurance Act 1911), the claimant could only secure entitlement to benefit if “capa-
ble of work but unable to obtain suitable employment”. The penalty comprised a 
period of disqualification for benefit of six weeks where the unemployment arose 
from “misconduct” or the claimant “voluntarily [left] his employment without just 
cause” (section 87).  
These features of unemployment insurance, its contributory basis and the fact 
that the scheme was limited to particular trades such as sawmilling and shipbuild-
ing where unemployment was cyclical and therefore largely short term, reflected 
the actuarial basis to the scheme. The work test and disqualification period helped 
to protect the collective insurance fund against unwarranted claims in the same way 
that avoidable losses (or losses capable of mitigation) would not be compensated 
(or fully compensated) under commercial insurance arrangements. The 1920s saw 
the gradual extension of the unemployment insurance scheme to cover more trades, 
provide benefit of longer duration and make provision for claimants’ dependants. In 




addition, new schemes such as “extended benefit” were introduced for those who 
had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit. Later, there was “transi-
tional benefit” for people who could not meet all the contribution conditions (Fraser 
1984, 187). Despite the increasing generosity of the unemployment insurance 
scheme, the conditions of entitlement remained tight and were intensified in re-
sponse to continuing concern to avoid abuse. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 embodied the notion of availability for 
work, which remains a condition of entitlement today. The above-mentioned work 
test condition became, under the 1920 Act (section 7(1)(iii)), one of being “capable 
of and available for work, but unable to obtain suitable employment” (emphasis 
added). However, the disqualification period in respect of voluntary employment 
ceased to be a fixed period of six weeks. Instead an element of officer discretion 
was introduced: it became “six weeks or such shorter period being not less than one 
week…” (section 8(2)). The work test condition was further tightened up just one 
year later when the proportionment of benefits to contributions – which it was as-
sumed would prevent abuse, as “the malingerer… could only cheat himself since 
unnecessary claims would reduce entitlement to benefit when it was really needed” 
(Fraser 1984, p 187) – was abandoned. Thus the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1921 provided that “No person shall be entitled to benefit… unless he proves that 
he is… genuinely seeking whole-time employment but unable to obtain such em-
ployment” (section 3(3)). Therefore mere availability for work was insufficient. 
The claimant now had to be “genuinely seeking” it and had the onus of proving that 
he or she was doing so. A further amendment, made by Unemployment Insurance 
(No 2) Act 1924 (section 3) confirmed two separate conditions related to this work 
test: first, the claimant had to be “capable of and available for work” and, secondly, 
had to be “genuinely seeking work but unable to obtain suitable employment”.  
Significant numbers of claims were refused as a consequence of the more oner-
ous conditions from 1921. According to Fraser (1984, 188), in the period from 
March 1921 to March 1930, three million claims were turned down for failure to 
meet the “genuinely seeking work” condition. There is an interesting contrast with 
the less strict work test condition that was attached to “extended benefit” (the bene-
fit for those who had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit) when 
entitlement to it was made of unlimited duration in 1924. The claimant was entitled 
to the extended benefit if, among other things, “he is making every reasonable ef-
fort to obtain employment suited to his capacities and is willing to accept such em-
ployment” (Unemployment Insurance (No 2) Act 1924, section 1(3)(d), emphasis 
added). Extended benefit was later replaced via the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1927 by a means-tested and discretionary benefit known as “transitional benefit”, 
noted above, which later became “transitional payment”. It was replaced in 1934 by 
“unemployment assistance” – the forerunner of successive means-tested assistance 
schemes: “(national) assistance” (1948-66), “supplementary benefit” (1966-87) and 
the two current schemes, “income support” (1987-) and “income-based jobseeker’s 
allowance” (1996-date). 




The “genuinely seeking work” condition of entitlement to unemployment bene-
fit was abolished under section 6 of the Unemployment Insurance Act 1930. It had 
been considered to be well nigh impossible to prove “genuineness” (Lundy 2000, 
302). Such a test was not to reappear until nearly 60 years later (below). The 1930 
Act also increased basic rates of benefit and has been viewed as the most generous 
of the unemployment insurance measures before economic slump and mass unem-
ployment forced the Government into cutting benefits and tightening conditions of 
entitlement, leading to some one million claimants being excluded from entitlement 
(Davison 1938, 8, 15; see Harris 2000, 81-82). Nonetheless, the 1930 Act intro-
duced some further work test conditions which are still with us today. Indeed, to-
day’s social security lawyers in the UK would instantly recognise the terminology 
employed in section 4 of the Act. This provided for disqualification from benefit 
“for a period of six weeks or for such shorter period and from such date as may be 
determined by a court of referees or the umpire” where the claimant: (i) had “with-
out good cause” refused or failed to apply for a vacancy notified to him by an em-
ployment exchange or other recognised agency; or (ii) had  
“without good cause refused or failed to carry out any written directions given to 
him by an officer of an employment exchange with a view to assisting him to find 
suitable employment (being directions which were reasonable having regard 
both to both the circumstances of the claimant and to the means of obtaining that 
employment usually adopted in the district…)”.  
These tighter conditions remained despite the extensions to provision that occurred 
as national economic conditions improved. 
The Poor Law idea of “setting the poor on work” was not adopted. But although 
there was no inter-war equivalent of the New Deal programmes introduced by the 
post-1997 Labour Government, there were industrial transference schemes under 
which unemployed workers were in effect compelled to move from areas of labour 
surplus into those where work was available (Harris 2000, 80-81). Under the Un-
employment Insurance Acts of 1920 and 1930, juveniles could be required to attend 
a course at an instruction centre or face disqualification from benefit. Subsequently, 
in exploring ways in which work incentives might be maintained, William 
Beveridge proposed not only the maintenance of a gap between basic benefits and 
wages, but also the discouragement of idleness through benefit sanctions, which 
were already a feature of the unemployment insurance scheme, and requirements to 
attend courses of training as a condition of receipt of benefit. The Beveridge Re-
port, which formed the blueprint for the UK’s welfare state which was developed 
after the second world war, argued that safeguards were needed in case “men… set-
tle down to” life on benefits; it proposed attendance at a work or training centre for 
six months (Beveridge 1942, para 131), although in the event this reform was not 
implemented because it was considered impracticable.  
However, both the work test that was attached to the basic conditions of enti-
tlement and the six weeks’ maximum disqualification continued on into the Na-
tional Insurance Act 1946 that embodied the social insurance reforms proposed in 




the Beveridge Report. As the insurance and assistance schemes evolved, these fea-
tures were present within both of them. There was a requirement on the claimant to 
register as available for work, a requirement that did not for example apply to 
women caring for a child or persons who were physically or mentally incapable of 
work. This is important, as the same basic work test conditions applied to all unem-
ployed claimants apart from those exempt from them. Insurance benefits declined 
in importance particularly by the 1960s and 1970s (Wikeley 1989) because they 
were not sufficiently up-rated and because unemployment became more long term 
and increasing numbers of young people who had no insurance contributions 
claimed benefit on leaving school. These factors led to an increasing demand for 
means-tested (and non-contributory) assistance, known by then as supplementary 
benefit, and a much reduced demand and qualification for insurance-based unem-
ployment benefit. 
So we can see that in the period from the National Insurance Act 1911 until the 
Unemployment Act 1934 the basic framework was established and that despite 
some changes, including the extension of the maximum disqualification period, its 
features represent an important continuity in social security law. However, although 
unemployment in the UK in January 2008 stood at exactly the same level as in 
1935, at 1.6 million (Ministry of Labour Gazette, December 1935, 480; 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=12 (accessed 26 March 2008)), 
those claiming benefit today face much tougher work test conditions, linked to sig-
nificant administrative controls. So, moving on from the continuities, what transi-
tions have occurred, and why? 
Tightening the screw – the Conservatives’ reforms post-1979 
By the 1980s there was perceived to be crisis in the welfare state in the UK. The 
benefit system had become unsustainably expensive, overly complex and con-
demned for stifling individual endeavour. These problems were anathema to a 
Government committed to monetarist economic policy and a neo-liberal approach 
to state welfare. According to the Conservative Governments’s policy document 
(Green Paper) on social security reform in 1985, social security had “lost its way” 
(HM Government 1985, Vol 1, para 1). The Conservatives, who had been returned 
to power in 1979, instituted a review of the social security system. However, it was 
principally concerned with means-tested benefit, especially supplementary benefit 
and housing benefits, which were the most complex and expensive to administer. 
Essentially the basic general conditions of entitlement to unemployment benefit 
were not affected by the proposed changes that resulted from this review. However, 
the Social Security Act 1986 effected an increase in the maximum period of dis-
qualification for ‘voluntary’ unemployment and related matters (above) from six to 
13 weeks. The Secretary of State for Social Security was also given a power by the 
Act to increase this period using delegated legislation. It was not long before the 
power was exercised. In 1988 the maximum disqualification period was extended 




to 26 weeks, where it remains. However, the Secretary of State had and continued 
to have (Social Security Act 1989, section 12(2), Jobseeker’s Act 1995, section 
19(3)) no power to increase it beyond 26 weeks, it can only be reduced unless Par-
liament votes otherwise. There was, however, no tightening up in the basic avail-
ability for work condition, save for the introduction of limitations which claimants 
were permitted to place on their availability (see Wikeley 2002, p 341). These limi-
tations were greatly increased once JSA was introduced in 1996/97 (see below).  
There was a return to the idea that the law should place some onus on the 
claimant not merely to indicate availability for work but also a sincere intention to 
obtain it. Previously, as noted above, claimants had had to show they were “genu-
inely seeking work”. Under the Social Security Act 1989 (section 10) that condition 
was effectively reintroduced through a requirement to be “actively seeking em-
ployed earner’s employment”. The Act also enabled the “steps which a person is 
required to take in any week if he is to be regarded as actively seeking employed 
earner’s employment in that week” (section 10) to be prescribed by regulations. 
Concerns were, however, expressed that the new condition was demeaning, since 
those who remained unemployed despite seeking work would regularly be con-
fronted with their own demoralising sense of failure (Buck 1989). They were also 
considered to be harsh given the paucity of job opportunities, the extent of unem-
ployment at the time and the unreliability of the evidence cited by the Government 
to confirm that claimants in general made inadequate efforts in the search for a job 
(Wikeley 1989).  
In 1990, when Parliament was debating a new Social Security Bill, an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made by an opposition MP to have the “actively seeking” work 
condition abolished, on the grounds that it was unfair and was designed to depress 
wage levels by forcing the unemployed to accept low paid work (House of Com-
mons Debates, 3 April 1990, col 1086), a charge which in fact is less potent today 
in view of the introduction of the minimum wage in the late 1990s. It was reported 
that in the first seven weeks after the implementation of the Social Security Act 
1989, 700 unemployment claimants per week were being given written warnings 
about their job-seeking activities and nearly 600 of them “subsequently had their 
benefit suspended when their claims were referred to adjudication officers” 
(col.1088). The Government confirmed that between 9 October 1989 and 26 Janu-
ary 1990, 11,400 claimants were issued with warning letters for failing to seek 
work actively, and that there was “a rising trend in the number of claimants warned 
about inadequate job search” (col 1093, Mrs G Shephard MP, Under-Secretary of 
State). Approximately 15% of the claimants who were warned had to be referred to 
adjudication officers for consideration of disallowance (col.1093). 
By this stage the Government could point to the development of training and 
employment assistance programmes, both for adults and specifically for young 
people (Harris 1989). Among these was the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Young 
people leaving school and finding themselves unable to secure employment did not 
have the contributions record to enable them to qualify for unemployment benefit, 
but they could qualify for means-tested supplementary benefit. However, if they 




unreasonably refused or failed to avail themselves of a training place on the YTS 
they faced a 40% reduction in their weekly benefit. In the nine months from De-
cember 1983-September 1984 over 10,000 young people were subjected to this re-
duction on the grounds of non-participation in the YTS (House of Commons De-
bates, Vol 69, cols 165-166, 4 December 1984). The Government went one impor-
tant stage further in the Social Security Act 1988, when it raised the minimum age 
of entitlement to social security for most claimants from 16 to 18 (see Harris 1988).  
For older people there was the Employment Training programme, which paid 
an allowance marginally higher than the relevant rate of benefit. Under the Social 
Security Act 1975 (section 20) those who refused to participate in training ap-
proved for the claimant by the Secretary of State faced benefit disqualification. 
Eventually training was covered by a number of separate disqualification grounds, 
introduced by the Employment Act 1988 (section 27), and later consolidated in 
1992 legislation (Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, s 28), re-
lated to failing to apply for or take up a training place, voluntarily leaving a training 
place or losing one’s place due to misconduct. In most cases there was a defence of 
having “good cause” for the action or inaction in question. As with the employ-
ment-related grounds of disqualification, those who claimed basic assistance 
(which from 1987 changed from supplementary benefit to “income support”) dur-
ing the period of disqualification were also subjected to a reduction in the rate of 
this benefit. The reduction, amounting to 40% of the personal allowance element of 
the benefit, ensured that the disqualification had “a financial bite” (Mesher and 
Wood 1995, p 126).  
So, by the early 1990s there was in place a detailed and wide-ranging statutory 
regime for the enforcement of worksearch and availability for work. There was 
once again a test to be satisfied of being actively engaged in the search for em-
ployment, although as Lundy points out, it had already been held that the basic test 
of availability for work implied “some active step by the [claimant] to draw atten-
tion to his availability” (Commissioner’s Decision R(U)5/80, para 14, cited in 
Lundy 2000, n.60). Although some of disqualification grounds required an absence 
of “good cause” – for example, for failing to apply for a position notified to the 
claimant – the factors that should be taken into account in determining “good 
cause” were tightly defined by the regulations, as amended in 1989; a person could 
not, for example, normally claim that travel to work time constituted good cause 
unless it was more than one hour each way (Social Security (Unemployment, Sick-
ness etc) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1598), reg 12E). Disqualification could now 
be imposed for up to 26 weeks and the grounds on which it could be instituted had 
been extended to include participation in training programmes.  
The Jobseekers Act 1995 and activation  
The most recent legislative reform of real significance occurred in 1996 with the 
introduction of jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) under the Jobseekers Act (JA) 1995. 




The current framework is still based around this Act. JSA combines two separate 
schemes: (1) Contribution-based JSA (CBJSA), which replaced unemployment 
benefit; and (2) Income-based JSA (IBJSA), which replaced income support (but 
only for those who are required to be available for work) and which, like income 
support, is a means-tested benefit. Approximately 80% of the people entitled to 
JSA received IBJSA, since individual entitlement to CBJSA runs for only six 
months and once it is exhausted a claimant will in effect be forced to seek enti-
tlement to IBJSA, as will a person who does not meet the contributions require-
ment for CBJSA.  
As Lundy explains, “JSA was introduced with the express intention of rein-
forcing the link between the receipt of social security and the search for work” 
(Lundy 2000, 291). The notion of an obligation to work that underpins JSA may 
be in furtherance of traditional values, religious and moral, attached to the work 
ethic. But it also has a strong contractarian association in the context of social 
security and with the reciprocal obligations of citizenship. The latter are re-
flected in the long-standing principle of universal insurance but have been given 
additional emphasis by government in recent years as political justifications for 
making welfare entitlement increasingly conditional, particularly at a time when 
levels of unemployment had begun to fall and the availability of work increased.  
In 1994 the Government set out its proposals for JSA, stating three main 
aims to the new benefit (Department for Employment/DSS 1994). First, JSA 
would “improve the operation of the labour market by helping people in their 
search for work, while ensuring that they understand and fulfil the conditions for 
receipt of benefit”. Secondly, it would result in a better deal for taxpayers, since 
it would offer “streamlined administration, closer targeting on those who need 
financial support and a regime which more effectively helps people back into 
work”. Thirdly, it would provide a better service to claimants by virtue of there 
being a “clearer, more consistent benefit structure, and by better service deliv-
ery”. What was contemplated was a more active, managed process of ensuring 
that the unemployed retained a firm attachment to the labour market. This meant 
a shift in the balance between state and individual responsibility. Claimants 
would only enjoy a maximum period on contribution based benefit of just six 
months rather than 12, a change which reflected a further diminution of the in-
surance principle (Buck 1996). There would also be increased pressure to engage 
in the search for work or to participate in activities which enhance the prospects 
of securing full-time employment. The new measures included a requirement to 
enter into a “jobseeker’s agreement” with the relevant government agency, cur-
rently called “Jobcentre Plus”. There would be an even wider range of sanctions 
for non-cooperation or non-compliance.  
JSA is a complex benefit, made the more so by a legal structure based largely 
on secondary legislation that is subject to frequent amendment. Although the 
Labour Government post 1997 has developed a new programme of activities de-
signed to provide a welfare-to-work pathway, notably the various New Deal 
programmes offering work experience and/or a programme of training or educa-




tion (such as the New Deal for Young People, New Deal 25 Plus and New Deal 
for Lone Parents), it has not significantly altered the basic architecture of the 
JSA scheme. It should be borne in mind that because of the attempt to individu-
alise and personalise the relationship between the claimant and the advisory 
team in the jobcentre, it is important to judge the system with particular refer-
ence to the way that the process is managed on the ground. For example, in 2005 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) introduced a series of pilots in-
volving quite different regimes affecting those claiming JSA who had entered 
the so-called “gateway” when they have to attend the jobcentre every fortnight 
for a “jobsearch review”. This process of attendance is still known by its tradi-
tional name of “signing on”. Under the pilots, some claimants were able to sign 
on by telephone. Others were excused signing on for the first 7 or 13 weeks but 
were telephoned at random to discuss their worksearch activities. Some fort-
nightly reviews were conducted in groups. Piloting of this kind is complemented 
by a constant process of review and evaluation, designed to maximise efficien-
cies while retaining adequate controls. The evaluation of this particular pilot 
turned out to be mostly inconclusive but recommended against a national roll-
out of the 13 week and telephone signing on arrangements, since they were less 
effective at getting people into work. Moreover, it was found that the extra bene-
fit payments that were required were “likely to be greater than the administrative 
savings” (Middlemas 2006, para 10.7).  
The structure of JSA 
One of the fundamental aims of the JA 1995 was to establish a single benefit for 
the unemployed. However, it is basically two different benefits albeit within a 
common framework and a joint name. As noted above, there are two types of 
JSA: 
1. Contribution-based JSA. This is payable for a maximum of 182 days 
(six months). Entitlement is dependent upon (among other things) having 
paid or been credited with sufficient national insurance contributions 
(per section 2 of the Act). 
2. Income-based JSA. This is payable to persons who do not meet the 
contribution conditions for CBJSA or who have exhausted their entitle-
ment to it, provided, in either case, that they satisfy a mean test. 




The detail of the JSA scheme, including the rate at which weekly JSA is to be 
paid,1 is set out in secondary legislation, in the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 
1996 (SI 1996/207), as amended (the JSA Regs). 
General conditions of entitlement 
The general conditions of entitlement for both types of JSA are (JS Act, section 
1(2)-(2D)), all of which must be satisfied, reflect the purpose of this benefit as a 
means of support for those who are not in work but who nevertheless would be ex-
pected to have an attachment to the labour market by virtue of their age, physical or 
mental capacity for work and the fact that they are not engaged in full-time educa-
tion. The conditions require the claimant to demonstrate that attachment to the la-
bour market through, for example, an active engagement in the search for work. 
The conditions, all of which must be satisfied, are that the claimant is: in Great 
Britain; under pensionable age; “available for employment”; “actively seeking em-
ployment”; signed up to an extant jobseeker’s agreement; capable of work; not en-
gaged, nor his or her partner engaged, in “remunerative work” (defined as 16 hours 
per week on average, or 24 hours per week in the case of the claimant’s partner); 
not receiving relevant education (basically non-advanced full-time education); and 
meets the relevant contribution conditions for CBJSA or the income based condi-
tions for IBJSA. 
The JSA scheme retains the minimum age of entitlement of 18. However, the 
regulations (regs 57-61) prescribe exceptional cases when a young person (aged 16 
or 17) may nonetheless be eligible for JSA. In addition, a 16 or 17 year old who is 
not entitled to JSA and is registered for training but not being provided with any 
may be awarded a “severe hardship payment”, under section 16 of the 1995 Act. 
However, even that may be revoked if the young person rejects a reasonable train-
ing opportunity or job vacancy or interview or opportunity to apply. Severe hard-
ship JSA can also be reduced by 40% of the personal allowance element of the 
benefit in some circumstances, such as where the young person has given up a 
place on a training scheme or has failed to attend the scheme or has lost their place 
on it through misconduct (JS Act, section 17; JSA Regs 1996, reg.63).  
                                           
1 The current rates of weekly benefit (until April 2009) of CBJSA are  
Aged under 18 £47.95 
Aged 18-24 £47.95 
Aged 25 or over £60.50  
– minus deductions:  
£1 per £1 for amounts of occupational or personal pension in excess of £50 per week; £1 per £1 for the claimant’s 
earnings (subject to prescribed disregards). 
The calculation of IBJSA entitlement, on the other hand, is very complex due to it being a means tested-benefit 
with separate and very detailed income and capital limits and calculation rules. The basic rates of personal allow-
ance are the same as for CBJSA, but claimants may be entitled to various premiums in respect of disability or 
other factors, which will increase entitlement (JSA Regs, regs 82-86D). There are separate rates for couples. 
 




The availability and job search conditions 
Available for employment 
The basic test of availability per se, which has remained the same for over 30 years, 
is that the claimant must be “willing and able to take up immediately any employed 
earner’s employment” (JS Act 1995, section 6(1)). This requirement of immediacy 
is strict, although there are limited exceptions: for example, it is sufficient for a per-
son who has caring responsibilities to be willing and able to take up employment 
within 48 hours; and in the case of a person engaged in volunteer work the take-up 
time is extended to one week, provided he or she is prepared to attend for interview 
for employment within 48 hours (JSA regs 1996, reg.5). The employment that the 
claimant must be willing and able to take up must be of at least 40 hours per week. 
The claimant can limit the amount that is acceptable to a set amount of 40 or more 
hours provided his or her “pattern of availability” affords him or her reasonable 
prospects of securing such employment (JSA Regs, regs 6 and 7). The claimant 
must also be available for work on all days during the benefit week; unavailability 
on one day (even if he or she nevertheless remains available for more than 40 hours 
in total in that week) means loss of a week’s benefit. Normally there is no provision 
to award JSA for part only of week (Commissioner’s Decision R(JSA)3/01, para 4).  
The claimant has in fact long been permitted to set some restrictions on the 
kinds and place of work he or she is willing to accept, while remaining “available 
for work”. There is what has become known as a “reasonable restrictions test”, 
which is tightly regulated and less flexible than in the past (see JS Act 1995, section 
6(2) and (3), JSA Regs, regs. 7, 8, 9 and 13). In addition to the limited right to re-
strict availability to 40 hours or more per week, mentioned above, a claimant may 
limit his availability with reference to the nature or terms of conditions of employ-
ment (including the rate of pay) or the locality of the work, provided he can show 
he or she has “reasonable prospects of securing employment notwithstanding those 
restrictions” and other prescribed restrictions on his availability. However, any al-
lowed restrictions related to pay will cease to have effect once the claimant has 
been in receipt of JSA for six months. The claimant may also restrict the nature of 
the employment he or she is willing to undertake with reference to a sincerely held 
religious belief/conscientious objection “provided he can show reasonable pros-
pects of securing employment notwithstanding those restrictions”. A claimant may 
also set restrictions which are “reasonable in the light of his physical or mental 
condition”. In some circumstances a claimant who is a carer is permitted to restrict 
his or her total hours of work availability to an amount below 40 in any week, again 
subject to the same “reasonable prospects of employment” condition. The law sets 
out the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a person has “reason-
able prospects of securing employment”, which it will have been seen is a condition 




linked to several of the permitted restrictions.2 The onus lies with the claimant to 
show, for this purpose, that he or she has reasonable prospects (JSA Regs, reg.10). 
For a short period at the start of the claim the claimant may in any event be 
permitted to restrict his or her availability to his or her usual employment, work 
that pays no less than the amount he or she is accustomed to receive from work, or 
both. Those restrictions may only be set for a limited period of not less than one 
week nor more than 13 weeks; the actual permitted length will be determined with 
reference to a range of factors essentially designed to reflect any specialism and the 
degree of experience – such as the nature of his or her usual occupation, the claim-
ant’s skills, the length of training for the occupation, the length of time he or she 
worked in such employment and the time that has elapsed since he or she worked in 
it (JS Act 1995, section 6(5) and JSA regs 1996, reg.16). Thus a qualified account-
ant who becomes unemployed after 20 years may be granted a longer period in 
which to restrict his or her availability to that job than an unskilled former shop as-
sistant with no training would be permitted to confine his or her availability to shop 
work.  
Actively seeking employment 
A person will be classed as actively seeking employment in any week “if he takes 
in that week such steps as he can reasonably be expected to have to take in order to 
have the best prospects of securing employment” (JS Act 1995, s 7(1), JSA Regs, 
reg.18). But the claimant will have to take more than two such steps in any week 
unless taking fewer two steps is reasonable for that person to do that week. The ex-
pected steps might include oral or written job applications; seeking information on 
the availability of employment from job ads, employment agencies and employers; 
getting specialist advice; drawing up a curriculum vitae; and seeking a reference or 
testimonial from previous employer. Various factors must be taken into account in 
determining what would be reasonable steps for the particular claimant to be ex-
pected to take. Some relate to claimant him or herself, such as his or her skills, 
qualifications and abilities and physical or mental qualifications; some relate to his 
or her actions in trying to secure work, such as the steps taken in the previous week 
and their effectiveness; and others relate to the availability or location of any va-
cancies. 
The law is so concerned to prevent possible abuse of the system that it stipulates 
that steps taken are to be ignored where the claimant, while taking them, “acted in a 
violent or abusive manner”; or he or she spoiled a job application; or “by his behav-
iour or appearance… otherwise undermined his prospects of securing the employ-
ment in question” (see Wikeley 1996). The claimant will, however, be excused this 
conduct if “the circumstances were due to reasons beyond [his or her] control”.  
 
                                           
2 JSA regs, Reg.10(2). They include the claimant’s skills, qualifications and experience; the type and number of 
vacancies within daily travelling distance from his or her home; the length of time he or she has been unem-
ployed; the job applications which he or she has made and their outcome; and his or her willingness to move 
home to obtain employment. 




Attendance, information and evidence 
The above provisions are reinforced by administrative controls exerted via a power 
to require the claimant to attend at a place and at such time as an officer may spec-
ify, and to provide information and evidence “as to his circumstances, his availabil-
ity for employment and the extent to which he is actively seeking employment” (JS 
Act 1995, section 8). The officer/adviser may notify time and place of attendance, 
and may require a claimant to provide a signed declaration as to his or her avail-
ability and active search for work (JSA Regs, regs 23, 23A and 24). The attendance 
requirement is capable of strict enforcement (see regs 25 and 26), as entitlement to 
benefit will normally cease if the claimant fails to attend on the day specified in the 
notification, or at the stipulated time, or if the claimant fails to provide a signed 
declaration that he or she has been available for or actively seeking employment.  
These are strict conditions, clearly designed to ensure that claimants conform to 
the expected pattern of behaviour in return for benefit. The agency seems to apply 
the attendance condition particularly firmly: in 2005-06, for example, there were 
154,800 referrals to a “Sanctions Decision Maker” in such cases and in 74% of 
them (115,050) a benefit sanction (a reduction of the personal allowance element of 
the benefit, by 20%) was applied (HCPAC 2007). The sanction is not to be applied, 
however, where the claimant shows that there was “good cause” for the failure 
(regs.27-30), provided he or she shows it within 5 days of the failure to comply. A 
range of factors may be considered in determining whether there was good cause. 
Inadequate notification by Jobcentre Plus is specifically identified as one of them.  
The jobseeker’s agreement 
As noted above, one of the primary conditions of entitlement to JSA is entry into a 
jobseeker’s agreement. This is “[a]n agreement which is entered into by a claimant 
and an employment officer and which complies with the prescribed requirements in 
force at the time when the agreement is made…” (JS Act 1995, section 9(1)). It 
must be in writing and signed by both parties, and it can be varied by agreement 
(sections 9(3) and 10). The contractual element reflected in the notion of “agree-
ment” implies mutuality and voluntariness, but the jobseeker’s agreement is very 
one-sided. As Lundy (2000, 304) argues, “The official’s hand which shakes on this 
agreement is truly a hand of velvet masking a fist of steel, since failure to sign up to 
the agreement will result in the claimant being denied benefit”. Entry into an 
agreement can, in this regard, be seen as part of the process of “responsibilization”, 
involving state governance of behaviour intended to make people behave as “re-
sponsible” citizens (Ican and Basok 2004, 130-133). In that sense, it epitomises the 
attempt under both the Conservative and now the Labour Government to rebalance 
rights and responsibilities by placing a greater emphasis on the latter (Lister 2003; 
Lund 2008).  
The required contents of the agreement are specified by regulations. They in-
clude the claimant’s name; the stated hours of availability; any agreed restrictions 




on availability; the type of employment sought by claimant; the action the claimant 
will take to seek employment and to improve his/her prospects of finding employ-
ment; the start and finish dates of any permitted period during which the claimant 
does not have to be available for up to 40 hours per week; and a statement of the 
claimant’s rights to challenge a determination or direction by the Secretary of 
State.3 
Sanctions 
As we have seen, sanctions have long been a feature of this area of social security 
law They were originally designed to prevent abuse of the system and to protect the 
insurance fund from unjustified claims. While these remain part of the continuing 
justification for them, their intensification under JSA, and therefore the tighter con-
trol of behaviour that they impose, signifies a greater intolerance of any shortfall in 
the claimant’s commitment to the labour market and a concern to further the state’s 
interest in minimising public reliance on the benefits system and to re-emphasise 
the responsibility of citizens to support themselves through work. As a review of 
social security sanctions by the Social Security Advisory Committee says, one of 
the main objectives of JSA sanctions is to “induce individuals to act in accordance 
with their job-search responsibilities as part of the ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
agenda” (SSAC 2006: 54).  
One of the major features of the sanctions regime, as shown in Michael Adler’s 
paper in this collection, is that there is a significant element of officer (or office) 
discretion in many cases. The SSAC has highlighted the inconsistencies in the ad-
ministration of sanctions, in terms of the “significant differences” between district 
offices in the numbers of sanctions imposed (or in referral of cases for possible 
sanctioning). As the SSAC states, the discrepancies result in “inequity, as where a 
claimant lives may determine whether they are sanctioned” (SSAC 2006: 69) 
In addition to the sanctions of discretionary (variable) length, which represent a 
continuity with the old unemployment benefit rules, there are now sanctions related 
to the worksearch conditions that are primarily of fixed length. Tables 1 and 2 in 
the Appendix contain statistics on the number of referrals for a sanctions decision 
and the number of fixed period and discretionary length sanctions imposed between 
2000 and 2006. It will be seen that while only one quarter of referrals in discretion-
ary length sanction cases result in the imposition of a sanction, the rate of sanction-
ing is twice as high in fixed term cases. The statistics also reveal a decline in the 
numbers of referrals and sanctions. However, discretionary length sanctions fell 
much more sharply than fixed term sanctions (and, in fact, at a much steeper rate 
                                           
3 Under JS Act 1995, s 9(6), the officer must, if asked to do so by the claimant, refer the proposed JS agreement to 
the Secretary of State for him to determine whether, (i) if the claimant complies with the agreement and its terms 
he would satisfy the statutory requirement to be available for or actively seeking employment, or (ii) it is reason-
able to expect the claimant to have to comply with the agreement. On such a reference, the Secretary of State is to 
give such directions regarding the terms of the agreement as he considers appropriate: section 9(7). 
 




than the fall in jobseeker numbers). From representing nearly 75% of all sanction 
cases in 2002, the proportion of cases that were discretionary length cases fell to 
around 67% in 2006.  
In the case of either type of sanction the period of sanction eats into the 182 day 
period of entitlement. This is because JSA entitlement continues during the sanction 
period, even if payment does not. In addition, as noted earlier, claimants can have 
their claim for benefit disallowed for failure to attend a regular interview with the 
personal adviser at Jobcentre Plus.  
The sanctions are identified in the JS Act 1995, sections 19-20B. It will be seen 
that in some cases a sanction may not be imposed because the claimant had a “good 
cause” for acting as he or she did. It is a matter of judgment for the relevant official 
as to whether a person had “good cause”, but the JSA Regulations prescribe factors 
that should be taken into account for the purposes of determining this question.4  
Sanction of discretionary (or variable) length 
A sanction of discretionary length may be applied where the claimant has lost his 
or her employment due to misconduct; or voluntarily left it “without just cause”; or 
where without “good cause” he or she failed to apply for or accept a vacancy noti-
fied by the jobcentre or in any event “neglected to avail himself of a reasonable op-
portunity of employment”. The period of sanction must be set at between one week 
and 26 weeks. The precise length of the period in an individual case is to be deter-
mined by the Secretary of State – in practice, an official acting on his/her behalf. 
There is some limited guidance in the regulations as to particular matters that 
should be taken into account in determining the length of the sanction. For exam-
ple, account should be taken of “any mitigating circumstances of physical or mental 
stress” connected with the employment which the claimant has left or neglects to 
pursue (JSA Regs, reg.70) Otherwise there is a need to refer to the substantial body 
of case law that has developed over the years in which these various sanction 
grounds have been in operation, particularly those relating to misconduct and vol-
untarily leaving without just cause. The case law confirms, for example, that a per-
son who came close to establishing justification for leaving voluntarily may expect 
a short period of sanction (see Wikeley 2002, ch 9).  
                                           
4 For example, a claimant would have good cause for non-participation in a training programme if he or she has a 
condition or personal circumstance such that participation would be detrimental to his/her health; or where non-
participation resulted from religious or conscientious objection; or if caring responsibilities make it unreasonable 
to participate: JSA Regs, reg.73. Other factors may also be taken into account in determining whether or not there 
was good cause. In the case of a claimant’s failing or refusing to take up a particular job or to comply with a job-
seeker’s direction, the above mentioned factors are among those which should be taken into account by the offi-
cer, but they do not automatically give rise to good cause: see reg.72. Other factors to be taken into account in-
clude excessive travelling time and the disproportionality of expenses incurred by the claimant in undertaking the 
job or complying with the jobseeker’s direction.  




Sanctions of prescribed length 
The sanctions of prescribed length apply where there is a failure/refusal, without 
good cause to carry out any jobseeker’s direction which was reasonable in his cir-
cumstances or to participate in (or attend or remain on) a training scheme or em-
ployment programme (such as under one of the New Deal programmes) notified to 
him or her; or has lost his or her place on such a scheme through misconduct (note 
there is no “good cause” excuse here). The statute empowers the length of the pre-
scribed length of the sanction to be somewhere between one to 26 weeks. The sanc-
tion for refusal or failure to carry out a jobseeker’s direction is a fixed period of two 
weeks. If there is a further breach within 12 months of the first, the sanction is four 
weeks. If the sanction is applied for a failure to take up or apply for a training 
scheme or employment programme or for the circumstances in ground (c), the 
sanction is a fixed period of two weeks. Again, if there is a further breach within 12 
months of the first, the sanction is four weeks (reg.69). However, it is 26 weeks if 
the failure etc relates to an act or omission in respect of one of the specified New 
Deal options or in relation to the Intense Activity Period (for 25-49 year olds, last-
ing 52 weeks) and in either case there have been two or more sanctions for such a 
failure in relation to these options by the claimant, the most recent being within the 
previous 12 months.  
Hardship 
A claimant may be entitled to some JSA notwithstanding disqualification under the 
above provisions, but it can be made payable at a reduced rate or for a prescribed 
period. In essence, the claimant will have to show that he or a member of his 
household will suffer hardship during the period of the sanction. The regulations 
prescribe when a person is in hardship (for example, a woman is pregnant, or per-
son has a long term medical condition restricting functional capacity, or a person is 
caring for another who is receiving disability benefits) and the date from which a 
payment is to be made (JSA Regs, regs 140-141). If the claimant is entitled under 
these hardship rules, his or her benefit is reduced by 40% of the personal allowance 
for a single person or by 20% if the claimant or any member of his her family is ei-
ther pregnant or seriously ill (regs145 and 146A-H).  
The impact and effectiveness of sanctions 
Although there is constant evaluation of welfare-to-work policies such as Pathways 
to Work and the role of the advisers working in Jobcentre Plus who deal with job-
seekers, there has until recently been no attempt to review the operation of the 
benefit sanctions and the traditional structures which still underpin the statutory re-
gime governing benefits for the unemployed. However, in the 2004 the Govern-
ment promised a review of the JSA sanctions for non-compliance “to ensure that 
the penalties for failure to carry out responsibilities are timely, fair, practical and 




effective” (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2004, para 4.31). In 2006 the Department 
for Work and Pensions published two reports based on research into the benefit 
sanctions. One of the reports, by Joyce and Whiting (2006), is based on research 
into the effects of sanctioning regime operated by Jobcentre Plus on lone parents, in 
connection with failure to attend work-focused interviews (WFIs). These are regu-
lar claimant interviews with an adviser, intended to explore routes into work and 
review progress; a lone parent on income support would be required to attend such 
an interview when the youngest or only child reaches the age of five years and 
three months. At the time of Joyce and Whiting’s report the interviews were an-
nual, but from 30 April 2007 they have become six-monthly and will be extended 
to lone parents with children under five from 28 April 2008.5 The report relates to 
means-tested income support entitlement. A lone parent can qualify for this benefit 
(to which jobsearch and availability conditions per se are not attached) while they 
still have a child under the age of 14, although this age is set to fall (see below). 
The other report (by Peters and Joyce 2006) reviews JSA sanctions, based on a 
sample of over 3,000 interviewees.  
Joyce and Whiting found that claimants generally understood the principle be-
hind the sanctioning regime but not the specific details of the amount by which 
their income support would be reduced or the length of the period for which their 
reduction in benefit would run. Claimants tended to have negative feelings about 
the invitation to attend a WFI. Some felt they were being coerced and would be 
forced into taking a job when they attended rather than having the opportunity to 
discuss career options. Some had difficulties attending because they had health 
problems or there were childcare difficulties. There were, however, some who wel-
comed the opportunity to discuss their options. There was evidence that sanctions 
had caused hardship, since many claimants had already been struggling on the rate 
of benefit they received. The reported that their children often lost out, as pocket 
money or treats were denied. Some had become indebted to friends or family, who 
would need to be repaid out of future benefit. Stress and anxiety had been exacer-
bated.  
The researchers considered possible changes that could be made to the sanction-
ing policy and process in the light of suggestions from claimants and Jobcentre Plus 
advisers. There was a view that sanctions should be considered a last resort and that 
claimants should be given a “second chance” before they were applied. Another op-
tion could be to reduce the rate of the sanction from 20% to less or to abolish sanc-
tions altogether and instead provide an incentive of additional benefit for atten-
dance.  
                                           
5 The Social Security (Work-focused Interviews for Lone Parents) Amendment Regulations 2007 (SI No 
1034/2007). Note that those living in an area in which one of the New Deal welfare-to-work programmes oper-
ates, namely the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents, who have been continuously entitled to income support for at 
least 12 months and whose youngest child is aged 11-13 could be required to undergo a work-focused interview 
every 13 weeks.  
 




The JSA research by Peters and Joyce was based on a much bigger sample than 
the lone parents research and incorporated significant quantitative as well as quali-
tative elements. The research found that there were no significant differences be-
tween sanctioned and non-sanctioned claimants in terms of gender, ethnicity or ill-
ness/disability, or on the basis of their qualifications, literacy or numeracy. But 
sanctioned claimants tended to be younger. This was attributable to young claim-
ants’ more relaxed attitude towards sanctions, which was possibly due to the fact 
that they tended to live with parents who could provide some financial support. 
Claimants to whom sanctions were applied were also more likely to have a learning 
difficulty, particularly those who were sanctioned over participation in the New 
Deal programme. 
Most claimants reported some understanding of the rules on claiming JSA. 
Among the others, those with literacy problems or who were of non-white ethnicity 
or new claimants had the least understanding. Generally the acquisition of knowl-
edge appeared to be linked to the level of experience of the jobcentre. Those who 
were sanctioned for “voluntarily leaving” their employment tended to have low 
levels of knowledge. Typically, there was an erroneous view that sanctions only 
applied to persons who worked while claiming benefit. As with the lone parents re-
search, claimants lacked a detailed knowledge of how sanctions operated. Only 2% 
of those questioned identified “voluntary leaving without just cause” as a sanction 
ground.  
The research found that challenging a sanction would not generally be contem-
plated. Those subjected to a sanction would probably not ask for a reconsideration 
or bring an appeal, a tendency that is perhaps reflected in the very low number of 
appeals on sanctions coming before tribunals. Reasons for not appealing varied, al-
though some respondents simply lacked awareness of the right to appeal or thought 
the appeal process would be overly complicated, drawn out or likely to end in fail-
ure. In some cases claimants had been discouraged from appealing by their adviser 
or had found a job. 
It is interesting that the supposed deterrent effect of sanctions, for example in 
relation to voluntarily leaving one’s employment, is not borne out by the views ex-
pressed by claimants, a majority of whom either did not know they would be sanc-
tioned or did not feel that it could have been avoided. However, once they had ex-
perienced a sanction, many claimants seemed to be concerned to avoid one in the 
future. DWP statistics cited in the report show that of those sanctioned, 73% had 
only been sanctioned once, although the paucity of second or subsequent sanctions 
might partly be attributable to the take-up of employment. It is also interesting that 
a substantial majority of claimants, even those who had experienced a sanction, 
agreed with the principle of sanctioning for those who did not comply with the 
conditions attached to claiming JSA, although they were much less likely to think 
that it was fair to sanction them. Some Jobcentre Plus advisers said that sanctions 
“could have a destructive effect on the relationship and rapport between advisers 
and their customers which might inhibit their ability to work effectively with cus-
tomers in the future”. Needless to say, this research also found that sanctions had a 




significant impact on claimants’ finances and strained family relationships and 
friendships. 
The research also asked claimants whether they would prefer a regime of “fixed 
fines” rather than sanctions. The Government appears keen to explore their viabil-
ity. Overall, the responses seem to have indicated a slightly greater concern about 
fixed fines than sanctions; the former were perhaps more likely than sanctions to 
influence behaviour. The SSAC has suggested that if fines replaced the current 
sanctions regime it would have the advantage of a reduced financial impact on 
claimants (SSAC 2006: 69).  
Overall, the JSA research concluded that the sanctions regime was “broadly ef-
fective” and did influence behaviour to some extent, but was not as well understood 
as it could be. The researchers conclude that, among other things, the major policy 
challenge is to raise awareness levels and detailed understanding of the processes 
among claimants, perhaps through simplification of the system. The SSAC has 
similarly recommended improved communication “at all stages of the sanctions 
process” (SSAC 2006: 68). It has also suggested that because the sanction for vol-
untarily leaving employment is not well understood by claimants, and therefore has 
a reduced disincentive effect, one possible reform that should be considered is 
easement so that a sanction would only be imposed on the second or subsequent 
occasion that a person left a job voluntarily (SSAC 2006: 69); information could be 
given on the first occasion that would serve as notice and a warning.  
Forthcoming reforms: an “active” benefits system 
Jobseekers will face a more intensive regime of activation under forthcoming re-
forms. The DWP talks of “raising expectations of what a jobseeker should contrib-
ute” (DWP 2007a: 49). There will be more clearly defined stages in the administra-
tion of the regime facing a jobseeker. They will start with a widening of jobsearch 
expectations after three months on benefit. After six months there would be entry to 
a “Gateway” stage, with a formal review of the jobseeker’s agreement, the drawing 
up of a back-to-work plan involving mandatory “agreed” activities – with sanctions 
for failure to comply – and a skills “health check” with the offer of any necessary 
training. After 12 months, the claimant would be referred to a specialist return-to-
work provider. The provider would be paid by results to find work for the claimant. 
What is particularly interesting and also controversial about that stage is the poten-
tial involvement in the JSA regime of voluntary and private sector providers (as 
recommended by Freud 2007), and thus harnessing of the profit motive. The Secre-
tary of State for Work and Pensions has recently argued that “[w]e should not be 
ideological about who provides the service, we should just work out who is best at 
providing it” (quoted in Webster 2008). The DWP has published a “Commissioning 
Strategy” in respect of this provision (DWP 2008a), which is indicative of its po-
tential spread within the benefits system. Those still not in work after these stages 
have been completed would be required to undertake work experience (DWP 




2007a), which the Government has recently indicated would be for a minimum of 
four weeks.  
As Dorsal (2008) has recently pointed out, there has been and remains a crucial 
dualist feature of the UK’s social security system: those required to maintain an at-
tachment to the labour market and (since 1989) be actively engaged in the search 
for employment are distinguished from those of working age but not expected to 
seek work because they are caring for young children (as lone parents) or whose 
mental or physical condition makes them incapable of work (see also Rahilly’s 
chapter in this collection). In some cases claimants can cross the boundary between 
the two categories (Kemp and Davidson 2007). With the numbers in receipt of in-
capacity benefit reaching over 2.5 million (as compared with approximately 
800,000 receiving JSA as at February 2008) and the arguments that with the exten-
sion of in-work benefits and other support (including after-school childcare) the ex-
emption of all non-working lone parents with children under 16 from work-search 
requirements seen by government as increasingly less justifiable, there is growing 
pressure to shift the boundary so that more claimants are subjected to a JSA-type 
regime.  
In the case of people on incapacity benefit (or incapacity credits for people re-
ceiving income support), despite the trumpeted success of the Pathways to Work 
programme for encouraging and supporting people back into work the Government 
has embarked on a restructuring of benefits in order to place a particular emphasis 
on the possibility of working rather than on incapacity for work. The idea is to re-
duce by at least one million the numbers who receive benefit on the basis of inca-
pacity for work (Rahilly 2006). The new benefit, entitled Employment and Support 
Allowance – which, according to the familiar rhetoric, is being “built on the princi-
ple of rights and responsibilities” and will involve the claimant’s participation in 
WFIs and signing up to an action plan, with sanctions for default (DWP 2006) – 
will be introduced in October 2008, under the Welfare Reform Act 2007. The re-
gime will be tougher than many incapacity benefit claimants currently face, particu-
larly because many claimants will be required to undertake a “work-related activ-
ity”. It is estimated that as a consequence there will be approximately 20,000 addi-
tional appeals per annum made to the appeal tribunal, 14,000 of which will result in 
a hearing (DWP 2008b). There are also fears that if Jobcentre Plus offices are set 
job-entry targets the degree of tension between the enabling and enforcing roles of 
personal advisers, which has been falling (Knight et al 2005), may increase.  
Meanwhile, changes to the position of lone parents are being introduced and the 
regime for those claiming JSA is being further intensified. Despite an improving 
employment rate for this group, which has risen from 44.7% in 1997s to 57.2% in 
2007 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2007), the DWP has set an objective of increas-
ing this rate to 70% by 2010, which would mean that a further 300,000 lone parents 
enter employment (HCWPC 2007: para 226). The Government has endorsed a rec-
ommendation of the independent review it commissioned on the welfare-to-work 
strategy, by David Freud, that lone parents of children younger than 16 should be 
expected to seek work if they are to continue to receive out of work benefits. Freud 




recommended that lone parents should only enjoy their current exemption until the 
child is 12 years old and that they should be required to participate in regular WFIs 
(Freud 2007). Part of the rationale is that their benefit position was out of line with 
that in states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, where a work test may 
be applied once the lone parent’s child reaches the age of three (or five in the case 
of the Netherlands). It was also considered to be inconsistent with the intended po-
sition that many other claimants in the UK would face once the Employment and 
Support Allowance (above) is introduced. The Government has endorsed Freud’s 
recommendation and proposes to implement progressively, starting in October 
2008. From October 2009 it will be extended to lone parents whose child is aged 
10. From 2010 the exemption will not apply where the child is aged 7 and over 
(DWP 2007a and 2007b).  
The independent statutory advisory body, the Social Security Advisory Com-
mittee (SSAC), has concerns about the fact that lone parents “will simply be trans-
ferred onto the current JSA regime with its relatively intensive work-focused condi-
tionality” (SSAC 2007: para 3.3). There is in fact evidence that increasing the con-
ditionality of benefits may be less successful in maximising jobsearch, take-up and 
retention of employment among lone parents than intensifying the involvement of 
personal advisers and providing a more active encouragement to participate in 
work-related programmes such as the New Deal for Lone Parents (HCWPC 2007; 
DWP 2006). Indeed, support for lone parents making the transition to work has 
been introduced, such as a £250 job grant for those entering work after 26 weeks or 
more on income support and a discretion for personal advisers to extend the pay-
ment of benefit for up to four weeks after a lone parent starts work and is waiting 
for their first salary payment. Lone parents are also going to be offered a financial 
incentive to undertake an activity which helps to prepare them for entry into the la-
bour market, in the form of a “Work Related Activity Premium” (DWP 2007a: 44).  
Improvements to the system of means-tested tax credits, a form of support paid 
to people on low incomes in work, have also been recommended as particularly 
useful in the realization of these goals for lone parents. There is considered to be a 
need to increase their flexibility and to reduce the likelihood and impact of the 
overpayment of credits, which is a feature of the system’s method of (in effect) re-
calculating entitlement at the end of the fiscal and benefits year (Millar 2008). The 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee has found in its recent inquiry 
that more flexibility in the JSA regime is needed to facilitate a pattern of work that 
is consistent with the burden of family responsibilities that lone parents have to dis-
charge; there were “real concerns that JSA conditionality cannot be adapted to re-
flect the complex realities of lone parents’ lives” (HCWPC 2008: paras 227-235). 
However, the Government has argued that there is already flexibility in terms of the 
work pattern lone parents may be expected to follow in the light of their particular 
circumstances, but it plans to increase the discretion available to advisers (DWP 
2007b: 41-42). Another constant barrier to employment among lone parents is the 
unaffordability or unavailability of suitable childcare. There is a childcare tax credit 
to meet some or all of the cost, but the DWP has had to acknowledge that that does 




not guarantee that affordable childcare will be available to all claimants. The House 
of Commons Work and Pensions Committee has recently argued that 
“[c]onditionality should be linked to the availability of childcare and before and af-
ter school care” (HCWPC 2008: para 252). The Government, while committing it-
self to improve childcare provision, has undertaken to avoid penalizing a claimant 
who either fails to take up or leaves a job because of the unavailability of appropri-
ate and affordable childcare (DWP 2007b: 35); the Work and Pension Committee 
says that the burden of proof to show that childcare is available to a claimant 
should rest with the DWP, not the claimant (HCWPC 2008: para 252).  
Conclusion 
The aim of this review of the development of the legal structure surrounding the 
principal benefit concerned with unemployment has been to show the continuities 
and changes and how they have shaped both the form and operation of this benefit. 
The intensification of the activation policy that the post-1995 system in particular 
represents and which has included, since the start of Labour’s administration in 
1997, a range of welfare-to-work policies and programmes – principally the various 
New Deal schemes targeted at different groups and offering, variously, a period of 
work experience, training or education – is not merely a response to particular eco-
nomic or social pressures. While it might be assumed, for example, that a greater 
concentration on measures to increase employability by ensuring participation in 
training or employment experience means that it has become more difficult for citi-
zens of working age to find work, that is only partially true, in that while particular 
skills may be in greater demand now, there is nonetheless a fairly high overall de-
mand for labour, certainly compared with earlier years. But at the same time, the 
greater opportunities for employment have given political justification to the impo-
sition of a greater squeeze on the unemployed through the benefits system, a system 
that the Government is trying to turn into an “active” one under which those not in 
employment are moved away from being “passive recipients of benefit” (or, as 
stated in the same document, “recipients of passive benefits”!) to become “partici-
pants” or “jobseekers” who are “actively seeking and preparing for work” (DWP 
2007b: 10 and 103). However, as Dostal (2008: 34, 35) points out, while trying to 
convey the impression that it is significantly tightening up the benefit regime, the 
Government’s “actual policy change has been limited in scope and has mostly fo-
cused on the renaming of existing policy instruments such as the interview regime 
between Jobcentre staff and their clients”, while “the policing of the system in 
terms of benefit sanctions has remained similar to that operating in the pre-Labour 
and pre-New Deal period”.  
The continuities in the law illustrate Clasen’s point that the developments in so-
cial security policies are not merely a response to social, economic and political 
pressures, but also national traditions and institutional structures (Clasen 1994). 
There is a long tradition of penalising those deemed to be workshy through reduc-




tions in benefit or disqualification from entitlement. The recent reviews of the op-
eration of the sanctions regime suggest that traditions may sometimes need dis-
placement not merely in pursuit of ideological goals but for reasons of practicality 
and, more importantly, fairness (see White and Cooke 2007). Moreover, on the ba-
sis that there is an economic case for benefit conditionality as reflected in the JSA 
regime, there must also be concern that, as a witness to the HCWPC’s recent in-
quiry commented, JSA has “possibly the most out-of-date set of entitlement rules in 
the whole benefits system, much of it unchanged since 1911 and not designed for 
the modern economy” (HCWPC 2008: Minutes of Evidence, Q153). 
 





STATISTICS ON J.S.A. BENEFIT SANCTIONS, GREAT BRITAIN, 2000-2006 
 
(Source: House of Commons Written Answers, 12 March 2007, cols 165W-166W) 
Note: figures are rounded to the nearest 10. 
 
Table 1: Fixed Length Sanctions 
Quarter ending, in which decision 
was made 
Number of referrals Number of referrals which 
resulted in a sanction 
April-May 2000 11,120 5,650 
August 2000 16,610 8,380 
November 2000 17,930 8,470 
February 2001 17,140 8,330 
May 2001 17,890 8,620 
August 2001 17,790 8,380 
November 2001 17,160 7,790 
February 2002 15,250 7,040 
May 2002 18,480 8,530 
August 2002 18,480 8,630 
November 2002 17,550 8,250 
February 2003 15,540 7,660 
May 2003 16,590 8,250 
August 2003 16,890 8,530 
November 2003 15,900 7,760 
February 2004 14,340 7,010 
May 2004 14,470 7,170 
August 2004 15,390 7,580 
November 2004 15,430 7,530 
February 2005 13,840 7,020 
May 2005 15,120 7,680 
August 2005 14,500 7,520 
November 2005 13,590 7,040 
February 2006 13,310 6,960 
May 2006 15,700 8,340 
August 2006 17,020 8,750 
 





Table 2: Discretionary period (variable length) sanctions 
Quarter ending, in which de-
cision was made 
Number of referrals Number of referrals 
which resulted in a sanction
April-May 2000 75,350 18,090 
August 2000 124,530 29,070 
November 2000 127,780 28,480 
February 2001 117,740 28,320 
May 2001 117,160 29,140 
August 2001 122,310 29,990 
November 2001 113,330 28,230 
February 2002 102,750 26,230 
May 2002 114,480 29,700 
August 2002 114,580 30,080 
November 2002 121,200 31,290 
February 2003 106,920 28,480 
May 2003 95,710 26,520 
August 2003 88,410 24,500 
November 2003 89,840 23,890 
February 2004 87,120 23,340 
May 2004 84,470 23,200 
August 2004 82,340 22,120 
November 2004 83,000 21,320 
February 2005 74,130 19,690 
May 2005 76,000 20,620 
August 2005 71,590 19,190 
November 2005 68,770 17,950 
February 2006 61,630 16,000 
May 2006 64,370 16,080 
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Activating benefit claimants of working 
age in the U.K. 
Simon Rahilly  
The main aim of this chapter is to review the work activation requirements within 
benefits for people of working age who are either unemployed or sick (and in re-
ceipt of benefits such as jobseeker’s allowance or incapacity benefit). In the case of 
unemployed claimants, conditions which are designed to ensure that benefit claim-
ants take active steps to find work have been in place for some time. These have 
more recently been extended with the introduction of education, training and em-
ployment programmes within several “New Deal” schemes. Conditions which will 
require claimants who are sick or disabled to show that they are taking steps to im-
prove their chances of a return to work are about to be introduced nationally fol-
lowing initial pilot “pathways to work” projects. Many of these work activation 
provisions are supported by sanctions and therefore have the potential to further in-
tensify the poverty of the benefit claimant.  
One of the central difficulties within U.K. social security is its “all or nothing” 
nature- claimants are either considered to be unemployed or in work. Alternatively, 
they are either incapable of work or they are capable. This makes it difficult to al-
low for part time work as a part of an activation policy. The chapter will conclude 
with a brief consideration of the provisions which allow for part-time work, work 
trials, “therapeutic work” etc. and of incentives introduced to ease the transition 
from benefit to work and to “make work pay”. 
Introduction 
Until recently activation policies within UK social security have been limited in 
scope and extent. Whilst unemployed claimants have always been required to be 
available for work, it is only in the last decade or so that the labour market condi-
tions required of this group have been considerably extended. Benefit conditions 
are now also being progressively introduced for other claimants of working age. 
This can be seen as part of a project to move towards a more common earnings re-
placement benefit for all claimants of working age, which incorporates a degree of 
labour market conditionality. This chapter will review these conditions for the most 
significant earnings replacement benefits for claimants of working age- the unem-
ployed, those who are incapable of work because of sickness or disability and car-
ers. 




This project to extend labour market conditionality must be seen as a part of 
two other agendas. Firstly, there is the commitment to reduce child poverty and 
tackle social exclusion. Neighbourhood statistics demonstrate the close correlation 
between poverty and deprivation and numbers of social security benefit claimants 
(DWP, 2006,a)1 and the key policy instrument to tackle poverty is to move people 
from benefits to employment, from “welfare to work”.  
Secondly, demographic changes have resulted in a decline in the proportion of 
the population in paid work which has caused concern as to the sustainability of 
pension provisions for those no longer in work. As a result the government has 
adopted an aspirational 80% employment rate for those of working age. This can 
only be achieved by extending the welfare to work agenda to people who have tra-
ditionally been considered to be outside the labour market, such as lone parents and 
those who have been classified as incapable of work because of illness or disability. 
The focus of concern has moved from unemployment to worklessness (Grover, 
2007) and has been reinforced by the publication of a government commissioned 
review of its Welfare to Work policies (Freud, 2007). Government green papers 
have set targets to reduce the number of people claiming incapacity benefits by 1 
million (DWP, 2006,a) and to reduce the numbers claiming benefits because they 
are lone parents by 300,000 (DWP, 2007,a). One of the key ways in which it hopes 
to realise these targets is by extending benefit conditionality to these groups in 
much the same way as it has required conditions of the unemployed benefit claim-
ant.  
U.K. Benefits for claimants of working age: 
Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) replaced unemployment benefit as the benefit for un-
employed claimants in 1996.2 JSA was intended to reinforce the link between bene-
fit entitlement and the search for work and thereby improve the supply of labour to 
meet the needs of a more flexible and de-regulated labour market. Whilst unem-
ployed claimants have always been required to be available for work and to seek 
and accept any reasonable opportunity of work, the introduction of JSA was in-
tended to represent a step change in these requirements. This intention was exem-
plified in the choice of name for the new benefit for the unemployed.  
Incapacity benefit (IB) is a contributory benefit for those people incapable of 
work because of sickness or disability. Its origins can be traced back to the sickness 
benefits first introduced by Part I of the National Insurance Act 1911. It is a work 
related benefit and can be compared and contrasted with benefits paid because of 
extra costs associated with disability (eg attendance allowance and disability living 
allowance), and benefits paid as compensation for loss or injury (such as industrial 
injuries benefits). Entitlement is determined by a medical assessment and by a test 
                                           
1Executive summary, para.6. 
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of functional ability, now known as the “Personal Capability Assessment” (PCA). 
Those people who are incapable of work but do not satisfy the contribution condi-
tions may be entitled to the means tested income support (IS). At the beginning of 
1996 the government issued a Green Paper (A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering 
People to Work) in which it set out proposals to reform sickness benefits (DWP, 
2006,a). These proposals built upon many of the initiatives within the “Pathways to 
Work” pilot programme that had been introduced within selected geographical ar-
eas in October 2003. Following a period of consultation on its proposals a Bill was 
taken through parliament and this has now been enacted as the Welfare Reform Act 
2007. A new benefit to be called employment and support allowance will replace 
IB and IS for claimants who are incapable of work. For the first twelve weeks, in-
capacity for work will be determined by the claimant’s own doctor, and benefit will 
be paid at the same rate as for JSA. This is to be known as the assessment phase 
and is the period within which a PCA will be completed to determine entitlement to 
the new allowance. There will also be an additional assessment of the claimant’s 
capability to undertake activities designed to improve their capacity to work (see 
Rahilly, 2006).  
The other significant group of working age claimants of earnings replacement 
benefits are those who are caring for children or disabled adults. Lone parents who 
live on their own with dependent children may have an entitlement to IS. Those 
who are caring for someone who is severely disabled can also claim a non-
contributory benefit, carers allowance. Whilst there have been no attempts to make 
benefit for the latter group of carers conditional upon labour market activity, the 
government has been very concerned to encourage lone parents to move from bene-
fit to work. Although the rate of employment amongst lone parents in the U.K. has 
risen to 57% over the past 10 years, it remains amongst the lowest in Europe, and a 
target of a 70% rate of employment has been set (DWP, 2005). 
Labour market conditionality: 
The labour market conditions will be considered under three headings: interviews, 
an agreed plan of action, and work-related activities. 
Interviews 
Unemployed claimants have always been required to “sign on”. This usually entails 
a fortnightly visit to the benefit office (now known as Jobcentre Plus) and a signed 
declaration that they continue to be availability for work and that there has been no 
change of circumstances. There is also an interview to check on the progress that is 
being made in the job search. Additional (“restart”) interviews are arranged after 13 
weeks unemployment, then after 6 months, 12 months and 24 months. Tradition-
ally, conditions have only been attached to the benefit claimant, but mandatory 
work-focused interviews (WFIs) have recently been introduced for partners. Ini-




tially this was just for those claimants with no dependent children, but it is now a 
requirement of all partners. 
WFIs with personal advisers at the JobCentre have also been introduced as an 
additional condition for other benefits. Lone parents have been required to attend 
an interview at the commencement of their claim since April 2001, with further in-
terviews after 6 months and a year. Those who have been on benefit for at least 12 
months and whose youngest child is 14 are required to attend an interview every 13 
weeks. The Green Paper suggested further extensions of these interviews, so that 
they are held at 6 monthly intervals for those with children under 11 and quarterly 
for those whose children are all aged 11 or over (DWP, 2006,a).3 
From April 2000 claimants who are incapable of work have also been required 
to attend an interview with a personal adviser at the start of their claim as an addi-
tional condition of benefit. Additional interviews have been required in the Path-
ways to Work areas for all new claimants. The first interview is arranged after eight 
weeks on benefit and there are then a further five follow up interviews at monthly 
intervals. 
Agreed work plan 
Since 1996, unemployed claimants have been required to sign up to an agreed job-
seeker’s agreement. This is discussed at the initial interview and sets out the hours 
that the claimant is available for work, and any restrictions as to the work that the 
claimant is prepared to do (the claimant must be able to show there is still a reason-
able prospect of work notwithstanding any restrictions) together with any steps to 
be taken to help improve the chances of finding work. A jobseeker’s direction can 
be issued to require a claimant to undertake specified activities to improve their job 
prospects.4 The government has announced its intention to reduce from 6 to 3 
months the period before which unemployed claimants are expected to broaden 
their job search (DWP, 2007,a). 
Similar requirements for a plan of action are now to be introduced for claimants 
who are incapable of work. For the majority, information about their capacity to 
undertake work-related activities will be fed into a personal action plan (PAP) 
which will need to be agreed by the claimant and their personal adviser at the Job-
Centre. Payment of an additional employment support component within their 
benefit will then be conditional on the claimant undertaking agreed job related ac-
tivities. 
Whilst work related activity has been voluntary for lone parents, the govern-
ment has introduced a financial incentive by way of a work related activity pre-
mium within their benefit. This is to last for a period of 6 months and be paid in re-
turn for claimants undertaking an agreed plan of action including work tasters, im-
proving their employability and job-search assistance. The intention now is to pro-
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gressively migrate lone parents from IS to JSA, with all the associated job-seeking 
conditions (DWP, 2007,a). 
Steps to improve the chances of work 
The Social Security Act 1989 amended the requirement that unemployed claimants 
should be “genuinely seeking work” to require them to be “actively seeking work”. 
This is defined within the Jobseeker’s Act 1995 as taking such steps as can rea-
sonably be expected to provide the best prospects of obtaining work.5 This might 
include activities such as making job applications, registering with an employment 
agency, drawing up a C.V. etc. When elected in 1997 the Labour government in-
troduced the New Deal employment programmes. These were first introduced as 
compulsory programmes for claimants under the age of 25 who had been unem-
ployed for 6 months and was then extended to claimants aged between 26 and 49 
who have been unemployed for more than a year. These claimants are given em-
ployment counselling and guidance for a “gateway” period. The aim is to help 
tackle any personal barriers to work that the claimant may have. After this period 
claimants must choose from one of four options, firstly, six months work in the pri-
vate sector (with subsidies paid to employers), secondly, six months voluntary 
work, thirdly, six months work with the Environmental Task Force or, fourthly, a 
full time education or training programme for up to twelve months.  
Other versions of the New Deal have since been introduced on a voluntary basis 
for other claimants of working age. In 1997 the New Deal for Lone Parents was in-
troduced as a pilot programme for lone parents whose youngest child is over the 
age of 5, and was extended to the whole country in 1998. The government claims 
that 750,000 lone parents have voluntarily signed up for this New Deal programme 
and that about half have been helped into work (DWP, 2006,a).6 The New Deal for 
Disabled People (NDDP) is also voluntary and was first introduced on a pilot basis 
in 1998. It also incorporates a personal adviser service and a range of work 
schemes with a national network of job brokers who are paid by their results in 
helping clients into work. About a third of the NDDP participants are on IB be-
cause of their mental health and another third because of musculo-skeletal difficul-
ties and initial evaluations have shown some success in terms of claimants moving 
into sustained work (Adelman et al, 2004). Finally, in 2000, the government intro-
duced a further New Deal programme for claimants over the age of 50. The inten-
tion is to convert what was a voluntary programme into a compulsory one (DWP, 
2006,a). 7 
When IB is replaced by ESA claimants will not only be assessed as to their in-
capacity for work, there will be an additional assessment as to their ability to under-
take work related activities which would improve their capacity to work. The pay-
ment of an additional employment and support component will become conditional 
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on the claimant satisfactorily undertaking any activities which have been agreed in 
the personal action plan. Claimants will be able to choose between a range of inter-
ventions designed to help them move from benefit to work. These could include the 
NDDP, voluntary work, training programmes, job-searches with assistance from 
personal advisors from the private and voluntary sectors and “Condition Manage-
ment Programmes” designed to help claimants manage their health condition. 
These might seek to “stabilise” life activities in key areas such as health, finances 
and housing (DWP, 2006,a).8  
The government’s hope is that the introduction of conditions for interviews with 
personal advisers and for work-related activities will convert the benefit into an ac-
tive “instrument of rehabilitation” (Bolderson, 1974), but this might depend upon 
the nature and quality of the advice (Bryson, 2003) and concerns have been raised 
about the adequacy of the resources and the capacity of the department to deliver 
given the context of reduced departmental expenditure and the government’s com-
mitment to reduce jobs within the public sector.9 It is now clear that most of the 
“services” to be provided to help improve the job prospects of incapacity claimants 
will be provided by the private sector. 
Sanctions 
Sanctions within benefits for the unemployed have been used to enforce “industrial 
discipline” for some time.10 They are now being progressively extended to other 
benefits for claimants of working age. Entitlement to JSA ends if a claimant fails to 
sign on or attend an interview unless they can show good cause within 5 days. 
Claimants of other benefits who fail to attend their initial work-focussed interview 
(WFI) without good cause will, similarly, not be entitled to benefit. Failure to at-
tend any subsequent work-focussed interviews without good case will result in a 
benefit reduction until the interview takes place. 11  Research suggests that these 
sanctions have not often been invoked in the Pathways to Work pilots, where 
claimants who fail to attend a WFI are first sent a reminder and, in some cases, a 
home visit is made before the imposition of a sanction which is then lifted as soon 
as the claimant attends an interview (Blyth, 2006). 
A review of the research evidence on WFIs by the Social Security Advisory 
Committee (SSAC) led it to conclude that compulsion and greater intervention 
have not necessarily resulted in better outcomes as far as the move from welfare to 
work is concerned. This is especially true for the “harder-to-help” claimants 
(SSAC, 2006). The early evaluations of the pathways to work pilots for incapacity 
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benefit show that they are having the greatest impact upon those who are motivated 
to return to work, and that others see the interviews as interfering and punitive. It is 
entirely possible that those claimants who are more motivated and able to return to 
work would have done so without any WFIs. 
Claimants who are considered to have voluntarily left their employment without 
just cause, or to have been dismissed because of misconduct are disqualified from 
JSA for a period of up to 26 weeks. A variable sanction period of up to 26 weeks 
can also be imposed when a claimant fails to apply for or accept a job without good 
cause, or where they neglect to avail themselves of a job without good cause. Los-
ing a place on a training or New Deal scheme without good cause, or failing to 
comply with a jobseeker’s direction without good cause, results in a fixed term 
sanction. This is a two week benefit disqualification on the first occasion and a four 
week disqualification on any further occasion within a 12 month period. Whilst a 
claimant is disqualified from JSA they may be entitled to a hardship payment if 
they fall within a number of “vulnerable groups”, or if they can show that they 
would suffer hardship, but these hardship payments are paid at reduced levels com-
pared with JSA. 
When ESA replaces IB, payment of the additional employment and support 
component will be conditional on a personal action plan. Furthermore, it can be 
progressively reduced by “a series of slices”12 if the claimant fails to undertake 
agreed work-related activities. Although there will be no sanction for failing to take 
up work or a New Deal option (as in JSA), there will be a sanction for failing to 
take steps to improve the chances of work. The sanction proposed in this event is a 
reduction in benefit rather the wholesale removal of entitlement (as for JSA).  
The changes being introduced within ESA are derived from the “Pathways to 
Work” pilots, but the evaluation and analysis of these pilot programmes was under-
taken after they had only been running for a very short time. Initial findings indi-
cated a 21% take-up of the voluntary package of work support and an 8% increase 
in off-flow from benefit (Blyth, 2006). The Government was quick to proclaim the 
success of what were voluntary arrangements within the Pathways, but in its Green 
Paper it proposed to make these “choices” compulsory. This had been predicted by 
David Bonner (2000) when discussing earlier reforms to IB made as a result of the 
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act (1999): “If the carrots do not produce the effect 
of encouraging more claimants into work, will a regime of sanctions on the JSA 
model prove too tempting to resist?”.  
Lessons can be learned from similar developments which have taken place in 
Australia, which has already integrated income security and labour market services 
using both private and voluntary sector agencies which are paid on results. Terry 
Carney (2005) found that these agencies tended to use standard contracts with little 
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evidence of negotiation or of personalised plans. The integration of benefit admini-
stration with job search assistance is always liable to result in tensions in the roles 
of the personal adviser who is expected to both enable and to enforce (Bryson, 
2003), and Carney found that there was both a 310% increase in the use of sanc-
tions over a 3 year period and a greater use of discretion, with a reduction in the 
number of decisions being challenged by external review. Perhaps as a result of this 
experience, the government dropped its proposals that would have enabled private 
companies contracted to supply assistance with the return to work to have the 
power to make decisions on benefit entitlement and sanctions. 
Permitted work 
JSA claimants are only allowed to work part time.13 However any income from this 
work is deducted from benefit entitlement apart from a small disregard.14 The effect 
of this rule is to provide practically no financial incentive to undertake part time 
work. For lone parents on IS the rules are similar: work for up to 16 hours is per-
mitted but earnings are taken into account in full apart from a disregard of £20. 
These rules provide a perverse incentive to work “informally”- i.e. outside the tax 
and national insurance system and employment regulation- and not declare any 
earnings. Recent Joseph Rowntree research suggests that claimants do indeed com-
bine benefits with informal work in response to their poverty. The research pro-
vided evidence of the disincentives within the tax and benefit system to take up 
formal work and that it can be easier for people with few skills and qualifications to 
access informal work (Katungi et al, 2006). 
The Government has claimed that up to a million of those people on IB would 
like to work (DWP, 2006,a), but this is another example of benefit rules providing 
perverse incentives: claimants undertaking paid work may no longer be considered 
sufficiently incapable to satisfy the test of entitlement to benefit. Claimants may 
have similar fears about undertaking voluntary work , but whilst entitlement to JSA 
may be compromised by voluntary work if it interferes with the claimant’s avail-
ability for (paid) work, there is no such difficulty within the rules of entitlement to 
IB. Indeed, the government is encouraging volunteering amongst IB claimants in 
the sensible belief that it will be good for them as well as being good for the com-
munity (DWP, 2006,a).15 Benefit rules have allowed for a small amount of paid 
work in recognition of the fact that it may help to improve the claimant’s health, 
although the extent to which paid work is allowed is severely limited to reflect the 
fact that IB is an wages replacement benefit. This has come to be known as “per-
mitted work”. Claimants are able to work for up to sixteen hours per week for earn-
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ings up to a prescribed ceiling,16 and then only for a year.17 After this they are only 
able to work for wages up to a much lower earnings limit.18 It is only those claim-
ants who have been assessed as having more severe health conditions who are al-
lowed to work under medical supervision or in a supported environment for an in-
definite period, but there is a limit to the extent to which their earnings are disre-
garded for benefit purposes.19  
Research suggests little knowledge and understanding of these permitted work 
rules (Dawson et al, 2004). Any improvements in working ability that have been 
gained in the year that claimants can work for up to 16 hours may be lost if they are 
not able to move off benefit and into work and have to give this permitted work up. 
Although part time work may be the best route back into full time work, the rules 
provide only small financial incentives but significant administrative difficulties. 
This is particularly true for those claimants who are incapable of work but are only 
entitled to the means tested IS.20  
Transition to work: incentives 
Claimants are worried that an unsuccessful attempt to undertake paid work may 
then result in a return to benefit at a lower rate.21 JSA claimants who have been on 
benefit for a minimum of 13 weeks have a limited opportunity to return to JSA 
without sanction if the job proves not to be satisfactory. The rules require them to 
have worked in the employment for at least 4 weeks and to leave it before the end 
of the 12th. week.  
Initially, IB is paid at a “lower” rate. This is increased after 6 months and then 
increased again up to its “higher” amount after a year. Any claimant considering a 
return to work may be worried about the possibility of having to return to the initial 
lower rate should they have to reclaim benefit. To address these concerns, linking 
rules were introduced in 1988, but they only applied when claimant returned to 
benefit after less than a year in work. Of the 24,500 claimants who left an incapac-
ity benefit to return to work in 2002/03, 2,700 of them returned to benefit within 
one year, but the rules required them to make a specific application for the linking 
rules to be invoked so that they could be paid benefit at their previous rate.22 Quali-
tative research suggested that these rules were not widely appreciated (Dickens et 
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al, 2004) and from October 2006 the linking became automatic without the need to 
apply and was extended to a period of two years.  
The “unemployment trap” is a more fundamental concern. Government social 
security policy has long sought to ensure that people are better off in work than on 
benefit. One approach is to reduce the levels of benefit payable,23 but the present 
government has been at pains to argue for the need for “security for those who can-
not (work)” and has recognised the need to provide financial security to those with 
health difficulties (DWP, 2006,a).24 Claimants will be no worse off on ESA when it 
is introduced to replace IB, (apart from the initial 12 week assessment period before 
the agreement of the personal action plan).25 The emphasis has rather been upon 
“making work pay” by means of the introduction of a minimum wage and the pay-
ment of in-work benefits to supplement low pay. The recent origins of this ap-
proach in the UK can be traced back to family income supplement which was in-
troduced in 1970 but with a very low take-up. Disability working allowance was 
introduced in 1992 as the first in-work benefit for disabled people. It too had very 
limited success. The government’s initial estimate had been for 50,000 claimants, 
but by 1997 there were only 12,000 (SSAC, 1997). Both have since been replaced 
by tax credits paid by the Inland Revenue. The prototypes (working families tax 
credit and disabled persons tax credit) have now been merged as the working tax 
credit, and whilst it may be true that it is rarely the case that people suffer from the 
unemployment trap, the loss of means tested benefits as income rises means that 
there continues to be a significant poverty trap in which many people in low paid 
work remain only marginally better off than on benefits.  
The availability and affordability of childcare represents one of the key barriers 
to work for lone parents. For the first time, the government has accepted some re-
sponsibility in the provision of childcare and has produced a National Childcare 
Strategy. The Childcare Act 2006 has provided new duties for local authorities to 
ensure that there are sufficient childcare places available in their area. A proportion 
of any costs borne by lone parents for registered childcare up to a ceiling, can be 
paid as a part of working tax credit; whilst the proportion has recently been in-
creased from 70% to 80%, the ceilings have remained at round about £170 for one 
child and £300 for more than one child, with the result that, often, tax credits can 
not fully accommodate childcare costs. There is an additional problem; parents will 
usually want to do what they think is best for their child. Duncan and Edwards 
(1999) have contrasted the “economic rationality” that government welfare to work 
policies assume as the basis of claimant decision making with a “gendered moral 
rationality” that better describes the actual basis of decision making.  
The Pathways to Work pilots introduced additional work incentives (DWP, 
2003).26 Firstly, there was a year long return to work credit of £40 per week for 
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those people coming off incapacity benefits and taking up work for at least sixteen 
hours per week with a gross annual pay of less than £15,000. This credit is disre-
garded for the purposes of assessing entitlement to other benefits. The Green Paper 
proposed that this return to work credit should be rolled out to other areas (DWP, 
2006,a).27 Secondly, personal advisers in the Pathways areas have been able to pro-
vide financial assistance towards any initial expenses accrued by claimants who 
move into work. The maximum payment was initially £300, but this has been re-
duced to £100. A similar approach has been adopted for lone parents on a pilot ba-
sis. In certain areas they have been paid an additional in-work credit for the first £ 
months of their return to work and the government has suggested that it might ex-
tend this provision (DWP, 2007,a).  
The loss of assistance with housing costs has been recognised as one of the 
most significant barriers to work (Rahilly, 2004). Housing benefit “run on” 
(whereby assistance is continued for 4 weeks when the claimant moves into work) 
was initially introduced for claimants leaving the means tested IS and JSA, and has 
now been extended to claimants leaving IB. 
 
Whilst the overall trend may be towards the progressive introduction of incen-
tives to work, the abolition of the back to work bonus in 2004 bucked the trend. 
This had enabled claimants of means tested benefits who moved from part time 
work to full time work to be paid a lump sum calculated as half of their earnings 
over the previous 12 months which had served to reduce their benefit entitlement. 
Conclusion 
The welfare to work agenda in the U.K. has been advanced by means of a series of 
“pilot” programmes in selected geographical areas. This power to introduce pilots 
and local variations to a national scheme had been introduced with the Jobseeker’s 
Act 1995. Whilst it is now difficult to keep up with all these initiatives, there is 
some evidence of their success. The number of young people claiming benefit be-
cause of unemployment has significantly declined (Finn, 2005), the number of IB 
claimants has been falling for the first time, and the employment rate of lone par-
ents has improved by 12 percentage points to 56.5% since 1997 with a 25% reduc-
tion in the number claiming benefits (DWP, 2007,a). It is of course hard to tell how 
much this is due to changes within the conditions of entitlement to social security 
and how much is due to the influence of external factors on the demand for labour. 
The government’s approach is to concentrate on measures to improve the availabil-
ity and suitability of the supply of labour, but in the absence of any continuing in-
crease in demand there is a real possibility that many of the measures become a 
meaningless bureaucratic exercise. As Trevor Buck (1996) wrote of earlier meas-
ures: “there may develop a commonality of interest between the front line decision-
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makers and the majority of claimants to collude in a bureaucratic exercise which 
bears littler relevance to the economic realities of the job market.”. 
Linking rules may reassure those who would otherwise be worried about be-
coming worse off if they can not sustain full time work and need to return from 
work to welfare, but there is also a real concern as to the quality of work that peo-
ple on benefit are being encouraged to take up, and of the possibility that they may 
become trapped in low status, low income employment. The options for education 
for those on benefit are limited to employment related skills training programmes, 
and for many claimants full time education ends benefit entitlement. The impor-
tance of employers to the welfare to work agenda is recognised within the 2007 
Green Paper (DWP, 2007,a), in which the government sets out plans for local em-
ployment partnerships. Employers are to be encouraged to recruit from benefit 
claimants in return for the government’s investment into improving their work 
skills. There is also a recognition of the need to provide in-work training to con-
tinue to improve skill levels and thus aid retention and progression.  
The growing use of sanctions to enforce conditionality runs the risk of exacer-
bating social exclusion rather than tackling it. The evidence suggests that it is those 
who are most vulnerable and who are least “job-ready” who most run the risk of 
sanctions (SSAC, 1997; Dean et al 2003), and that it those people who are already 
motivated to work who most benefit from the work-focussed interviews and choice 
options. More could be done to reduce the barriers to work. Notwithstanding the 
adoption of a national child-care strategy and the incorporation of assistance with 
the cost of childcare within Working Tax Credit, inadequate child-care provision 
remains a real barrier. The Disability Discrimination Acts have so far done little to 
reduce the discrimination suffered by disabled people in employment. 
Over thirty years ago Helen Bolderson (1974) was arguing that an earnings re-
placement benefit (for incapacity) placed “obstacles to rehabilitation and fosters no-
tions of malingering and exploitation”. The increased provision of skills training, 
work-seeking assistance and health management programmes etc. may improve the 
employability of benefit claimants, but claimants may continue to fear that the steps 
that they are required to take to “improve the prospects of work” or to “actively 
seek work” may be taken as evidence of either their capacity for work, or of their 
non-availability for work. The government is of the view that there should “no 
longer be an automatic assumption that just because someone has a health condition 
or is disabled that they are incapable of doing any kind of work” (DWP, 2006,a).28 
Work experience may well be the most significant factor in improving the employ-
ability of claimants, but the fundamental difficulty with earnings replacement bene-
fits remains their inability to promote part time work as a step on the welfare to 
work journey. This is particularly true of those income based benefits that are 
means tested. In addition there is a significant administrative difficulty presented by 
the requirement to report any change of circumstances, so that benefit entitlement 
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can be adjusted accordingly. This does not fit well with the demands of a flexible 
labour market. 
The most obvious way to make benefits more compatible with part time work is 
to significantly increase the disregard of income for benefit purposes. In-work 
benefits for those considered to be in full time work, together with short term 
measures to ease the initial move into work, may make the case on paper that (full 
time) “work pays”, but the financial difference is often marginal. Increasing the dis-
regard applied to income from part time work would, in turn, require additional 
support to be provided to those in full time work to maintain any financial incentive 
to move to full time work. Whilst these changes would add significant costs to the 
social security bill, they could be significantly offset by helping to remove of one 
of the main reasons for the existence of an informal economy.  
The government has proclaimed the success of many of its welfare to work ini-
tiatives, but even with the move to convert what have been largely voluntary oppor-
tunities into conditions enforced by sanctions, it is most unlikely that they will 
achieve the targets that have been set. The main way in which the government is 
likely to be able to reduce the numbers of people claiming incapacity benefits is by 
introducing a new operational definition of incapacity through its amendments to 
the PCA. Thinking here has been heavily influenced by the American insurance in-
dustry, which has itself been developing a “claims management” response to the 
increasing number of claims. Incapacity is seen as a growing social and cultural 
phenomenon which can be distinguished from disease. The most significant growth 
in claims has been because of mental health factors and there is to be a new as-
sessment of mental health for the purposes of entitlement to ESA, drawing upon the 
work of a Technical Working Group which was advised by representatives of the 
American insurance company UNUM (DWP, 2006b and DWP 2007b). The likeli-
hood is that this will result in what Deborah Mallett (2003) has referred to as a 
“sharpening” of the test of medical conditionality, with significant numbers unable 
to claim ESA and having to claim JSA instead.  
Similarly, with lone parents the target is to reduce the number claiming benefits 
by 300,000. At present the benefit claimed is IS, which has none of the work-
seeking requirements of JSA. However, from October 2008 and in line with the 
recommendations of the Freud report (2007), lone parents whose youngest child 
has reached the age of 12 will be required to claim JSA instead of IS, and this age 
will be reduced to 7 years from 2010 (DWP, 2007,a).29 In both cases the govern-
ment’s policy intention is to increase the conditionality attached to groups who 
have not traditionally been considered to be unemployed for benefit purposes. 
These developments are consistent with the Green Paper’s vision for a “single 
gateway to financial and back-to-work support for all claimants” (DWP, 2006,a),30 
and represent a move towards a common earnings replacement benefit for all those 
of working age who are not in full time work (Smith, 1999) in which there will be a 
                                           
29 Para. 34 
30 Executive Summary, para.49. 




blurring of the distinction between benefits for the unemployed and for those previ-
ously considered unable to of work. In the meantime the aim seems to be to make 
all claimants of working age subject to work-related conditions which need to be 
agreed in action plans after compulsory interviews with personal advisers.  
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The Justice Implications of ‘Activation 
Policies’ in the UK 
Michael Adler∗ 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the development of 
social security provisions for the unemployed in the UK and describes the shift 
away from a more passive approach, in which the main function of social security 
was to prevent hardship, towards a more active approach, in which the main func-
tion of social security is to get unemployed people back into work. This shift has 
involved the integration of social security policies and employment policies, which 
were formerly relatively autonomous policy areas in the United Kingdom. The pas-
sive approach was in the ascendancy for the first 40 years after World War 2 while 
the active approach has increased in importance over the last 15-20 years. The first 
part of the chapter concludes by describing the two main elements of the active ap-
proach, the Jobseekers Allowance, which was introduced by the Conservatives in 
1996, and the New Deal, a set of programmes that have been introduced by New 
Labour after its return to government in 1997 and are one of its flagship welfare re-
forms. These developments are analysed at a macro and a micro level. The second 
part of the chapter focuses on these developments to the macro level. It refers to the 
government’s dissatisfaction with the emphasis in the passive approach on rights 
and its neglect of responsibilities. It explores the shift away from a contribution-
based approach to citizenship, in which rights to benefit are derived from work and 
the payment of insurance contributions, first to a status-based approach to citizen-
ship, in which rights to benefit apply to everyone who qualifies on income grounds, 
and then to a reciprocity-based approach to citizenship, in which rights to benefit 
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are dependent on the individual’s behaviour. The third part of the chapter focuses 
on these developments to the micro level. It explores the shift away from a more 
bureaucratic and legalistic type of decision-making towards a more professional 
and managerial one, and examines the implications of this shift for rights of redress 
and accountability. 
The development of social security provisions for the unem-
ployed in the UK and the shift from a passive to an active 
approach 
The Beveridge Legacy 
The Beveridge Report1 proposed and the post-war Labour government introduced, 
with some modifications, a universal scheme of contributory social insurance 
against a range of misfortunes that people encounter in the course of their lives.2 In 
return for what were initially flat-rate, but soon became earnings-related, contribu-
tions, people received flat-rate benefits when they were no longer able to support 
themselves financially, e.g. as a result of an accident at work or through unem-
ployment, sickness, disability or old age. The aim was to prevent want (or poverty) 
by providing a decent level of income as of right and without resort to a means test. 
Beveridge had assumed that, in peacetime, men would go out to work and earn 
enough to support their wives and children, while their wives would stay at home 
and look after the family. However, to contribute to the costs of child rearing, the 
government introduced flat-rate family allowances financed out of taxation3. Men 
who were unable to work could claim social insurance benefits, which were in-
tended to meet the needs of everyone in the household. Thus, men could claim al-
lowances for their wives and dependent children. Although successive governments 
did not abolish means-tested social assistance, it was widely believed that, over 
time, the number of people who were forced to rely on it would decline to a bare 
minimum. This optimistic prognosis followed from two assumptions. The first of 
these was that, by introducing a free National Health Service, the health of the 
population would improve and the number of people who would not be able to 
work on grounds of sickness would decline. The second was that, through Keynes-
ian demand management, full employment would be achieved and the number of 
people unable to find work would be very small indeed. Although an employment 
service was set up, its main functions were to provide careers advice, particularly 
for young people, and to match potential employers with potential employees – it 
                                           
1 Beveridge (1942). 
2 The legislation introduced by the post-war Labour Government did not implement the Beveridge Report 
in full. For an account of the ways in which the legislation differed from Beveridge’s proposals, see, for 
example, Glennerster (1995, chapters 2 and 3). 
3 These were originally for the second and subsequent children. Grants were also introduced to contribute 
to the costs of important ‘life cycle’ events such as birth and death 




was certainly not to pressurise the unemployed back into work. Policy makers as-
sumed that everyone would prefer work to unemployment. 
As it turned out, both the assumptions referred to above turned out to be false. 
In spite of a free National Health Service, the demand for health care continued to 
rise and, after a period of near full employment, unemployment began to rise too. 
Both of these developments had major implications for social security and, contrary 
to the optimistic prognosis outlined above, the number of benefit claims from sick 
and unemployed people did not decline. In this chapter, I shall focus on the impli-
cations of rising unemployment for social security. 
As unemployment began to rise in the 1960s, people experienced longer spells 
of unemployment and many of them exhausted their rights to contributory unem-
ployment benefit. Although Beveridge had recommended that unemployment bene-
fit should last until the unemployed person had found another job, the post-war La-
bour government had limited the payment of unemployment benefit to 12 months. 
After that, the increasing numbers of long-term unemployed had to rely on means-
tested social assistance. In addition, because many young people were unable to 
find employment, they did not acquire the contribution records that would have en-
titled them to unemployment benefit. They, and others who experienced intermit-
tent spells of unemployment, also had to rely on social assistance. The number of 
single parent households headed by women, most of whom had not paid contribu-
tions and were therefore not entitled to unemployment (or any other contributory) 
benefit also increased. Thus, by the 1960s, it was clear that more and more people 
were falling through the social insurance net and becoming dependant on social as-
sistance. However, instead of increasing the scope and coverage of social insur-
ance, as it might have been expected to do, the incoming Labour government4 de-
cided instead to strengthen social assistance, which was ‘re-launched’ as supple-
mentary benefit (the forerunner of today’s income support and the social fund) in 
1966. 
These developments had a number of consequences. As far as the unemployed 
were concerned, it institutionalised a two-tier structure of social security provisions, 
comprising unemployment insurance for those who met the contribution conditions 
for 12 months and supplementary benefit for those who did not.5 Those who were 
dependent on supplementary benefit, comprised school leavers and other young 
people who had not been in work long enough to fulfill the contribution require-
ments and the ‘long-term’ unemployed who had exhausted their entitlement to un-
employment benefit. 
Until 1966, unemployment (and sickness) benefit were paid at a flat rate that 
did not take into account previous earnings. However, in 1966, earnings-related 
supplements (ERS) to these benefits were introduced − in the case of unemploy-
                                           
4 After 13 years of Conservative rule, Labour was returned to office in 1964. In opposition, Labour had 
been antipathetic to means testing. See Atkinson (1969). 
5 Although supplementary benefit was paid at two rates, a lower rate for the first 24 months and a higher 
rate after that, the unemployed were not paid at the higher rate. They were the only claimant group who 
were excluded from the higher rate. 




ment benefit, the earnings-related supplement lasted for six months. Unemploy-
ment (and sickness) benefits were not taxable and those who were unemployed for 
short periods often received tax rebates and were subject to less tax if/when they 
returned to work.6 By the end of the 1960s, the average replacement rate for the 
first 13 weeks of unemployment was 87% and, for 35.2% of the unemployed, it 
was higher than 90%.7 The government soon began to express concern that this 
situation might reduce the incentive for the unemployed to move into paid em-
ployment. 
This phenomenon, known as the unemployment trap,8 had been recognised by 
Beveridge who had argued, in his 1942 Report, that ‘it is dangerous to allow benefit 
during unemployment or disability to equal or exceed earnings during work… 
…[and that]… the gap between income during earning and during interruption of 
earning should be as large as possible’9. This was achieved by keeping benefit lev-
els for the unemployed low and, for low paid workers, by resorting to the wage 
stop, which limited the amount of social assistance an unemployed person could 
receive to what that person would be earning if he/she had been in work. However, 
because the government was, in due course, persuaded that it was wrong for the so-
cial security system to pay benefits at less than subsistence level during periods of 
high unemployment, the wage stop was used less and less and it was eventually 
abolished in 1975. 
The government introduced a series of measures to deal with the disincentive 
effects of the unemployment trap. These involved a mixture of carrots and sticks. 
During the 1970s, it introduced a range of means-tested benefits, which were de-
signed to boost the incomes of people in low paid employment. These included 
Family Income Supplement (the forerunner of today’s Tax Credits) – introduced in 
197110 – for families with dependent children, and rent and rate rebates (the fore-
runners of today’s Housing and Council Tax Benefit) – introduced in 1972 – which 
provided assistance with rent and rates. Between 1979, when the Conservative 
Party (led by Margaret Thatcher) returned to office, and 1988, a plethora of policy 
changes,11 which included abolishing the earnings-related supplement and making 
benefits liable to taxation, led to a substantial reduction in the incomes of the un-
                                           
6 The size of the rebate and the reduction in tax liability depended on when in te tax year the person had 
become unemployed. 
7 See Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984, p. 58). 
8 The unemployment trap refers to the lack of financial incentives for unemployed people to return to 
work. It is caused by high replacement rates, i.e. by incomes for people who are unemployed that ap-
proach (and in some cases exceed) incomes they did or could obtain from work. Income out of work in-
cluded unemployment benefit, supplementary benefit, child benefit, housing benefit and tax rebates while 
income in work comprised wages, child benefit and housing benefit net of income tax and national insur-
ance contributions. The calculations assume that people claim all the benefits to which they are entitled. 
9 Beveridge (1942, p. 154, para 411). 
10 After six years in opposition, the Conservatives were returned to office in 1970. 
11 Atkinson and Micklewright claim that a total of 38 significant changes to unemployment benefit and to 
supplementary benefit and housing benefit for the unemployed were implemented in the 10-year period 
from 1979 to 1988. A small minority of these changes favoured the unemployed, a few were neutral but 
the large majority were unfavourable. See Atkinson (1989), chapter 8. 




employed. By the early 1980s, the average replacement rate for the first 13 weeks 
of unemployment had fallen to 60% and, for only 2.9% of the unemployed, was it 
higher than 90%.12 However, the increased reliance on means-tested benefits cre-
ated another problem, known as the poverty trap.13 
During the 1980s, some low paid workers faced marginal tax rates of more than 
100 per cent.14 This meant that an increase in earnings could actually leave them 
worse off than they were before unless their earnings rose substantially and this fu-
elled demands for substantial wage increases. By reducing tax rates and altering the 
rates (known as ‘tapers’) at which means-tested benefits are withdrawn, the number 
of people experiencing marginal tax rates of 100 per cent was reduced, although the 
numbers experiencing marginal tax rates of 60-80 per cent actually increased. More 
recently, the introduction of a national minimum wage in 1997 has undoubtedly re-
duced the severity of this problem. 
The Balance between Help and Control 
Policies towards the unemployed have always involved a mixture of help and con-
trol. 
Help has taken two forms. First, social security benefits have provided a 
substitute income that, however inadequate it may have been, has pre-
vented destitution; second, employment services have provided help, which 
has sometimes included training, in finding new employment. 
Control has taken a number of forms. From the start of the contributory un-
employment benefit scheme in 1911, unemployed persons could be dis-
qualified from benefit if: 
• they left work ‘without good cause’, 
• they were dismissed for ‘misconduct’, and 






The justification for these penalties is that they were needed to protect the integrity 
of the national insurance fund. In private insurance, people who are deemed to be 
responsible for their own misfortune do not receive insurance payments. In social 
insurance, the rules are not quite so strict but it has always been argued that those 
who bring their misfortune on themselves should not be able to make a claim on the 
                                           
12 See Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984, p. 58). 
13 The poverty trap refers to the situation in which a low-paid worker could find that, if his/her earnings 
were to increase, he/she would not only have to pay more in income tax (then 30p in the £1.00) and na-
tional insurance contributions (then 9p in the £1.00), but would also experience a withdrawal of their 
means-tested benefits (housing benefit at between 28p and 33p in the £1.00, FIS at 50p in the £1.00, as 
well as un unspecified amount of ‘passport’ benefits). Thus, for a low paid worker, an increase in earnings 
of, say, £1.00 might well lead to, say, 80p being lost due to a combination of increases in taxation and re-
ductions in benefits. This would be equivalent to an effective ‘marginal rate of taxation’ of 80 per cent – 
far higher than anything experienced by those with higher earnings. 
14 This assumes that they claimed all the benefits to which they were entitled when they were out of work. 




fund in the same way as those who experience misfortune through no fault of their 
own. 
Although unemployed persons could be disqualified from unemployment bene-
fit for periods of up to six weeks15, they could still claim means-tested social assis-
tance, although this was reduced to below subsistence level (the deduction was 40 
per cent of the value of the personal allowance for a single claimant of their age). 
The Paradox of Control 
During the years of low unemployment, from the 1940s until the 1960s, the control 
function was relatively unimportant. However, during the years of high unemploy-
ment, from the 1970s until the 1990s, it became much more important. There is 
something of a paradox in this: one might think that, as far as the unemployed are 
concerned, controls against abuse of the benefits system would be greater when 
work was easy to obtain (because unemployment was low) than when work was 
hard to find (because unemployment was high). In fact, the reverse is the case. 
In the early 1970s, the government decided that the employment service was too 
closely associated with the system of unemployment benefits – unemployed per-
sons ‘signed on’, they were assessed for benefit, and they sought information about 
employment opportunities in the same place. The following quotation, from a De-
partment of Employment publication16, makes it clear why a change of policy was 
thought to be necessary. 
‘The majority of workers who register with the employment office are those 
claiming unemployment benefits. For this reason, the service is regarded by 
many workers as a service for the unemployed – and mainly for manual workers 
at that. … The task facing the service is to break out of the situation where em-
ployers do not use it because they doubt – somewhat rightly – whether it has 
suitable people on its books and where workers seeking jobs do not visit the local 
employment office because the vacancies they want are not notified by the em-
ployer.’ 
The Government decided that, if the employment service was to be an active force 
in the labour market, its links with the benefit system would have to be weakened. 
In accordance with this philosophy, it set up a network of Job Centres, run by the 
Manpower Services Commission. Many of these Job Centres were located in shop 
fronts in the main shopping areas of our towns and cities where they still are today. 
However, one consequence of this divorce was that, because employment service 
staff were reluctant to get involved with the control mechanisms referred to above, 
social security staff were instructed to enforce them more strictly. 
                                           
15 The 1911 National Insurance Act imposed a blanket six-week disqualification but the 1920 National 
Insurance Act replaced this by a period of ‘up to six weeks’. This provision was carried forward into the 
National Insurance Act 1946 and remained the statutory position until it was increased, first to 13 weeks in 
1986 and then to 26 weeks in 1988. See Section 1.5 below. 
16 Department of Employment (1971), cited in Hill (1990, p. 135). 




In the late 1980s, the policy was put into reverse. The Manpower Services 
Commission was abolished and its functions were taken over by the Department of 
Employment. A quotation from a later Department of Employment publication17 
makes the thinking behind the policy reversal clear. 
‘Many of those who are genuinely unemployed have lost touch with the jobs mar-
ket. That is why the separate management of the Job Centre network and the Un-
employment Benefit Service no longer makes any sense. Over recent years, un-
employed people have continued to attend benefit offices, but their contact with 
Job Centres has often been limited to occasional scrutiny of the self-service dis-
plays. There has been no opportunity for Job Centre staff to advise them regu-
larly and individually about the jobs, training and other opportunities available. 
It is in no-one’s interest that unemployed people remain out of touch with the 
jobs market and become passive recipients of unemployment benefits.’ 
Thus, the wheel came full circle. The last 15-20 years have seen the increasing in-
tegration of help and control for the unemployed, with the two functions now dis-
charged by a single agency, Jobcentre Plus. This agency administers the payment of 
benefits for the unemployed but its main function is to ‘persuade’ the unemployed, 
using a mixture of carrots and sticks, to get back into the labour market, either di-
rectly by finding a job or indirectly by undertaking training to improve their em-
ployability. 
The establishment of Jobcentre Plus in 2002 reflected a new mode of govern-
ance for social security. The Employment Service, which had been part of the De-
partment for Education and Employment (DfEE), was transferred to the Depart-
ment of Social Security (DSS) and the DSS was renamed the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP). This change was associated with the introduction of an indi-
vidualised service in which Personal Advisers meet claimants to discuss their work 
aspirations and options; assist them in searching for jobs; explore their training 
needs and the availability of training programmes; advise them on childcare and the 
availability of specialist services, such as services for those with drug or alcohol 
dependency; and make indicative calculations about whether or not they would be 
better off in work or on benefit.18 It was made possible by the transfer of front-line 
staff from the Employment Service, who had a more ‘professional’ orientation to 
their work than their counterparts from the Benefits Agency, whose orientation was 
more ‘administrative’.19 In parallel with this change, the role of the Treasury 
changed from that of providing resources for the DSS to enable it to implement its 
                                           
17 Department of Employment (1988), cited in Hill (1990, p. 136). 
18 Stafford (2003, p. 221). 
19 Emloyment staff were, for example, expected to have an in-depth knowledge of local labour markets, to 
understand the employment needs of employers, to be able to offer specialist help and advice to employers 
on training, rates of pay, equal opportunities and employing people from overseas, to be well informed 
about disability and equal opportunities issues, to be able to identify those who would benefit from train-
ing, to be able to match applicants with jobs. Their work involved the application of this knowledge to the 
needs of jobseekers. By contrast, the work of most Benefits Agency Staff involved the application of rules 
to the circumstances of claimants and was more routinised. 




agenda (which had been its role in the past) to that of monitoring the services pro-
vided, on a quasi-contractual basis,20 by the DWP and its agencies.21 
Active and Passive Intervention 
It is sometimes said of the Beveridge scheme of social insurance that it was essen-
tially passive.22 By this is meant that the post-war social security system that was 
inspired by Beveridge was designed to respond to the circumstances of people’s 
lives but not to influence them. 
This passive approach implies that the main function of social security is to 
prevent hardship. It does so by providing a replacement income for the male 
breadwinner who loses his job. Unemployment benefit was initially regarded as a 
temporary expedient that would only be required for a short period (it lasted for 12 
months) until the unemployed man found a new full-time job. Although single 
women were eligible for unemployment benefit, married women were regarded as 
being outside the unemployment benefit scheme because their role was that of wife 
and mother and, if they worked, they only did so on a part-time basis when the 
children had left home. 
When unemployment began to increase and the two-parent household began to 
break down, the inadequacies of unemployment benefit became apparent. The 
number of long-term unemployed persons and the number of single parents started 
to increase and social assistance became the main source of support for them. In an 
attempt to prevent hardship, the government responded by introducing higher bene-
fit rates for the long-term unemployed who were dependent on supplementary 
benefit (the forerunner of income support), and additional payments to lone parents 
in receipt of child benefit and income support. However, this approach did not last 
for long and soon gave way to the more active approach that has been adopted in 
the last 15-20 years. 
The active approach implies that the main function of social security is to 
change people’s labour market behaviour – mainly by placing much greater empha-
sis on getting unemployed people into work and discouraging them from relying on 
benefits. This involved reducing benefit levels, tightening up on the eligibility rules 
for unemployment insurance, increasing the use of means-tested unemployment as-
sistance and attempting to change people’s lifestyle choices, e.g. by reducing bene-
                                           
20 These comprised a Public Service Agreement, in which the Department set out its policy objectives for 
the next three years, and a Service Delivery Agreement, in which it specified how these objectives would 
be met and the indicators against which its performance would be measured. 
21 Carmel and Papadopoulos (2003, p. 40). 
22 This characterisation has been vigorously challenged, in particular by my Edinburgh colleague, Adrian 
Sinfield, who has argued that social security policy in the UK, and elsewhere, has always involved a mix-
ture of ‘active’ (labour market) and ‘passive’ (income replacement) measures. See, for example, Sinfield 
(2003). I accept that this is the case but would, nonetheless, argue that the balance between these of ‘ac-
tive’ and ‘passive’ measures has changed and that is the argument I attempt to advance in this section of 
the paper. 




fits for single parents with the aim of making life as a lone parent less attractive and 
encouraging them to take work, live with relatives or find a new partner. 
The first approach, which is the one put forward in the Beveridge Report, was 
the dominant one for more than 40 years while the second approach has been in-
creasing in importance over the last 15-20 years. It began to take hold in the late 
1980s under the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major and should not 
only be associated with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 
Following the example of the Reagan administration in the USA, the first two 
Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher23 adopted an increasingly neo-
liberal approach to policy – employment rights were reduced, wages councils abol-
ished and benefit levels reduced. After the 1987 general election, the government’s 
approach to the unemployed and the welfare state government changed quite dra-
matically. The overall aim of policy became that of reducing welfare dependency 
by restricting benefit eligibility and policing the job-seeking behaviour of the un-
employed more closely. The Department of Employment was given the primary 
task of re-motivating and improving the employability of those who had given up 
looking for work.  
By the end of the decade, new legislation had re-defined the position of those 
without work. Most unemployed 16 and 17 year olds lost the right to Income Sup-
port, in return for which they were offered a place on a Youth Training Scheme 
(YTS), and the claims of those above that age, in particular the longer-term unem-
ployed, were scrutinised more rigorously. The previous requirement that claimants 
should be ‘available for work’ was replaced by a stronger requirement that they 
should be ‘actively seeking work’. In addition, everyone who had been unemployed 
for six months was offered a ‘voluntary’ Restart interview, in which they were 
given advice and information about training and encouraged to agree on a course of 
action that would get them back into work. 
By 1995, a much stricter benefits regime was in place. Compulsory conditions 
were imposed on those who failed to find employment and the use of sanctions for 
those who did not meet them was stepped up. However, ‘carrots’ were used as well 
as ‘sticks’. The Department of Employment became involved in promoting in-work 
benefits, and claimants were increasingly given in-work benefit assessments along-
side the reviews of their job-seeking activities. These in-work benefits (involving 
assessments of entitlement to Family Credit, for those with dependent children, 
Housing Benefit, for tenants, and Council Tax Benefit) were intended to ameliorate 
the unemployment trap and encourage the low-paid to take jobs that were increas-
ingly being generated in the deregulated labour market. 
When the Labour Party was returned to government in 1997, it did not attempt 
to put the clock back but set out to develop a new ‘Third Way’ which incorporated 
some of the neo-liberal ideas that had been put in place by the Conservatives, while 
maintaining its social democratic commitment to social justice.24 Its centrepiece 
                                           
23 Elected in 1979 and 1983. 
24 See Giddens (1998). 




was the New Deal, a set of policies that the new government announced in its first 
budget in 1997. The avowed aim of these policies was to get young people, single 
parents and the long-term unemployed into work, in the belief that, for those who 
are able to work, work is the best guarantor of welfare. A distinction was made be-
tween those who were able to work, who were to be helped and/or cajoled into 
work by one of six New Deal programmes – the New Deals for Young People (un-
der 25), the Over 25s, for Over 50s, the Partners of Unemployed People, Disabled 
people, and Lone Parents – and those who were not able to work, who would con-
tinue to receive ‘unconditional’ support from social security. A number of separate 
‘businesses’ were set up to deliver benefits and services, one of which (Jobcentre 
Plus) has agency status and provides benefits and services to everyone, except dis-
abled people and their carers, who is of working age.25. 
Initial funding for the New Deal was provided by a £5 billion ‘windfall tax’ on 
the profits of recently privatised public utilities. The key feature of the New Deal, 
which distinguished it from previous initiatives, was the provision of support tai-
lored to the needs and circumstances of its client groups. Programmes are specific 
to target groups (such as young people or lone parents), a range of provision is of-
fered within each programme, and, most importantly, each participant has a New 
Deal Personal Advisor (NPDA) whose role is to provide individualised and con-
tinuous support during the period of participation in the New Deal.26 
Although the periodic, work-related interviews (known as ‘Restart interviews’), 
which were introduced for the longer-term unemployed in 1986, were compulsory, 
in the sense that claimants’ benefits could be reduced or withdrawn if they refused 
to attend ‘without good cause’, and attendance at work-focused training courses 
such as ‘Employment Training’ was a condition of entitlement to benefit, New La-
bour chose to emphasise the punitive elements of the Conservative legacy.27 Under 
compulsory New Deal programmes,28 increased sanctions, including the ‘full fam-
ily sanction’, which allows for the reduction of all the benefits claimed by the 
household, were introduced and the extent of compulsion has increased. 
Jobseekers Allowance and the New Deal 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), which replaced the combination of contributory un-
employment benefit and means-tested income support by a single benefit with uni-
                                           
25 The others are the Child Support Agency, which is also an executive agency and is responsible for run-
ning the child support system; the Disability and Carers Service, which is part of the Department for Work 
and Pensions and administers benefits for disabled people under pension age and their carers; and The 
Pension Service, which is also part of the DWP and provides a dedicated service for present and future 
pensioners. 
26 It has been argued that the provision of support that is tailored to the needs and circumstances of differ-
ent client groups distinguishes the New Deal from activation programmes in other liberal welfare states, 
e.g. in Australia and the USA. See Carney (2005). 
27 See Bryson (2003, p. 82). 
28 The New Deals for Young People and for the Over 25s are compulsory, while those for Lone Parents, 
Disabled People, the Over 50s and Partners are voluntary. 




fied rules, was introduced in 1996. It was designed to emphasise the responsibility 
of the unemployed to take advantage of every opportunity offered to them to return 
to work.29 Since then everyone in receipt of JSA has been required to enter a ‘Job-
seekers Agreement’ specifying the detailed weekly steps that they are expected to 
take in looking for work. These activities are monitored at fortnightly intervals. In 
addition to imposing sanctions for misconduct, voluntarily leaving work without 
just cause and refusal or failure to apply for or accept a job vacancy, JSA officials 
were given a new discretionary power to issue a ‘Jobseekers Direction’, which re-
quires those in receipt of JSA to look for jobs in particular ways, take specific steps 
to ‘improve their employability’ or take part in a training scheme.  
The duration of the sanction for misconduct, voluntarily leaving work without 
just cause and refusal or failure to apply for or accept a job vacancy is a discretion-
ary matter and claimants can now be disqualified from benefit for a period of up to 
26 weeks.30 By contrast, claimants who breach a ‘Jobseeker’s Direction’ are dis-
qualified from benefit for a fixed period of two-weeks or, in the event of a further 
breach within the next 12 months, for four weeks.31 Since the introduction of the 
New Deal, the sanctions that formerly applied only to work have been extended to 
cover prescribed training schemes and employment programmes.32 Table 1 below 
lists the number of cases between 2000 and 2005 referred by Jobcentre staff, who 
had doubts about a claimant, to a Sector Decision Maker who decided whether the 
doubts were sufficiently well founded for a sanction to be imposed. 
 
                                           
29 It contains a contribution-based element, which lasts for 6 months (contributory unemployment benefit 
lasted for one year), which does not contain any dependent’s allowances, and an income-based or means-
tested element, which is intended to cover the needs of the unemployed person and his/her household. JSA 
is paid at different rates for different age groups – there is a very low rate for those exceptional cases of 
people under 18 who are entitled to it, a reduced rate for those aged 18-24, and a standard rate for those 
aged 25 or over. Considering that average earnings for full-time adult employees were £457 pw in April 
2007, that median earnings for men in full-time employment were £498 pw for men and £394 pw for 
women, and that the standard rate of means-tested JSA is £60.50 pw, it is clear that Jobseekers Allowance 
provides very inadequate protection for most people. It is uprated annually in line with prices rather than 
wages and, in recent years, has fallen further behind the average increase in wages. 
30 For details see Wikeley and Ogus (2005, p. 373, n. 324). 
31 See Wikeley and Ogus (2005, p. 375). 
 
32 Like the sanctions for breaching a ‘Jobseeker’s Direction’, the training-related sanctions are non-
discretionary. Claimants are disqualified for two weeks for a first breach, for four weeks for a second 
breach within 12 months and for of 26 weeks for another breach within 12 months of the second breach. 
The latter penalty is particularly draconian. For a detailed account of the sanctions themselves, see Wike-
ley and Ogus (2005, pp. 375-6). For a review of the sanctions regime, which includes an account of its 
impact on claimants, see Peters and Joyce (2006).  




Table 1: Sanctions imposed on Unemployed Claimants, April 2000 – August 2005 
 
Type of decision Cases referred for 
decision 




Variable length:    
Leaving employment volun-
tarily 
1,385,590 32 443,388 
Refusal of employment 439,490 40 175.796 
Lost employment through 
misconduct 
358,490 26 93,207 
Neglect to avail of an oppor-
tunity of employment 
1,100 25 275 
Discharge from H M Forces 230 15 35 
Fixed length:    
Giving up a place on a train-
ing scheme or an employ-
ment programme 
36,990 55 20,345 
Losing a place on a training 
scheme or an employment 
programme 
67,510 62 41,856 
Refusal of a place on a train-
ing scheme or an employ-
ment programme 
4,600 66 3,036 
Neglect to avail of a place on 
a training scheme or an em-
ployment programme 
3,930 51 2,004 
Failure to attend a place on 
a training scheme or an em-
ployment programme 
197,950 61 120,750 
Refusal to carry out a 
Jobseekers Direction 
41,510 64 26,566 
 
Source: Peters and Joyce (2006, Table D2). 
 
 
From the above, it is clear that, although most referrals do not result in the imposi-
tion of sanctions, this is a commonplace event. 927,458 sanctions were imposed 
over the period April 2000-August 2005, corresponding to an annual rate of 
173,898 sanctions per year. Of this total, 133,631 (76.8 per cent) related directly to 
the circumstances in which a claimant left their previous employment or the refusal 
of an offer of employment, while 40,266 (23.2 per cent) were fixed-term sanctions 
imposed on those who did not fulfill their training or job search responsibilities. 
Claimants who disagree with the imposition of a sanction can ask for the decision 
to be ‘reconsidered’ and it is reported that approximately 20 per cent of the sanc-
tions imposed for leaving work voluntarily are lifted in this way.33 However, no 
                                           
33 Peters and Joyce (2006, p 67). In some of these cases, the claimant may have applied additional infor-
mation which was not available when the original decision was made. 




systematic data is available. There is likewise no systematic data on the number of 
appeals against the imposition of sanctions or the outcome of these appeals al-
though anecdotal evidence suggests that appeals against sanctions are now rela-
tively uncommon.34 
Although most people appear to support the government’s commitment to se-
curing employment for those who are out of work, and there is some evidence that 
the measures introduced by the government have contributed to the high employ-
ment rate and the relatively low levels of unemployment in the UK,35 there is a 
danger that its approach may become excessively authoritarian. The government’s 
obsession with social security fraud and the widespread use of television adver-
tisements,36 which encourage the public to treat those in receipt of social security 
with suspicion, reinforce the efforts of social get claimants off benefit and into 
work. As a result, claimants who are not really capable of work may be pressurised 
into seeking work and subjected to sanctions when they fail to obtain it and this 
emphasis on work may lead to the stigmatising of people on benefit. The applica-
tion to recipients of Incapacity Benefit of many aspects of the regime that was de-
veloped for recipients of Jobseekers’ Allowance, e.g. frequent attendance at work-
focused interviews with a Personal Adviser, was intended to produce a further shift 
in the boundary between those who can and those who cannot work, and to result in 
further reductions in the number of people on benefit. 
Under the Welfare Reform Act 2007, the process is being accelerated with the 
aim of getting 1 million of the 2.7 million claimants who are currently in receipt of 
Incapacity Benefit back into employment. Incapacity Benefit, and Income Support 
paid on the grounds of incapacity, will be scrapped in October 2008 and replaced 
by a new Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), which will have a new, 
stricter test of disability than the test that was used for Incapacity Benefit.37 Those 
who cannot engage in work-related activity will receive a 'support component'. 
Those who can engage in work-related activity will receive a 'work-related activity 
component' but may be required to undertake a work-focused health-related as-
sessment aimed at providing additional information about their functional capacity; 
to attend a work-focused interview to discuss what steps they can take to move to-
wards work; or to undertake activities, such as work trials, training, or attending a 
programme designed to help them manage their condition, which would increase 
their likelihood of getting a job. 
Claimants who are assessed as not being able to take part in any work-related 
activity (the minority who are most severely disabled) will not be expected to take 
part in work-focused activities unless they want to and will not be subject to any 
sanctions. They will receive a minimum of £89.50 a week and will be given a guar-
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anteed income of £102.10 a week. Everyone in this group will benefit since the 
long-term rate for Incapacity Benefit is currently £84.50 a week but the poorest will 
benefit most. Claimants who are assessed as capable of taking part in some form of 
work-related activity (the majority who are less severely disabled) will be entitled 
to claim ESA at £84.50 a week, i.e. at the same rate as Incapacity Benefit. They 
will be required to attend work-focused interviews, which are intended to help them 
overcome barriers to work and support them into sustainable employment, and their 
benefit may be cut if they do not do so.38 
The shift from a contribution-based approach first to a 
status-based approach and then to a reciprocity-based ap-
proach to citizenship 
The Balance between Rights and Responsibilities 
Underpinning the New Deal is a shift in the way government perceives the rela-
tionship between the state and the claimant. The government referred to this as ‘a 
change in the contract between the state and the individual’,39 which involved new 
rights for the claimant in return for the acceptance of new responsibilities. The 
new rights included the right to expect government to guarantee the availability of 
good quality job-search advice, training opportunities and employment (in a nor-
mal, unsubsidised job or in a job subsidised by the state). The new responsibilities 
involved an obligation to take full advantage of these opportunities. A ‘hand-up’ 
rather than a ‘hand-out’ became the new mantra: work rather than benefits became 
the main route to social security, and the New Deal was central to the new strat-
egy.40 
This new approach reflected, in part, the government’s dissatisfaction with the 
emphasis in the passive approach outlined above on rights and the neglect of re-
sponsibilities. In order to understand its concern, it will be helpful to clarify the 
meaning of rights and responsibilities and their relationship to citizenship. 
A right is an enforceable claim and individuals who have rights can enforce 
their claims against other individuals, corporate entities or the state. Moral rights, 
which are enforceable by appeals to morality, can be distinguished from legal 
rights, which are enforceable by appeals to the law, if necessary through appeals 
to the courts. If we were to say that everyone has a right to a job then, in the ab-
sence of any commitment by government to enforce this, we would be asserting a 
moral right. However, if, by acting as employer of last resort, the government 
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were prepared to guarantee that jobs could be found for everyone, e.g. by acting 
as employer of last resort, we would be asserting a legal right. What is at issue 
here are legal rights that people might wish to enforce against the government, for 
example the right to social security, and whether these rights should entail respon-
sibilities for the rights holder. 
Citizenship as a Contested Concept 
Citizenship is one of a set of moral and political concepts known as ‘essentially 
contested concepts’41. As such, it can be defined in relatively uncontentious, un-
controversial way but is open to a range of interpretations. Thus, it can be defined 
in terms of the rights and duties that people enjoy as a result of being members of 
a community. However, this leaves open the nature of the rights and duties, the 
balance between them, and the identity of the community (which may be a nation 
state but may equally be the international community) referred to in the definition. 
Disagreements over these issues are unlikely ever to be finally settled and it is this 
fact that, in my view, makes citizenship an ‘essentially contested concept’. 
The traditional view of citizenship, which is associated with the writings of T. 
H. Marshall42, is that social rights, which include the right to social security, are 
an essential component of citizenship. Marshall defines citizenship as ‘a status 
that is bestowed on everyone who is a full member of a community’ and draws 
attention to the tension or contradiction between the idea of citizenship and the 
operation of markets in a capitalist society. This is because citizenship is an egali-
tarian concept while capitalism inevitably involves economic and social inequali-
ties. Marshall believed that citizenship could not only co-exist with and amelio-
rate these inequalities but could also legitimate them and make them more accept-
able, and that the post-war welfare state provided the institutional means for re-
solving the conflict between individual choice, freedom, markets and capitalism 
on the one hand, and collective welfare, equality, politics and socialism on the 
other. 
Marshall argued that citizenship comprises three clusters of rights: civil rights, 
political rights and social rights. 
• Civil rights refer to rights which are necessary for individual freedom 
(freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion), the right to own property and conclude valid con-
tracts, and the right to justice (habeus corpus, i.e. freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, the assumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the right to 
a fair trial) 
• Political rights comprise the right to participate in the exercise of politi-
cal power both as a voter and as a candidate 
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• Social rights embrace the right to ‘a modicum of economic welfare and 
security and to live the life of a civilised person according to the stan-
dards of society’. 
Each of the three clusters of rights is associated with a different set of institutions. 
Thus, civil rights are intimately bound up with and, in theory, protected by the 
courts; political rights are linked to parliament; while social rights are − at least in 
Britain − associated with the social services, i.e. with the provision of benefits 
(like social security) and services (like health care and education) by the state. 
According to Marshall, citizenship as such did not exist in feudal society. The 
formative period for civil rights was the 18th century (more exactly the period be-
tween the Reformation and the first Reform Act in 1832), for political rights it 
was the nineteenth century and for social rights it was the twentieth century, al-
though there was clearly some overlap. Thus, the process was both sequential and 
evolutionary (civil rights came first, political rights next and social rights last) and 
the welfare state was to be understood as the culmination of this evolutionary 
process. 
Although Marshall’s thesis has been very influential, it has also generated a 
great deal of criticism. It has been criticised by comparative scholars (like Mi-
chael Mann43) on the grounds that it is entirely about Britain and other countries 
do not fit the British model and because the evidence from other countries sug-
gests that citizenship is not necessarily built up in the sequence Marshall de-
scribes. The experience of other countries makes it clear that capitalism does not 
necessarily lead to the welfare state 
This criticism has enabled right-wing liberals (like Norman Barry44) to criti-
cise Marshall for presenting a left-wing justification for the welfare state. These 
critics argue that citizenship is made up of civil and political rights only and that 
‘social rights’ are not really a component of citizenship because they can only be 
achieved at the expense of other, more fundamental, rights, in particular property 
rights. Thus, for example, a ‘right’ to social security pre-supposes a social secu-
rity system paid for out of taxation but the principle of taxation is inconsistent 
with respect for property rights. 
It has also been criticised by internationalists (like Yasemin Soysal45) for 
adopting a national conception of citizenship and for ignoring its international 
dimension, i.e. the rights (and responsibilities) people have in common as citizens 
of states that are governed by international treaties and conventions. Soysal de-
velops a more universal conception of citizenship, based on ‘universal person-
hood’ rather than ‘national belonging’, that finds expression in international trea-
ties and conventions like the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and numerous agreements of international bodies 
like the ILO, the WHO and other UN agencies. Although some of these interna-
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tional treaties and Conventions, e.g. UN Declaration on Human Rights, lack any 
means of enforcement and are merely aspirational, others, e.g. the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, can be enforced and clearly do add an extra dimension 
to the meaning of citizenship. 
Another criticism has come from feminists (like Ruth Lister46) who criticise 
Marshall for focusing on the effects of citizenship on class inequalities and for ig-
noring its effects on other forms of inequality, in particular gender inequalities. 
Marshall conceived of the citizen as an independent, autonomous male actor who 
participates as an individual in the labour market and in the political process and 
receives benefits and services on the basis of individual entitlement. However, 
this conceptualisation does not fit the circumstances of women with dependent 
children who are often excluded from full participation in the market, whose par-
ticipation in politics is frequently limited by their caring responsibilities, and for 
whom the receipt of benefits may reflect their dependent status within the house-
hold. 
It has also been criticised by communitarians (like Amitai Etzioni47) for its 
emphasis on rights and its neglect of responsibilities. These critics argue that citi-
zenship should take account of responsibilities as well as rights and that it should 
attempt to seek a proper balance between them. Such a balancing act could pro-
vide the basis for an active form of citizenship in which people are required to do 
things for society as well as expecting society to do things for them. 
It is the fifth criticism that concerns us here. The passive approach to social 
security regards social security as an unconditional right, i.e. as something which 
those who are citizens should be able to claim ‘as of right’ and without any condi-
tions attached. The active approach to social security is critical of this one-sided 
emphasis on rights, arguing that a ‘something for nothing’ approach results in 
people making demands against the state without feeling any obligation to con-
tribute anything to society, that it leads to ‘welfare dependency’ which is not only 
costly for society because it involves supporting people who ought to be able to 
support themselves, creates ‘perverse incentives’, undermines the work ethic and 
the nuclear family, and is conducive to anti-social behavior. 
Contribution-Based, Status-Based and Reciprocity-Based Conceptions of So-
cial Citizenship 
In a series of articles, the political theorist Raymond Plant48 has argued that, over 
a long period, the British welfare state has oscillated between two contrasting no-
tions of social citizenship and has analysed recent reforms to the social security 
system associated with welfare to work programmes and the New Deal in terms of 
these contrasting notions. 
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The first of these notions regards citizenship as a status that is not fundamen-
tally altered by the virtue (or lack of it) of the individual and is not concerned with 
whether (or not) the individual is making a recognised contribution to society. On 
this view, status and membership are the crucial issues rather than whether the 
person lives a life which others approve of or makes a positive contribution to so-
ciety as a whole. This notion of citizenship is associated with negative rights 
(rights not to be interfered with) and positive rights (rights to what Plant calls ‘the 
socio-economic conditions of citizenship’, i.e. to health care, education and wel-
fare. Thus, whether or not a person lives a life that is approved of by others, as 
long as that person does not interfere with others, he or she should be secure in his 
or her rights, both negative and positive. 
The second of these notions places less emphasis on rights and focuses instead 
on virtue, contribution and reciprocity. According to this view, citizenship is not a 
pre-existing status but is, rather, something that people earn by fulfilling their ob-
ligations to society. Citizenship is, therefore, an achievement rather than a status. 
It follows that individuals do not have a right to the resources of society unless 
they have contributed to it by working or by engaging in some other socially val-
ued activity, assuming that they are in a position to do so. 
Plant argues that these two notions of citizenship have informed the develop-
ment of the British welfare state. According to him, the Poor Law, which was the 
earliest form of public provision for those who were unable to provide for them-
selves, was based neither on contribution nor on contract but on mere membership 
of the community and it is in this sense it embodied the first notion of citizenship. 
This is a somewhat unusual claim in the sense that three of the key features of the 
Poor Law were punishing the ‘able bodied’, i.e. those who were capable of work, 
in ‘houses of correction’; requiring households to exhaust their own resources be-
fore providing relief; and depriving those in receipt of relief of their civil and po-
litical rights. However, the Poor Law did provide relief, of sorts, for those who 
were deemed to lack virtue, whose lives were not approved of, because they were 
unwilling or unable to support themselves. This approach stands in complete con-
trast with an insurance-based approach, in which the benefits that people receive 
when they are no longer able to work are based on the contributions they pay 
when they are able to do so. In this approach, which embodies the second notion 
of citizenship, benefits are earned by those who fulfill their obligations to society 
by working. 
Beveridge embraced the contributory principle and made a sharp distinction 
between insurance and assistance, believing that social security should be based 
on participation in the labour market and the payment of insurance contributions 
when in work. As he wrote in his famous report, ‘[b]enefit in return for contribu-
tions, not free allowances from the state, is what the people of Britain desire’49. 
He believed that citizenship had to be earned and was a strong exponent of the 
achievement view. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, i.e. during the heyday of 
                                           
49 Beveridge (1942, p. 11, para 21). 




what critics have termed the ‘entitlement society’, the distinction between insur-
ance-based and tax-financed benefits became rather blurred as the status view 
came into its own. This was, in part, due to the fact that, because insurance bene-
fits did not provide an adequate level of income support, increasing numbers of 
people, many of whom had been in employment and had paid insurance contribu-
tions, were forced to claim assistance and this development made it impossible to 
sustain the rigid distinction between insurance and assistance. It was also partly 
due to the impact of the ‘welfare rights movement’, which sought to uphold and 
strengthen the social rights of poor people, many of whom were dependent on so-
cial assistance, in order to promote their citizenship. However, the return of a La-
bour government in 1997, after 18 years in opposition, soon called into question 
the idea of an unconditional right to benefit. It made its preference for an recip-
rocity-based notion rather than a status-based notion of citizenship clear. 
Plant lists seven reasons for this change in emphasis: 
• The government was concerned about dependency and the ways in which 
recipients of benefits can cut themselves off from ‘the disciplines, the so-
ciability, the growth of knowledge and the confidence’ that come from be-
ing in the labour market. 
• It feared that the ‘moral hazard’ of claiming benefits as of right would fos-
ter the ‘habits of mind and character’ that trap individuals in poverty and 
prevent them from rejoining the labour market. 
• It was concerned with the broader issue of ‘free riding’, in which non-
contributory benefits for some are funded from the taxes that are paid by 
those in work, many of whom are themselves low paid. It took the view that 
people should not be free to choose a life on benefit since the costs fall on 
others who take their obligations to work more seriously. 
• It did not believe that taxpayers were prepared to fund benefits at a level 
that would lift recipients out of poverty. 
• It did not believe that taxpayers should fund benefits at this level since, be-
cause of globalisation, they have to compete with workers in countries with 
lower taxation. 
• It placed a great deal of emphasis on the development of human and social 
capital in order to improve their chances in the labour market and help them 
find a way out of poverty. 
• It was committed to promoting equality of opportunity, rather than equality 
of outcome, and wished to improve the employability of the worst off. 
 
This reasoning, which showed how much the government had been influenced by 
right wing, free-marketeering critics of state welfare,50 led the government in the 
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direction of policies that emphasised reciprocity and obligation. However, it is 
important to point out that this did not involve endorsing contributory benefits. 
This is because, in order to prevent large-scale dependence on social assistance, 
such a strategy would have called for a massively expanded social insurance 
scheme and the large-scale crediting in of people with insufficient contributions, 
with all the attendant problems that would have entailed. In any case, contributory 
benefits, which create rights to benefit, involve a retrospective, ex ante, form of 
reciprocity based on the contributions that an unemployed person paid when 
he/she was in work, and the government wished to promote a more contempora-
neous, current or ex post, form of reciprocity in which, in the case of an unem-
ployed person, looking for a job, undertaking training to enhance employability, 
or undertaking social beneficial activities secure the right to benefit. In a system 
of contributory benefits, virtue is established through prior attachment to the la-
bour market and the payment of national insurance contributions. In a system of 
non-contributory benefits, virtue is established through the concurrent fulfillment 
of reciprocal, work-related obligations. In both cases, the enjoyment of citizenship 
rights, in this case the right to social security, depends on the establishment of vir-
tue. 
As far as welfare to work schemes and the New Deal are concerned, Plant 
warned that, if work were to become the passport to economic and social citizen-
ship, stringent work tests to distinguish those who can work from those who genu-
inely cannot would be required. Likewise, there would have to be a very strong 
commitment to equipping those currently outside the labour market with the skills 
that employers want. Plant pointed to the limits of what could be achieved with 
the ‘one-off’ windfall tax and argued that, to ensure that there was work for eve-
ryone who is looking for it, the state would need to act as ‘employer of last re-
sort’. He thought this was essential if the government was to keep its side of the 
bargain but, because it would be very expensive, he thought it was most unlikely 
that it would be prepared to commit itself to that. Events have proved him right. 
He also argued that, unless the government was careful with its rhetoric, there was 
a real danger that those who were not able to work, and thus not able to satisfy the 
pre-conditions for contribution-based citizenship, would become an increasingly 
stigmatised group. 
The account of changes in notions of social citizenship presented here is 
somewhat more nuanced than that proposed by Plant. While Plant identified two 
contrasting notions of social citizenship – a contribution-based notion and a 
status-based notion – we contend that there are actually three contrasting notions– 
a contribution-based notion, a status-based notion and a reciprocity-based notion. 
Thus, rather than arguing that the British welfare state has oscillated between a 
contribution-based notion and a status-based notion, we contend that it has 
evolved first from a contribution-based notion to a status-based notion and then 
from a status-based to a reciprocity-based notion of social citizenship. Although 
the contribution-based notion and the reciprocity-based notion both make social 
citizenship rights conditional, in the first case on prior attachment to the labour 




market and the payment of national insurance contributions and, in the second 
case, on the concurrent fulfillment of work-related obligations, they represent 
very different forms of conditionality. 
The shift from a more bureaucratic and legalistic type of de-
cision-making to a more professional and managerial one 
Normative Models of Administrative Decision-Making 
We now turn to an examination of the implications of the New Deal for the ac-
countability of officials and the rights of redress that are available to the claimant. 
We do so by identifying and comparing a number of models of administrative de-
cision-making and by developing an approach that was originally put forward by 
the American public lawyer Jerry Mashaw.51 
In his pioneering study of the American Disability Insurance (DI) scheme,52 
Mashaw detected three broad strands of criticism leveled against it: the first in-
dicted it for lacking adequate management controls and producing inconsistent 
decisions, the second for not providing a good service and failing to rehabilitate 
those who were dependent on it, and the third for not paying enough attention to 
‘due process’ and failing to respect and uphold the rights of those dependent on it. 
He claimed that each strand of criticism reflected a different normative conception 
of the DI scheme, i.e. a different model of what the scheme could and should be 
like. The three models were respectively identified with bureaucratic rationality, 
professional treatment and moral judgment. 
Mashaw defined ‘administrative justice’ (i.e. the justice inherent in routine 
day-to-day administration) in terms of ‘those qualities of a decision process that 
provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions’.53 It follows that each of 
the three models he described is associated with a different conception of admin-
istrative justice. Thus, there is one conception of administrative justice based on 
bureaucratic rationality, another based on professional treatment and a third based 
on moral judgment. According to Mashaw, each of these models is associated 
with a different set of legitimating values, different primary goals, a different or-
ganisational structure and different cognitive techniques. Mashaw’s analytic 
framework is set out in the Table 2 below. 
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interpersonal clinical application 
of knowledge 
Moral Judgment fairness conflict resolu-
tion 
independent contextual  
interpretation 
 
Although this is very helpful, the association of fairness with one of the models (the 
moral judgment model), and the implication that the two other models are ‘unfair’, 
is unfortunate. In addition, the characterisation of the three models reflects an ex-
clusively internal orientation to administrative justice in that it does not refer to ex-
ternal mechanisms for redressing grievances. With these considerations in mind, 
Table 1 has been modified and a revised analytic framework is set out in Table 2 
below. 
In Table 3, the three models have been re-named − they are referred to as a bu-
reaucratic model, a professional model and a legal model, the ways in which they 
are characterised have been revised, and redress mechanisms, which include exter-
nal as well as internal procedures for achieving administrative justice, highlighted. 
This is important because internal and external procedures should not be seen as 
alternatives and are, in practice, often combined. 
 
Table 3: Models of Administrative Justice − Revised Analytic Framework 
 




Mode of  
Accountability 
Mode of redress 
Bureaucratic applying rules accuracy hierarchical administrative  
review 
Professional applying  
knowledge 
public service interpersonal complaint to a  
professional body 
Legal asserting rights legality independent appeal to a court or 
tribunal 
 
Mashaw claimed that each of the models is coherent, plausible and attractive and 
that the three models are competitive rather than mutually exclusive.54 Thus, they 
can and do coexist with each other. However, other things being equal, the more 
there is of one, the less there will be of the other two. His insight enables us to see 
both what trade-offs are made between the three models in particular cases and 
what different sets of trade-offs might be more desirable. His approach is a plural-
istic one, which recognises a plurality of normative positions and acknowledges 
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that situations, which are attractive for some people may be unattractive for oth-
ers.55 
The trade-offs that are made, and likewise those that could be made, reflect the 
concerns and the bargaining strengths of the institutional actors who have an inter-
est in promoting each of the models, typically civil servants and officials in the case 
of the bureaucratic model; professionals and ‘street level bureaucrats’56 in the case 
of the professional model; and lawyers, court and tribunal personnel and groups 
representing clients’ interests in the case of the legal model. They vary between or-
ganisations and, within a given organisation, between the different policies deliv-
ered by that organisation, and between the different stages of policy implementa-
tion. They also vary over time and between countries. 
Although, in my opinion, Mashaw’s approach is a very imaginative and fruitful 
one, it has been subjected to a number of criticisms. Although Mashaw believed 
that the three models described above, and only these three models, are always pre-
sent in welfare administration, this claim can be disputed since the bureaucratic, 
professional and legal models have, in many countries, been challenged by other 
models of decision-making, in particular, by a managerial model associated with 
the rise of new public management, a consumerist model which focuses on the in-
creased participation of consumers in decision-making, and a market model which 
emphasises consumer choice. 
A second criticism is that, in assessing the relative influence of the three mod-
els, Mashaw ignored their absolute strengths. Consider two situations in which the 
strengths of three models are given weights of 30, 20 and 10 units and 3, 2 and 1 
units – although they are identical in a relative sense, they are quite different in ab-
solute terms and clearly refer to what are, in reality, very different situations’. 
‘Strong’ balances are very different from ‘weak’ ones in ways that Mashaw’s 
analysis does not bring out very well. 
A third criticism is that Mashaw takes the policy context for granted. However, 
just as different orientations to administration, i.e. to how programmes should be 
run, can be understood in terms of a number of normative models which are in 
competition with each other, so different orientations to policy, i.e. to what pro-
grammes aim to achieve, can also be understood in this way. In a study of penal de-
cision-making,57 I attempted to demonstrate that Mashaw’s approach can be applied 
to competing models of policy as well as to competing models of administration. 
Each of several competing models of policy may, in theory, be combined with each 
of several competing models of administration. The resulting ‘two-dimensional’ 
model is necessarily more complex but its characteristics are similar in that it not 
only makes it possible to understand the trade-offs that are made between different 
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combinations of policy and administration in particular cases, but also makes it 
possible to see what different sets of trade-offs might be more desirable. 
In light of the criticisms above, Mashaw’s analytic framework can be extended 
in a number of ways. A revised and extended analytic framework is set out in Table 
4 below. 
 
Table 4: Models of Administrative Justice − Revised and Extended Analytic 
Framework 
 




Mode of  
Accountability 
Mode of redress 
Bureaucratic 
 
applying rules accuracy hierarchical administrative review
Professional applying  
knowledge 
public service interpersonal second opinion or 
complaint to a pro-
fessional body 
Legal asserting rights legality independent appeal to a court or 
tribunal (public law) 







none, other than  
adverse publicity 















to owners or 
shareholders 
(profits) 
‘exit’ and/or court  
action (private law) 
 
A brief explanation of this extended analytic framework is called for. During the 
post-war period, most public welfare services in the United Kingdom were shaped 
by the bureaucratic and professional models outlined above, although the trade off 
between them varied from one policy domain to another. However, by the mid-
1980s this pattern of administration came under attack. It was variously criticised 
for lacking neutrality and being biased against certain groups; for having a vested 
interest in the maintenance and expansion of existing empires and for not promot-
ing the ‘public interest’; and, as a ‘monopoly provider’ for being insulated from 
competitive pressures to become more efficient and more responsive to the de-
mands and preferences of consumers. New and better forms of management were 
championed as the most appropriate response to these criticisms. Managerialism, as 
this approach came to be known, challenged the powers and prerogatives of bu-
reaucrats and professionals in the name of managers who demanded the ‘freedom 
to manage’ the attainment of prescribed standards of service. It gave priority to 
achieving efficiency gains, introduced different forms of financial and management 




audit to assess how well the prescribed standards of service had been met, rewarded 
staff who performed well and, in theory at least, sanctioned those who did not.58 In-
evitably, the introduction of these new managers frequently led to struggles for 
power and control within welfare organisations. Managerialism can thus be charac-
terised in terms of managerial autonomy, enhanced standards of service, the devel-
opment of performance indicators and the use of audit. However, it lacks a redress 
mechanism and, apart from drawing attention to poor standards of service in order 
to put pressure on management, there is little that a dissatisfied service user can do. 
Consumerism has, likewise been a central reference point in the drive for public 
sector reform from the mid-1980s onwards.59 Like managerialism, it has been taken 
up as a response to criticisms of the bureaucratic and professional and the reshaping 
of welfare services around consumer choice has been visible in a number of re-
forms, in particular in the introduction in the UK of the ‘Citizen’s Charter’. Con-
sumerism embodies a more active view of the service user who is seen as an active 
participant in the process rather than a passive recipient of bureaucratic, profes-
sional or managerial decisions. It can thus be characterised in terms of the active 
participation of consumers in decision-making, consumer satisfaction, the introduc-
tion of consumer ‘charters’, and the use of ‘voice’60 together with the possibility of 
obtaining compensation if the standards specified in the charter are not met as 
available remedies. 
Markets constitute the final model in the extended analytic framework and have 
many of the characteristics of the managerial and consumerist models (although the 
reverse is not necessarily the case). Decision-making in the market involves con-
sumer choice and the matching of supply and demand. Consumers are viewed as 
rational economic actors who choose what best satisfies their wants or preferences 
while producers are profit maximisers who compete with each other. The legitimat-
ing goal of the organisation is economic efficiency and the prevailing mode of ac-
countability is to the owners or shareholders. In contrast to consumerism, where the 
consumer can use ‘voice’ as a remedy, and can obtain compensation through the 
consumer charters if the specified standards have not been met, markets provide the 
possibility of ‘exit’. In addition, an aggrieved individual may be able to raise a 
court action for compensation where he or she suffers some measurable loss from 
an administrative decision. Internal or quasi-markets61 have some but not all of the 
characteristics of the market model just outlined. 
Decision- Making and Appeals in Social Security 
The origins of the system of administrative decision-making in social security can 
be traced back to the introduction of social insurance under the National Insurance 
Act of 1911. This established two important principles. The first of these involved 
                                           
58 Clarke and Newman (1997). 
 
59 Ibid., chapter 6 
60 Hirschman (1970). 
61 Le Grand (1991), Le Grand and Bartlett (1993). 




the separation of responsibilities for making decisions under the law from the ad-
ministrative tasks associated with the processing of claims and the second gave 
claimants the right of appeal against these decisions.62 These appeals were not to 
the civil courts but to specially constituted tribunals, comprising a legally-qualified 
chair, a member representing employers and a member representing trade unions, 
that were set up to hear them. By the early 1930s, a three tier system of adjudica-
tion had evolved. Initial decisions concerning entitlement to benefit were taken by 
‘insurance officers’, appeals from them were heard by ‘referees’ (the forerunners of 
national insurance local tribunals) in the first instance, and from them, on points of 
law, to ‘umpires’ (the predecessors of the national insurance commissioners), who 
were lawyers of standing and whose decisions acted as precedents that first and 
second-tier decision makers were expected to follow. However, there was no right 
of appeal on purely administrative matters that were deemed to be the responsibility 
of the Minister. The Beveridge Report recommended the continuation of these ar-
rangements, which were written into the post-war legislation and continued in exis-
tence until the early 1980s. 
The system of administrative decision-making and appeals in social assistance 
was very different and can be traced back to the Unemployment Assistance Act of 
1934, which created a national assistance scheme for the unemployed.63 This pro-
vided for the right of appeal from the decision of an official to a local tribunal. 
However, unlike insurance officers, unemployment assistance officers were not ex-
pected to make independent decisions but were, rather, expected to carry out the 
policies of the Unemployment Assistance Board. Unemployment assistance tribu-
nals (which were later renamed national assistance tribunals) were lay bodies that 
lacked the independence of national insurance tribunals. Since there was no further 
right of appeal, their decisions were final. The Beveridge Report recommended the 
continuation of these arrangements and this was written into the National Assis-
tance Act 1946. However, under the impact of the welfare rights movement, the 
successors of national assistance tribunals, known as supplementary benefit appeal 
tribunals, were subjected to a great deal of criticism in the mid-1970s.64 They were 
widely criticised for their lack of ‘fairness, openness and impartiality’65 and for fail-
                                           
62 These arrangements were intended to protect Ministers from being held to account, and answerable in 
Parliament, for the huge number of decisions concerning entitlement to benefit. 
63 See Lynes (1975). 
64 See Bell (1975) and Adler and Bradley (1975). 
65 These three principles were put forward in the Report of the Franks Committee (1957). However, 
Franks regarded National Assistance Appeal Tribunals as sui generis and exempted them from its stric-
tures and recommendations that applied to all the other tribunals it considered. For an account of its think-
ing, see Bradley (1975). 




ing to control the exercise of discretion by the Supplementary Benefits Commis-
sion,66 which replaced the National Assistance Board in 1966. 
These criticisms led, first, to a series of piecemeal reforms and, then, to a com-
plete overhaul of the system of decision-making and appeals.67 Under the Health 
and Social Services and Social Security Act (HASSASSA) 1983, this involved in-
troduced a unified three-tier system of adjudication comprising Adjudication Offi-
cers (who replaced insurance officers and supplementary benefits officers), a uni-
fied social security appeal tribunal (which replaced national insurance appeal tribu-
nals and supplementary benefit appeal tribunals), the social security commissioners 
(whose jurisdiction covered supplementary benefits as well as national insurance 
benefits). Thus, the principle of independent adjudication was extended, for the first 
time, to social assistance. The legislation also established the new post of Chief Ad-
judication Officer (CAO), who was given the job of providing advice and guidance 
to Adjudication Officers and monitoring standards of decision-making. These ar-
rangements continued until 1998 although, since the establishment of the Social 
Fund in 1986, challenges to decisions concerning discretionary grants and loans 
have been handled separately, outside the appeal tribunal system.68 
The Social Security Act 1998 did away with the principle of independent adju-
dication and brought to an end the notional independence that adjudication officers 
had enjoyed since 1911. Adjudication Officers were replaced by ‘decision makers’ 
acting on behalf of the Secretary of State.69 The 1998 Act also abolished the role of 
the Chief Adjudication Officer and transferred the CAO’s role to the Chief Execu-
tives of the various agencies that were responsible for the provision of benefits and 
service to various client groups. These senior managers lack the independence of 
the CAO, who repeatedly drew attention to the poor standards of social security de-
cision-making, since they have an interest in playing down the poor standards 
                                           
66 According to David Donnison, who was Chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission, discre-
tionary additions to the basic rate of benefit (known as ‘exceptional circumstances additions’) and discre-
tionary grants (known as ‘exceptional needs payments’) were inappropriate in circumstances where the 
caseload was rising, there were no commensurate increases in staffing, and discretionary decisions were 
increasingly challenged through appeals to tribunals. See Donnison (1997 and 1982, chapters 5 and 6). 
67 For more detailed accounts, see Bradley (1985) and Sainsbury (2000). 
68 Applicants who wish to challenge the decision of a social fund officer may request an internal review of 
that decision by the officer who made the decision and by a manager in the local office. Applicants who 
wish to take the matter further may then request a further review by the Social Fund Inspectorate, which 
operates from a central office in Birmingham. The work of the inspectors is monitored by the Social Fund 
Commissioner.  For a fuller account of the operation of the Social Fund, which includes an account of the 
role of the Social Fund Inspectorate and the Social Fund Commissioner, see Buck (2000). 
69 For accounts of the impact of the 1998 Act on first instance and appellate decision making in social se-
curity, see Wikeley (2000) and National Audit Office (2003). 




achieved by decision-makers for whom they are responsible.70 The Act also at-
tempted to speed up and streamline appeal procedures by, for example, relaxing the 
requirement that tribunals should comprise a chair and two members in all cases 
but these changes do not really concern us here.71 However, a further change that 
does concern us, and which pre-dated the 1998 Act, was the requirement that, 
unless appellants specifically opted for an oral hearing, the tribunal would consider 
their case ‘on the papers only’, with no one present. 
The ‘success rate’ of paper hearings is much lower than that of oral hearings72 
and the introduction of paper hearings was at first associated with a fall in the ap-
pellant success rate. In 1995, the year immediately before the introduction of paper 
hearings, 43.9 per cent of hearings were decided in favour of the appellant73 and 
this fell to 34.5 per cent in 1997, the year immediately after their introduction.74 
However, in the period 2000-2005 (inclusive), the overall success rate has again 
been 43.9 per cent.75 During this period, the proportion of paper hearings has aver-
aged 26.2 per cent.76 
We are now in a position to consider the implications of these changes in terms 
of the models of administrative decision-making discussed in Section 3.1. 
Changes in the Form of Decision Making 
In a study of the adjudication in social security in Britain,77 John Baldwin, Nick 
Wikeley and Richard Young characterised the role of Adjudication Officers in the 
late 1980s as what I have called ‘bureaucratic’ and that of social security appeal tri-
bunals as what I have called ‘legal’ (see above).78 However, I think this is too sim-
ple. Readers will recall that Jerry Mashaw pointed out that that his three models of 
administrative justice were competitive rather than mutually exclusive and that they 
could and did coexist with each other. He also pointed out that, although one model 
                                           
70 To ensure public confidence, the Comptroller and Auditor General was asked to monitor the new ar-
rangements. However, in his assessment of the Secretary of State’s Report on Decision Making in 2002 
and 2003 (which was published in 2006), he reported that he was ‘unable to confirm that a substantial part 
of the information set out by the Secretary of State is fair or balanced’ and concluded that ‘unless all such 
performance data is subject to satisfactory quality assurance processes as to its robustness, the resultant 
report will be of limited utility as a measure of the Department’s success in improving the accuracy of de-
cision making’. See Department for Work and Pensions (2006, p. 20) 
71 For a fuller account of these changes, see Sainsbury (2000). 
72 In 2005, the last full year for which data are available, the appellant success rates for paper and oral hearings 
were 52.1 per cent and 22.5 per cent respectively. Figures based on statistics accessed at  
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/qat.asp 
73 Department of Social Security (1997, Table H 5.03). 
74 Department of Social Security (1999, Table H 5.03). 
75 Figures based on statistics provided by Gillian Ferry, Client Statistics Team, DWP Information Direc-
torate. 
76 It has hardly fluctuated, ranging from 25.7 per cent in 2000 to 26.6 per cent in 2004 and 2005. 
77 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992). 
78 In a subsequent article, Wikeley (2000, p. 499) claimed that, as a result of the 1998 Act, the bureaucratic 
model has ‘complete hegemony at the first-tier level’ and that the judicialisation of tribunals was ‘driven 
… by the policy imperatives of managerialism’. 




tended to be dominant, it could co-exist with the other two models. I think this was 
the case with first-instance decision makers and appeal tribunals when Baldwin, 
Wikeley and Young carried out their research. 
I accept that, when Baldwin, Wikeley and Young carried out their research, 
many Adjudication Officers did very little adjudication and that they simply author-
ised, with their signatures, decisions that had, in practice, been delegated to clerical 
staff.79 I also accept that they were increasingly required to give priority to meeting 
performance targets over fulfilling statutory requirements and that there were 
strong pressures on them to regard speed as more important than accuracy.80 Never-
theless, I do not think their characterisation of Adjudication Officers attaches suffi-
cient importance to their independent status or to the fact that claimants could ap-
peal against their decisions to an independent appeal tribunal. I can see elements of 
the ‘bureaucratic’ and the ‘legal’ model of administrative decision-making in their 
activities and would have characterised them in terms of a trade-off between these 
two models. I accept that the ‘professional’ model was important for some Adjudi-
cation Officers, especially for those who were responsible for the administration of 
discretionary provisions within the social security legislation, but that it was less 
important for most of them. Social Security Appeal Tribunals could likewise be 
characterised in terms of a trade-off between the ‘bureaucratic’ and the ‘legal’ 
model of administrative decision-making although, in this case, the latter was 
clearly dominant. 
We are now in a position to consider the impact of some the changes outlined in 
this chapter for the trade-offs between the different normative models outlined in 
Section 3.1 above and thus, for administrative justice in social security. Since there 
is little evidence, as yet, of user involvement in shaping the delivery of social secu-
rity81 and Jobcentre Plus has almost exclusive responsibility for implementing the 
New Deals,82 the discussion will not consider the consumerist or market models 
and will focus instead on the bureaucratic, professional, legal and managerial mod-
els. 
When Baldwin, Wikeley and Young undertook their fieldwork in 1989, the key 
decision-maker in the Department of Social Security was undoubtedly the Adjudi-
cation Officer in whose name all the decisions about whether or not claimants were 
                                           
79 This was in large part due to the HASSASSA Reforms of 1983 which, in theory, extended the principle 
of independent adjudication to supplementary benefit but, in practice, diminished its impact as the existing 
body of Adjudication Officers became responsible for a greatly increased number of decisions. According 
to Wikeley (personal communication), the old tradition continued to be evident in some offices but had 
been swept away in others where pressure of work had forced Adjudication Officers into doing ‘spot 
checks’ and signing off decisions relating to supplementary benefit that were made by clerical staff. 
80 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992 pp. 40-41) noted that officers responsible for determining claims to 
national insurance benefits gave much higher priority to accuracy than officers responsible for determin-
ing claims to unemployment benefit and income support, who gave higher priority to speed. 
81 Lister (2001). 
82 There has been some small-scale experimentation with private and voluntary sector involvement in the 
New Deals (Stafford, 2003, p. 226) and more can be expected in the future (National Audit Office, 2006, 
para. 34). 




entitled to benefit were made. However, this is no longer the case. Adjudication Of-
ficers were abolished under the Social Security Act 1998 and, when Jobcentre Plus 
was established in 2002, one of its aims was to create a unified workforce from 
staff who previously worked for the Benefits Agency and the Employment Service. 
It is my contention that the key decision-maker in Jobcentre Plus is now the Per-
sonal Adviser, who manages a caseload of jobseekers and has considerable discre-
tion in carrying out this task. The decline of the Adjudication Officer and the rise of 
the Personal Adviser reflect a shift from a predominantly bureaucratic to a much 
more professional model of administrative decision-making.83 
Although Adjudication Officers were, at least notionally, independent, they 
were, in practice, increasingly accountable to their line managers. Accountability 
has increased greatly in recent years and Personal Advisers are now subject to vari-
ous forms of performance management and are expected to give priority to meeting 
a variety of nationally and locally set performance targets.84 This change reflects 
the increase in importance of the managerial model of administrative decision-
making. At the same time, the ending of the Adjudication Officers’ independent 
status and the abolition of the role of the Chief Adjudication Officer in 1998 have 
undoubtedly led to a reduction in the importance of the legal model of decision-
making. The weakening of claimants’ appeal rights, which resulted from the re-
moval of social fund decisions from the jurisdiction of appeal tribunals and the in-
troduction of ‘paper’ hearings, have had a similar effect. 
The changes described above suggest than, on the one hand, the bureaucratic 
and legal models of decision-making have decreased in importance while, on the 
other hand, the importance of the professional and managerial models of decision-
making has increased. The final section of the chapter considers the implications of 
these changes for rights of redress and accountability. 
The Implications of Changes in the Form of Decision Making for Rights of 
Redress and Accountability 
In their study of adjudication in social security, Baldwin, Wikeley and Young de-
scribed what happened when a claimant attempted to challenge a decision relating 
to their claim to benefit.85 The claimant could either request a review of the initial 
decision or lodge an appeal. Reviews were conducted either by the officer who 
                                           
83 In Australia, where activation measures have been contracted out to private and voluntary sector provid-
ers, Carney (2005) has identified a shift from a bureaucratic mode of decision making, which emphasises 
rules ad procedures, to a to a market mode of decision making, which emphasises discretion. 
84 In an attempt to reduce the burden that performance measurement places on Personal Advisers, Job-
centre Plus replaced its former Job Entry Target with a Job Outcome Target in April 2006. However, Job 
Outcome Target data will be collected at district level and will not make it possible to attribute job out-
comes to individual offices and advisers. Jobcentre Plus has also developed a set of alternative perform-
ance measures for Personal Advisers that focus on the content and quality of their work. See National Au-
dit Office (2006, paras. 44 and 45). 
85 Baldwin, Wikeley and Young (1992, pp. 65-67). 




made the initial decision86 or by a specialist officer87, while appeals were heard by 
an independent social security appeal tribunal. However, in practice, the receipt of 
an appeal would trigger off an informal review to establish whether the initial deci-
sion should stand and this would often lead to a formal review. If, after a formal re-
view, the claimant’s case was met in full, that would be the end of the matter, but, 
if it was only met in part or not at all, the case would proceed to a tribunal.88 
These two procedures (reviews and appeals) constitute the characteristic modes 
of redress associated with bureaucratic and legal models of decision-making (see 
right-hand column in Tables 2 and 3 above).89 The characteristic modes of redress 
associated with professional and managerial models of decision-making are much 
less well-developed. In discussing this issue (in Section 3.1 above), we suggested 
that the characteristic mode of redress associated with the professional model was a 
second opinion or a complaint to a professional body. However, although these 
mechanisms are usually available when the decision maker is a professional, this is 
rarely the case when the decision-maker is a semi-professional90 or a ‘street-level 
bureaucrat’91. In such cases, it is unlikely that a second opinion will be an option or 
that there will be a professional body to complain to. We also suggested that there 
was no effective mode of redress associated with the managerial model and that the 
only option available to someone who wished to make a complaint was to create 
adverse publicity. 
It is the contention of this chapter that the shift away from a situation in which 
bureaucratic and legal models of decision-making were dominant to one in which 
professional and managerial models of decision-making have greatly increased in 
importance has made it extremely difficult for anyone who is required to take part 
in any of the New Deal programmes to complain about the advice and help they are 
given or about any sanctions that may be imposed on them.92 In Jobcentre Plus, 
Personal Advisers have many characteristics associated with semi-professionals 
                                           
86 In the case of contributory (social insurance) benefits. 
87 In the case of means-tested (social assistance) benefits. 
88 When Baldwin, Wikeley and Young carried out their research, tribunals could consider the claimant’s 
situation at the time of the hearing. However, under section 12 (8) of the 1998 Act, they were precluded 
from taking into account circumstances that did not apply when the appealed-against decision was made 
and, under section 36, they could no longer consider issues that arose for the first time on appeal. 
89 If a claimant wants the decision-maker to look again at a decision, he/she can ask for it to be reconsid-
ered. Decisions may be revised if they are incorrect or superceded in light of fresh evidence. For the latest 
data on revisions and supercessions, see Department for Work and Pensions (2006). 
90 A semi-professional is someone, like a librarian, who works in an occupation which has some but not all 
the characteristics of a profession. The domain in which a semi-professional can make independent deci-
sions is smaller than that in which a professional can. See Etzioni (1969). 
91 A ‘street-level bureaucrat’ is an official, like a policeman on the beat, who works without direct supervi-
sion and is required to take ‘on-the-spot’ decisions by exercising his/her judgment. See Lipsky (1980). 
92 In Australia, Carney (2005) has noted that it has likewise become difficult to challenge the imposition of 
sanctions and the quality of the activation measures that are provided. 




and street level bureaucrats.93 They wield a great deal of power − they meet claim-
ants to discuss their work aspirations and options, assist them in searching for jobs, 
explore their training needs and the availability of training programmes, advise 
them on childcare and the availability of specialist services, such as services for 
those with drug or alcohol dependency, and make indicative calculations about 
whether or not they would be better off in work or on benefit. Many of them, un-
doubtedly, do their jobs very well and levels of user satisfaction are reported to be 
high.94 Although they are involved in the assessment of claims to Jobseekers Al-
lowance (JSA), standards of decision have not, until recently, been monitored on a 
national basis.95 
As described in Section 1.5 above, Jobcentre Plus staff can impose a range of 
sanctions, not only on claimants but also on their families, on those who fail to at-
tend work-focused interview with them, on those who cannot demonstrate that they 
are ‘actively seeking work’, on those who fail to attend a work interview and on 
those who turn down offers of ‘suitable’ work’. However, tribunals hear very few 
appeals against the imposition of sanctions and the staff who impose them are 
therefore effectively immune from challenge. The culture of independent adjudica-
tion and appeal has pretty much disappeared. Thus, staff are not really accountable, 
through internal or external audit, for their performance or to members of the public 
for the decisions they make. 
Conclusion 
It is the contention of this chapter that, however laudable the aims of the New Deal 
may be, each of the shifts that it has entailed − from a more passive type of inter-
vention to a more active type of intervention; from a contribution-based approach, 
first to a status-based approach and then to a reciprocity-based approach to citi-
zenship; and from a primarily bureaucratic and legalistic type of decision-making 
to a primarily professional and managerial one − is fraught with problems. The 
first shift is problematic because there is a real danger that those who are not really 
fit for work will be required to look for work and will be penalised – and feel a 
sense of failure − when they are unable to find it. The second shift is problematic 
because, by refusing to become the ‘employer of last resort’, there is a very real 
                                           
93 Wright (2003) has used Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy to analyse the ways in which the 
staff in a Jobcentre placed claimants into administrative and moral categories and traced the consequences 
of these processes for the services they received. Her study which was carried our in 1998, i.e. before the 
merger of the Benefits Agency with the Employment Service into Jobcentre Plus, drew attention to the 
discretion exercised by staff. She notes that the, as a result of subsequent policy developments, the impor-
tance of discretion has undoubtedly increased since then. 
94 According to the National Audit Office (2006, paras. 21 and 31), Jobcentre Plus’ customer survey 
shows that 77 per cent of jobseekers and 90 per cent of employers are satisfied with its performance. 
95 Department for Work and Pensions (2006, p. 11). According to this report, a monitoring scheme was 
introduced in 2005 and will provide the basis for future reports on standards of decision making in Job-
centre Plus. 




danger that if, and when, unemployment starts to rise, the government will lose 
credibility by not being able to deliver. The third shift is problematic because, al-
though Jobcentre Plus staff exercise a great deal of power over those who are look-
ing for work, it is increasingly difficult for job-seekers to challenge what the staff 
do or do not do for them. Although ‘Welfare to Work’ is a fine ideal, it should not 
be implemented without due regard to justice and fairness. 
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Hartz’ Reforms – Hard reconstructions? 
Eberhard Eichenhofer 
Introduction 
Between 2002 and 2005 the unemployment insurance and assistance scheme of 
Germany had been altered profoundly. The Volkswagen manager Peter Hartz di-
rected a governmental commission which submitted in 2002 a plethora of reform 
proposals. They should help to overcome the unbearably high unemployment rate 
of more than 10% in the whole country, up to officially 25 % of the entire working 
population in some areas of eastern Germany. Many of these reform ideas had been 
taken over from other countries – predominantly from the Netherlands, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom. In the context of the European Employment Strategy they 
were identified as “good practices”.  
Summarising the 2003/4 re-enactments of social protection for the unemployed 
in Germany, the far reaching changes encompassed the main elements of unem-
ployment protection: the organisation, the relationship between the unemployed 
and the administration, the leading principles of protection and the main instru-
ments of placement and integration. In this respect one might say: the Hartz com-
mission’s reform proposals implemented a contractual approach to tackle with the 
challenge of unemployment. 1 Since this period job seeker’s agreements play a piv-
otal role to outline strategies for the unemployed on how to re-integrate themselves 
into the labour market.  
The reforms were inspired by the ideal of an activating welfare state, which is 
conceived as a means for self help to all of those who risk social exclusion. The 
chapter gives at first an overview on the changes implemented in the last legislative 
period between the years 2002 to 2005, afterwards it illustrates the achievements of 
the reform and, finally, it tries to answer the question on whether the reform can be 
assessed as a dismantling of welfare or a new version of the welfare state.  
This chapter tries to illustrate the main targets and changes made in order to 
pursue an in-depth reform of the unemployment protection of Germany. It sketches 
the main reform steps (II) and tries to inquiry, to which extent the changes had been 
inspired by initiatives of other EU countries or had been formally approved as a 
good practice in the context of the European Employment Strategy (III).  
                                           
1 Els Sol/Mies Westerveld (Eds.), Contractualism in Employment Services, Kluwer Law International, 2005. 




Outlines of the Reform 
Mandate of the Reform Commission 
In February 2002, a governmental commission had been nominated to make proposals 
on “Modern Services for the Labour Market”2. The commission had 15 members, 
among them managers, trade unionists, politicians and academics. The chair had been 
taken by Peter Hartz. This manager had made a series of unconventional alterations 
and arrangements becoming effective in the Volkswagen Company, in order to con-
serve the once substantially jeopardized jobs. The commission’s proposals were ad-
dressed to the public; their main emphasis was put on the reduction of unemployment 
and the reorganisation of the German employment service.  
The commission’s formation was the political reaction towards a scandal in the 
employment service, which had been unveiled by the press. It turned out that an em-
ployee in a local employment office for years whitewashed his figures on placements 
induced by him- without any notice taken by other instances of the employment ser-
vice. This scandal indicated evident short comings in the monitoring and effectiveness 
of the German employment service. Additionally, immediately after the New Econ-
omy hype came to an end in late 2000, the figures on the unemployment rate rose sub-
stantially. The official doctrine of the government as to combat poverty was “to en-
hance and to demand” (Fördern und Fordern!) a modern version of a carrot and stick 
policy The financial subsidies to the unemployed are granted to make them seeking 
work in the labour market successfully; so, all help is to be combined with the demand 
for a successful re-entry into the labour market. The imminent Federal Election’s date 
in late September 2002 gave a further momentum for the government, to issue new 
proposals to solve the most ponderous problem of the German internal policy of these 
years till nowadays– the high rate of unemployment.  
Main topics of Interest 
Competition in Placement 
The reform commission raised the question on how a quick, effective and sustain-
able integration of the unemployed into the labour market can be achieved. It ar-
ticulated the assumption that both the unemployment insurance and assistance and 
above all the placement of job seekers should be reorganised profoundly. Place-
ment should be made more flexible, accountable and effective. The leading idea 
behind the reform of placement was to give competition between public and private 
placement agencies the broadest room ever. This should bring about a more client-
oriented employment service. The reform intended to replace the bureaucratic ori-
                                           
2 Bericht der Kommission, Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt, Berlin 2002. 




entation, still prevailing in employment service by an entrepreneurial approach: 
The heads of the organisations should no longer be appointed as public functionar-
ies on the basis of a lifelong tenure, but work on the basis of a temporal work con-
tract as managers - i. e. higher paid than their predecessors. In order to put a much a 
greater emphasis on competition in placement services, a free access to placement 
services should be given ; additionally, the public employment service should be 
made mandatory to issue vouchers for private placement services, if those were un-
able to find a job for the unemployed within a reasonable period oft time (3- 6 
months) . The main task of placement services should be the acquisition of jobs and 
job seekers and not the administration of unemployment benefits. Benchmarking 
and quality assessments and also competitions between the various local entities of 
employment services within the employment service should create a general cli-
mate committed to overcome the unemployment by improved endeavours to 
placement in as many respects as possible. The benefit should not pamper the re-
cipient to stay unemployed, but be frugal enough to give an incentive to take over 
also badly paid work.  
Structural reforms in unemployment insurance 
Additionally, the reform commission listed a whole series of structural changes of 
the unemployment insurance scheme. The leading motivation, upon which the pro-
posals were brought forward, was summarised in the saying: “induce initiative – 
safeguard security!” (Eigeninitiative auslösen - Sicherheit einlösen!). This maxim 
illustrated the activating strand the labour market reform proposals of the commis-
sion were built upon. The process of labour market integration should be accompa-
nied by consultation, support and financial protection. The local employment ser-
vices – traditionally called “Arbeitsamt” (work office) – should be called with the 
artificial American word: “JobCenter “.  
Each of these entities should dispose of a budget on its own discretion out of 
which it should finance the appropriate instruments for integration. The reform 
should coax the local employment offices to spend the main in the most effective 
and appropriate manner, based on the discretion of the local entities without any in-
terference of the federal or regional authorities. In the long run, the unemployment 
insurance – till restricted to dependent workers – should be transformed into an in-
come protection system for both wage earners and the self-employed. The new cen-
tres should not only focus on placement and re-integration of the job seeker into the 
labour market, but also assist the individual in the plethora of social hardships and 
handicaps of the unemployed persons by rendering services and assistance as to 
their health, drug, sanitary, addiction, debt, housing or education problems. All so-
cial work activities should be concentrated in the job centres. Within these centres, 
however, the placement work should be separated from the other activities of social 
work. The latter should be devoted to special services which should densely col-
laborate with other services of the centre.  




Placement should be made effective as quickly as possible. So, both employee 
and employer should be imposed the commitment to indicate a job vacancy as fast 
as possible. Each violation of this commitment should be sanctioned severely. The 
criteria for job offers should enlarged in the sense – that for each job seeker each 
lawful and adequately – i. e. in line with the existing collective agreements – paid 
should be acceptable. In the formation and definition of the re-integrative strategy 
an integration agreement should e play the key role. This should be elaborated by 
the case manager of the centre and the job seeker and figure out the strategies to be 
carried out by the job seeker in order to regain a paid work.  
Further proposals for changes were addressed to unemployed persons over 55 
years or physically or mentally handicapped persons. For them work should be 
found on the basis of contacts for services concluded between the job centre and an 
employer, who not become the employer of the unemployed, but should hire their 
services on a contract concluded between the employment administration and the 
employer. In the contract the price for hiring the unemployed temporarily should be 
fixed. Unemployed should also be empowered to start their own business by utilis-
ing their beneficiaries’ rights to temporal income support and social protection also 
while earning at the commencement of their work a small income as a self-
employed.  
Merging two systems of assistance to one 
Before the reform had taken place unemployed persons, who exhausted their bene-
ficiaries’ rights under the unemployment insurance scheme were entitled to a 
means tested benefit, if they – as regularly - did not dispose of substantial means of 
their own to afford their adequate living. In case of unemployment there were two 
competing systems of means tested benefits: the unemployment assistance (Arbeit-
slosenhilfe) and the social assistance (Sozialhilfe). For those who got unemploy-
ment insurance benefits before the assistance did not depend on needs but on the 
previous income of the unemployed. For the unemployed who were not covered by 
the unemployment insurance immediately before becoming dependent they re-
ceived a benefit, which was determined according to the need of the unemployed 
individual and her/ his family. This duplicity of assistance schemes lead to incon-
sistencies, contradictions and a twofold protection. The assistance for the needy un-
employed was to complex to be conserved. So, the ultimate proposal of the reform 
commission was to merge the two systems and make a unique scheme out of it.  
Making Hartz Reform Work 
Not all, but most of the proposals were implemented by four legislative acts. In the 
public debate they were abbreviated as “Hartz I to Hartz IV”. Each piece of legisla-
tion assumed various elements of the reform commissions’ proposal. The changes 
proposed had been conceived as a profound desecration of the inherited principles 
of the welfare state. So, the phase of legislation and implementation was accompa-
nied by a series of protests and public manifestations - above all in high unem-




ployment areas of East Germany Monday’s manifestations in remembrance of the 
manifestations’ traditions which once brought down the East German communist 
regime.  
Improved placement (Hartz I) 
In the First Law on Modern Services on the Labour Market3 the deficits in the 
placement service should be altered. The employee had been made mandatory to 
indicate an imminent redundancy immediately after the redundancy was declared. 
This reform step should abbreviate the period of unemployment by implementing 
the job research at the most early moment possible. Additionally, an institution was 
established, which meanwhile was already dissolved because of lacking efficiency. 
The employment service should also be active as an employment business. It 
should not only indicate job seekers but should also offer the working capacity of 
unemployed persons on the basis of a contract for work. In order to fuel the effi-
ciency of public employment services already in 2002 the instrument of placement 
vouchers had been introduced4; in 2003 this instrument had been enlarged as to 
training services. In order to strengthen the market mechanism and to empower the 
beneficiary, she or he was entitled to demand services from private training provid-
ers on the costs of the public employment service.  
Part-time work, self-employment and household work(Hartz II) 
The Second Law on Modern Services on the Labour Market came into force at 
January, 1st, 20035. It made the small jobs of a low monthly income more attractive 
by lowering the overhead for taxes and social contributions to 25 %. To combat 
moon light work in households a tax-deduction for housekeepers’ wages had been 
implemented. And finally, unemployed persons can receive subsidies when starting 
their own business. Both initiatives became a success both the so called “mini-
jobs”- so the official “German” word – as the support given to persons keen on 
starting their own business had been accepted by many unemployed persons.  
Restructuring employment service (Hartz III) 
The Third Law on Modern Services on the Labour Market6 became effective on 
January 1st, 2004. It reorganised the more than ninety thousand employees in six 
hundred offices of the Germany wide operating unemployment and placement of-
fice “Bundesanstalt für Arbeit” into a more service oriented agency. It is from that 
time onwards called “Bundesagentur für Arbeit”. This change from “Anstalt” - 
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4 Regina Konle-Seidl, New Delivery Forms in Germany, in Els Sol/ Mies Westerveld (Eds), Contractualism in 
employment services, Kluwer Law International 2005,187, 190 ; Oliver Bruttel, New Private Delivery Arrange-
ments in Germany, ibid., 209, 222. 
5 BT-Drucksache 15/26. 
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which reminds to a state institution - into an agency, which sounds like a private 
enterprise should symbolise the conceptual change of this enormous administration. 
The changes brought about a new logo, a new approach towards utilising the inter-
net and other communication services to improve the cooperation between the em-
ployment agencies and the beneficiaries, which had since then be called “clients”. 
The contract management within the organisation had been implemented. A reduc-
tion of the ratio between case-mangers and beneficiaries was intended in order to 
reduce the efficiency of placement.  
Merging two systems of assistance for able-bodied (Hartz IV)  
As the most profound change was conceived the Fourth Law on Modern Services 
on the Labour Market7, meant to reorganise the financial support of those unem-
ployed persons, who have exhausted their benefits rights. The traditional division 
between unemployment assistance and social aid had been replaced by a new sys-
tem in 2005. After the reform the assistance scheme had been transformed on draw-
ing a new – but in the history of social policy a quite old distinction8 – between the 
able-bodied and those needy persons being incapable to do gainful work. The first 
piece of legislation was incorporated in Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) II, the lat-
ter in Social Code XII. The first is financed predominantly by the national budget, 
the latter by the municipalities.  
So, systematically spoken, the “merging” of unemployment assistance and so-
cial assistance did not touch the duplicity of assistance schemes in Germany, but 
brought about a new borderline between two still existing schemes. The limit is 
based upon the traditional distinction between the non work-able and the work-able 
poor – a borderline, which was in quite old days conceived as the frontier between 
the deserving and the non- deserving poor.  
The new law made necessary to find a solution on the administrative responsi-
bility. Two proposals had been made – one was to make the employment service 
responsible also as to the social services for the many handicaps and short comings 
of the unemployed persons. The other proposal was to make the municipalities, 
originally competent to administer social assistance benefits – also to act as a part 
of the employment service. The law provides for the general competence of the 
employment office; but 69 municipalities got the right to administer the whole new 
scheme by their own administrations. Till 2011 the final assessment shall be made 
based on the experiences of the competing organisations. Already today, however, 
it is obvious, that the employment service, which has to collaborate with the vari-
ous social services of the municipalities is not an appropriate organisation, because 
the limits of action are not clear cut and the direction of such a unit turned out to 
                                           
7 BT-Drucksache 15/1516; Eberhard Eichenhofer, Sozialrecht, 2007 (6. Aufl.), Tübingen, Textziffer 482; Johan-
nes Münder (Hg.), Sozialgesetzbuch II, Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende, Baden-Baden 2007 (2. Aufl.); Heri-
bert Renn/Dietrich Schoch (Hg.), Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende (SGB II), Baden-Baden 2007 (2. Aufl.). 
8 Eberhard Eichenhofer, Geschichte des Sozialstaats in Europa, München 2007, S. 38 ff. 




become extremely complex, because of the lack of a transparent internal organisa-
tion9.  
The law brought a redefinition of the elementary needs. The payments monthly 
transferred to the recipient were increased for 16% compared to the previous legis-
lation on social assistance. On the other hand, single benefits to meet single needs 
(winter coat, heating materials, school meals or excursions, TV set) were now 
longer paid by social assistance. For the recipients of the former unemployment as-
sistance the change mattered deeply because the former system was income based. 
So, the unemployed persons, who had lost a well previous paid job, lost more than 
those with lower incomes out of paid work. Under the new scheme all recipients 
are integrated into the social insurance to protect them in cases of old age, invalid-
ity and sickness. The protection as to pension rights, however, is definitely modest. 
This is due to the expenses necessary for the acquisition of protection under the 
German pension scheme. So, for one year of unemployment benefits’ receipt a pen-
sion right matures, which gives an entitlement for 4 €(from 2007 onwards only 2, 
15 €). This is definitely low, because an ordinary worker earns with work paid on 
the average basis a pension right of over 25 € a year. So from one year of subsis-
tence payments matures a pension right of less than one month of a worker who 
earns an average income.  
The new assistance scheme for the needy unemployed persons introduced a se-
ries of unprecedented elements. The benefit is defined upon a family unit (Be-
darfsgemeinschaft); it encompasses all needy family members, irrespective of their 
legal status. They count as a unit of both need and as resources. Also in the absence 
of legal maintenance obligations – so among unmarried couples – they deemed to 
support one another. In this construction a potential for increasing benefit rights by 
restructuring one’s family life opened space for unexpected effects on increasing 
the number of family units and, hence, the amount of cash transfers, e. g. parents 
once lived with their children in a flat rented a part of their flat to their children. So 
they were conceived as a family unit of their own with an entitlement to further 
benefit rights10.  
The beneficiary with working potential is obliged to contribute actively to her/ 
his integration into the labour market. Each one has to agree on an integration 
agreement (Eingliederungsvereinbarung), which has to determine the ways and 
means pursued by the unemployed to achieve re-integration into the labour market. 
This change coincides with an alteration in the understanding of reasonable alterna-
tive employment11. The formerly respected right of being acknowledged as em-
ployable on fields of activity, on which the individual has proven to be skilled by 
her/his previous occupation had been altered by the new rule: each unemployed 
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11 Ingwer Ebsen, Contracting Between Social Services and their Clients in the German Concept of Fördern und 
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person is expected to pursue each lawful and lawfully paid occupation available on 
the labour market. The contract notion points out that under the law of unemploy-
ment protection a reconciliation between the beneficiary and the administration 
takes place, which might correct and limit the wide scope of optional occupations –
assessed to be reasonable by law - what occupation is appropriate is not primarily a 
matter of general principles but is to be specified under the very concrete auspices 
of matching on the local labour market12. Integration of the unemployed persons 
aged under 25 years became imperative.  
The benefit is given as a subsidy and understood as a basic income (“Grundsi-
cherung”), payable in lack of other support, above all on the basis of a work con-
tract or an unemployment insurance entitlement. It is based upon the assumption, 
that member of the family, which do not belong to the household of the beneficiary 
are not mandatory to support the unemployed, e. g. the children of the elderly un-
employed persons. The federal budget covers the cost for the living allowance and 
the contributions for the unemployed to their pension and health insurance; the 
costs for housing are borne by the municipality of the place of residence. A subtle 
debate emerged on how to deal with income earned as a beneficiary. The law pro-
vided for a partial reduction of the benefit in case of income reception: 15 % of an 
earned income till 400 €, 30 % of an income between 401 € and 900 € and 15% of 
an income of more than 900€ a month remained free of deduction. These percent-
ages and limits were highly controversial. Critics argued the high deduction would 
act as a disincentive to reintegration into the labour market. However, if the deduc-
tion would be less restrictive, the whole system would attract to many persons to 
become unemployed. This example shows clearly, that the incentive structure of 
unemployment protection schemes can be analysed under different angles. At the 
moment, once again a revision is in the making, directed towards making small ex-
tra- incomes becoming more deductible than before to avoid that unemployed stick 
too long and to frequently at the state of unemployment and by reducing higher ex-
tra-incomes less than before in order to make the take-over of extra- work more at-
tractive 
A further highly controversial issue related to additional public work which is 
offered to those unemployed persons who are not likely to get a job on the labour 
market easily or even at all. They can do public work for an additional remunera-
tion of 1€ per hour. So, these opportunities were called “1 € jobs”(German: Ein 
Euro-Job). They offer income for non marketable services. The political debate fo-
cussed on whether it could be fair “to offer jobs for such a low salary”. The critics 
did not take into account, that these jobs are not meant for being done on the labour 
market, so that those workers would and should not compete with regularly paid 
workers, who do earn at least 4- 5 € an hour. Additionally, the critics are not aware 
of the fact that the basic needs are met by the social benefit, so that the 1€ job 
brings extra money which is to be added to the benefit covering the elementary 
needs.  
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Good practices of other countries – dubious practices in 
Germany? 
Reform fits into the European Employment Strategy 
For the framers of the reform the European Employment Strategy and examples 
given by other EU member states were taken into account. This intention was quite 
often and explicitly articulated in the reform process13. So, all the suggestions were 
understood as authentic interpretation and conclusion from the European Employ-
ment Policy Guidelines on which the EU and the member states agreed upon in the 
framework of the European Employment Strategy. The lesson one can draw from 
the German reform experience already after a while is : the labour market is divided 
into those persons who are adequately – above all intellectually – qualified, and 
who quite normally do find a suitable occupation after having been unemployed be-
forehand, and of those, who do not dispose over sufficient qualifications. They 
have severe handicaps to regain a job at all, because the labour market – with its 
high costs imposed on labour – is not open for the creation of low skill jobs, which 
allows the employee to acquire a still decent income out of work – above all an in-
come which exceeds the income from social benefits14. In these days, the German 
public realizes more than ever of being challenged by an increasingly growing low 
income population living at the brink of social exclusion. Above all in the high em-
ployment regions of East Germany a growing part of the population is jeopardized 
by sinking prospects in an ever possible future re-integration into the labour mar-
ket.  
Examples for good practices 
So, in some of the proposals examples given by other member states can be discov-
ered quite easily. The organisational reform drew many lessons from the Dutch re-
form on werk boven incomst. Also the contrat d’insertion of France and the British 
Job seeker’s Agreements gave a sort of blueprint for the integration agreement. The 
measures taken to integrate those under 25 years have strong resemblances with the 
British New Deal approach and the Danish emphasis on facilitating the unem-
ployed person with training and other efforts to increase their employability, also 
these traces can be detected in the proposals made and submitted. As the examples 
quoted the German reform put more power of discretion to the employment ad-
ministration. In this respect the reforms marked an end on the bureaucratic and au-
thoritarian traditions still prevalent in the German employment service and replace 
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this model by a more managerial approach. This change had been appreciated by 
both the personnel as the clients. But it is dubious on whether it is more than a 
model of conduct and became indeed a part of reality.  
Tough reconstructions? 
Because of the profound changes – above all the ones made in the context of re-
forming the assistance to the unemployed - there was a massive uproar against this 
reform – above all in the East German regions, where poverty and unemployment 
are most spread. There the main argument was the reform ends in a drastic cut back 
of benefits.  
After some years, after the reform got traction, it turned out, that the new sys-
tem is more costly to the public than the previous one. The protest of the period of 
debate and deliberation reverberated: What was criticized once as the most drastic 
social cutback ever, turned out to be much more expensive than the previous sys-
tem had been ever! So, this experience ushered in new questions, stemming from 
the opposite side of the political spectrum. The question is raised: Is the scheme too 
generous? Is it more attractive than ever? Should more emphasis to be given to a 
combination of income from social transfer and work by restructuring the rules on 
deducting social transfers for those earning small amounts of work income? Pre-
dominantly, the increase is due to an unexpected increase of beneficiaries. This 
might be the consequence of definitely unfavourable conditions on the labour mar-
ket, an increasing tendency of persisting, long term unemployment and the making 
public of poverty, which had been hidden in the past. In any respect, if one should 
characterise the reforms made in Germany during the last years in the system of 
unemployment protection one could not assess it as a series of cutbacks, but it can 
be more precisely understood as a means to put Germany in line with the European 
development – above all of those member states who changed their system of pro-
tection most profoundly in the direction of the activating welfare administration. 
Also under a social perspective the lessons from Germany might attract attention 
outside this country: because the consequences of the German reform process can 
show, that an activation policy is embedded in social circumstances – which are not 
alike in all countries and parts or regions of country due to remarkable social and 
economic differences : matching on the labour market is easier under low unem-
ployment rates, however far from effective at all, if the unemployment rate is so 
enormous, that there are more unemployed than employed persons. Different acti-
vation models, hence, react differently, when they are established and embedded in 
different economic environments and under distinct social circumstances.  
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Work Activation and Rehabilitation of dis-
abled people in Germany in the framework 
of European strategies – problems of co-
herence and policy mismatch 
Felix Welti 
Introduction 
In social policy and in law there are different approaches to the subject of employ-
ment and activation of people who are disabled or have any form of health problem 
following the basic lines of economic and social integration and of freedoms, 
equality and solidarity. These different approaches lead to different political and 
legal instruments. In social and employment policy and even more in a legal system 
they have to be brought in a coherent system. Negative interaction and mismatch 
problems between goals and instruments have to be minimized. On the European 
and even more on the national German level some problems of coherence have not 
been solved yet. 
Employment policy as economic policy and the individual 
right to work 
European Basis 
The first approach to the problem is to subsume it under the greater strategy of em-
ployment and labour market and the related individual rights (Oppermann 2004; 
Haines 2004; Welti 2004). The goal is to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities and a 
high level of employment which shall be based on the close coordination of Mem-
ber states economic policies according to Article 2 and 4 of the European Treaty 
and to realize what Article 15 of the charter of fundamental rights of the European 
Union calls the right of everyone to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen 
or accepted occupation. Since the beginning of modern history and modern welfare 
there have been designed legal instruments for the activation of the poor to work. 
They always required the distinction of those who were able to work and those who 




were not. It is in special for this reason that health condition comes into the focus of 
general employment policies. On a higher level of reflection and evaluation policy 
and law makers will also find, that disability and health problems correlate with un-
employment and with employment on a low level of qualification and payment. 
Then special instruments of support and activation might be developed. 
Germany: The “Hartz-Laws”, especially SGB II 
In Germany the laws for modern services for the labour market, known as the Hartz 
reforms, have been the last big attempt to increase employment and to activate the 
unemployed, especially by creating a new system of steering the Federal Agency 
for work and a new system of basic security for job-seekers in the Social Security 
Code Book II (SGB II), in force since the beginning of 2005. 
The definition of ability to work 
Integrating two former systems of social welfare and of work promotion in the re-
sponsibility of the Federal Agency on the one hand and of the local social welfare 
on the other hand, a new definition of the ability to work had to be found. It is now 
defined in § 8 of the SGB II: Able to work is everyone from 15 to 65 – and in a few 
years up to 67 - who is able to work under normal labour market conditions at least 
three hours a day. Specialists of Social Medicine say, this is really difficult to de-
cide. 
The normal labour market condition is the ideal labour market condition - 
which in many parts of Germany is far away from the real labour market condition. 
Official unemployment in 2005 amounted to 12% in Germany as a whole and to 
19% in Eastern Germany. This definition declares a lot of even severely disabled 
people able to work. In 2002 the Federal Agency had found out that one quarter of 
all unemployed were limited by health condition. It can be taken for granted that 
those who came out of the social welfare system were even worse off in their health 
status. 
The system is dichotomous: You are either able to work or you are not. In the 
Social Security Code Book VI (SGB VI) the same definition is used (§ 43), but 
there is to be found also the category of partially unable to work for those who can 
work from three to six hours a week. They are entitled to half of a invalidity pen-
sion. But this does not help most of the unemployed, because they have at least 
marginal claims to invalidity pensions. The definition of work-ability had been very 
important, because after the reform the unemployed have to be paid by the Federal 
Government and the invalid have to be paid by the local authorities and the Länder. 
A first look: Poor results 
So the systems covers a lot of disabled people and you should expect some highly 
developed instruments for dealing with these persons. But the Hartz Commission 
was not really concerned with this problem. Their subject had been wording and 




building a new bureaucratic structure – which meanwhile in 2007 has been found to 
be in contradiction to the constitutional guarantee of local self-government by the 
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, 20.12.2007, Az. 2 BvR 2433/04) - and poli-
tics were occupied with discussing the amount and conditions of the basic payment 
and about those unemployed supposed being not willing to work. So the German 
employment policy today has to face poor results on behalf of unemployed people 
with disabilities and in bad health condition (Weber 2002, Welti 2004). Around 
three millions of Germans between 15 and 65 are recognised as severely disabled 
and only a few more than one million are official part of the labour market, includ-
ing nearly 200.000 unemployed. Nearly 250.000 are occupied in sheltered work-
shops outside the labour market, with an increasing tendency. A special campaign 
had decreased the number of unemployed severely disabled in 2002 to 150.000; in 
the last years it has been increasing again. Only around 25% of severely disabled in 
2005 left the official unemployment status for employment, 10% for qualification 
and most of them shifted outside the system. 
Some explanations 
For the disabled people themselves the strict demarcation between the status of be-
ing a job-seeker able to work and of being a fully invalid welfare client has created 
a non-activating effect. The rigid workfare regime of the Social Security Code II is 
not designed for the needs of people who struggle for their ability to work. It ist 
more attractive for them to be classified as fully invalid and to get the right to work 
in a sheltered workshop and some more individual support (Welti 2005a). If You 
first prove to be able to work for more than three hours and afterwards loose Your 
employment, You are worse off than before. In Social Security Code II case man-
agement is an administrative task, in Social Security Code XII - the social assis-
tance - it is a task for social workers.  
The steering mechanism inside the federal agency and the newly designed local 
bodies for the basic security combined from federal agency and local community 
also has produced some questionable effects. The federal agency hast started with 
the first parts of the Hartz reforms in 2003 to invent new criteria for vocational re-
training and education. To improve their quality and effectiveness they demanded 
high quotas up to 70% of immediate reintegration of the participants in the labour 
market. The number of disabled participants decreased significantly, because their 
special integration problems had not been taken into account. This can be seen as 
discrimination (Davy 2002, Welti 2004). 
Now the federal agency, financed by special contributions of employees and 
employers, has to pay an amount to the federal budget for every person being un-
employed for longer than one year and then being paid out of the federal budget. 
This should be an incentive to bring the unemployed into work. But as the agency 
cannot bring all into work in fact it is an incentive to care especially for those who 
easily can be brought into work. Disabled people mostly do not belong to this 




group. There is no incentive to do something for people with severe problems 
whose reintegration may take a longer time than one year. 
Federal Agency, federal government and local authorities disagreed over the re-
sponsibility for vocational rehabilitation of unemployed in the system of the Social 
Security Code II. It could not be implemented to have the local bodies carrying out 
Social Security Code II responsible for vocational rehabilitation, so now the Fed-
eral Agency is responsible for it (§ 6a SGB IX). In the result, there is a divided re-
sponsibility for their case management (Welti 2007). 
Rehabilitation and the right to integration and participation 
European Basis 
The second approach to the problem is more specific. It covers the traditions of vo-
cational and medical rehabilitation which have been developed in Europe and Ger-
many in the last 100 years especially in the context of pension and work accident 
insurance and of war victim support. This special policy has the double justification 
of avoiding the costs of social disintegration, at first of invalidity pensions, and of 
social integration as a reason for its own sake. In the treaty this goal is called a high 
level of social protection and, more precise, in the treaty for establishing a Euro-
pean constitution the combat of social exclusion and discrimination and the promo-
tion of social justice and protection. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union states in Article 26 that the Union recognises and respects the right 
of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their inde-
pendence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the 
community. The “respect”-formula is taken in the charter being conscious that there 
is a long and manifold tradition of such measures in each of the member states. 
The German system and the SGB IX 
“Rehabilitation has priority over pension” has been the legal slogan in this field 
over many decades in Germany. This is activation policy avant la lettre and it has 
worked well and still works well for some groups, especially for those whose work-
ability is endangered by accident or by illness after long years of workplace inte-
gration (Eichenhofer 2005). Responsibility for the rehabilitation of potentially 
working people in Germany is shared between the bodies of pension insurance, ac-
cident insurance, federal agency for work and the integration office, which for-
merly was an exclusive agency for war victims and now has to promote the work-
place integration of all severely disabled people. Some responsibilities are also im-
posed on the employers who have an employment quota of 5% severely disabled in 
relation to their total workforce and some duties for adapted employment. 
In 2001 the system of rehabilitation and workplace participation has been regu-
lated in a new legal system in the Social Security Code Book IX (SGB IX). The 




aim of this legislation was to achieve more cooperation, coordination and conver-
gence of the different bodies involved into the rehabilitation system including the 
sickness insurance and the local social welfare bodies. For the first time the obliga-
tions of all social security authorities in the field of rehabilitation and also of em-
ployers were regulated in one law (Kohte 2005). A common legal concept of dis-
ability has been established which is derived from the International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability and Health of the World Health Organisation (Seger et. 
al. 2004). Disability is defined as a lack of participation in society caused by a 
health problem. This is an advanced definition which includes the individual condi-
tion and the social context. In Germany we say “Menschen sind nicht nur behin-
dert, sie werden behindert.” (People are not only disabled, they are being disabled), 
which means: Disability is not only a personal disadvantage but also a relation be-
tween a person and its environment. This concept of disability does not fit in the 
concept of work-ability which does not regard the ability to work in the real labour 
market but in an ideal labour market. 
Activation and employment instruments in SGB IX 
Also the instruments have been revised and improved: “Rehabilitation has priority 
over pension” has been generalized to “Rehabilitation has priority over each kind of 
benefit in cash.” (§ 8 SGB IX) This means, that all social security authorities are 
obliged to examine in each case of application for any benefit in cash, if any kind 
of rehabilitation of any authority can be taken into account. So for example after an 
application for sickness allowance the sickness insurance has to examine not only if 
medical rehabilitation as a benefit in kind from itself or from the pension insurance 
should be given but also if vocational rehabilitation from the pension insurance or 
from the federal agency could be successful. On the other side the federal agency 
has to take in account medical rehabilitation, if disabled people apply for job-
seekers allowance. This would be some kind of revolutionary for the strictly seg-
mented German system of welfare (Gagel/ Schian 2002; Gagel 2004). Unfortu-
nately the new law is not properly executed in wide parts of the administration. 
There is no incentive for the administrative bodies to do so. Especially in the fed-
eral agency and in the sickness insurance there is a lack of competence in the direc-
tion of the other parts of the social security system 
A second instrument of the Social Security Code Book IX is the new institution 
of common service units (Gemeinsame Servicestellen, § 22 SGB IX), for all the au-
thorities dealing with rehabilitation. Citizens and employer should have to deal only 
with one single unit to get all the possible and fitting benefits in kind of medical, 
vocational and social rehabilitation. The common service units should also do case 
management. This would be a real progress in the segmented system. Unfortunately 
the first evaluation of the common service units found out that they are still not 
ready to serve their management functions and only work as normal advice centres, 
sometimes they are just “one-more-stop-agencies” (Shafaei 2008). 




The Social Security Book IX also brought a few inventions for the rehabilitation 
services themselves. Strongly disabled people now can profit from a personal 
workplace assistance (Arbeitsassistenz, § 102 Abs. 4 SGB IX) which really is help-
ful for example for blind or deaf people. Also new Integration Services for special 
needs (Integrationsfachdienste, § 109 SGB IX) were invented. They are financed 
by the fund financed from the countervailing charge employers have to pay if they 
do not employ enough severely disabled people. Due to reforms and economic cri-
sis the fund is lacking money although employment of disabled people has not in-
creased. So also the services are facing a financial crisis. 
At least the employers responsibilities were made more clear than before in the 
Social Security Book IX. The employers are obliged to carry out a Company Inte-
gration Management (Betriebliches Eingliederungsmanagement) in every case of 
an employee being absent from work more than six weeks a year (§ 84 Abs. 2 SGB 
IX). This corresponds to the beginning of sickness allowance payments after six 
weeks and marks a first step to a new balance of responsibility between employers 
and social security after two decades of a policy of early retirement and workplace 
disintegration carried out nearly cooperative between companies and social security 
system (Welti, 2006a). There are no direct sanctions if employers miss their re-
sponsibilities for a Company Integration Management, but they may face problems 
when trying to dismiss employees for sickness reasons (Deinert 2007). Also some 
companies, especially from the bigger ones, realize that it is more reasonable for 
them to end the policy of disintegrating employees with health problems, because 
for demographic reasons even today skilled workforce is more and more difficult to 
hold. The Company Integration Management is also an important link to workplace 
security and workplace environment as another main area of European social and 
employment strategy. It seems that Company Integration Management may work as 
far as it can be carried out in internal responsibility of the companies, but the link to 
the social security system, which should be built by the common service units, does 
not work properly. Employers often miss one person being the responsible partner 
for rehabilitation in the sense of case-management. 
Systemic problems 
Five years after enforcement of Social Security Code IX the outcome of implemen-
tation is not very satisfying. It should not be forgotten that Germany still has in 
many parts an efficient rehabilitation system. But the tasks and incentives for the 
responsible authorities are not promoting innovation in this field. Incentives for the 
federal agency as mentioned had a result of creaming the unemployed. The bodies 
carrying out the sickness insurance are in competition with each other and so try to 
avoid the “bad risk” of doing a good job and being attractive for disabled and 
chronically sick people (Welti 2006). 




Equality and Non-Discrimination 
The European Basis 
The third approach to the problem follows the principle of non-discrimination. Ac-
cording to Article 21 of the Charter of fundamental rights any discrimination on the 
ground of disability shall be prohibited. This goal of achieving equality not only be-
fore the law but also in society corresponds with both fundamental goals of the 
European Union: Building a common market requires a common society based on 
the equality of market participants, deepening the market means involving every-
one in it. Building an integrated European society means giving everyone access to 
his fundamental needs even if markets do not satisfy these needs. 
The items mentioned especially for non-discrimination in the European and na-
tional law are not equal in function and impact. Regarding the equality of sex, race, 
colour, language or religion in most cases we call the state as well as the actors in 
society to be like the goddess of justice with a blindfold on: just to ignore prejudice 
regarding these special topics. Regarding the equality of disabled people in many 
cases we want the goddess of justice to be the goddess of equity and to have a good 
look on the special conditions people are living and suffering with. The concept of 
considering disability in equality means not a formal equality of rules but a material 
equality of chances and even of results.  
In European Law this concept of non-discrimination is broadly accepted and 
can be found in the Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation (ECJ 11/7/2006, C-13/05, 
Chacón Navas; Welti 2008). Going beyond the right to positive action stated in Ar-
ticle 7 in Article 5 of the Directive the member states are obliged to provide rea-
sonable accommodation in relation to persons with disabilities. This means that 
employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to 
enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in em-
ployment or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a dispropor-
tional burden on the employer. The member states have the opportunity to make 
this burden proportional by helping the employers within the framework of their 
disability policy. 
German Implementation 
In Germany this directive has been implemented with the Social Security Book IX 
(§§ 80-84 SGB IX) on behalf of severely disabled people and on behalf of other 
disabled people with the General Equal Treatment Law of 2006 (Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG). Concerning reasonable accommodation it can be 
doubted that the implementation is complemented but it is possible to understand 
German Law in conformity with European Law. 




It is prohibited for employers to discriminate anyone on the ground of his or her 
disability when making decisions about employment, advancement and dismissal 
and employers have to provide reasonable accommodation for disabled people 
which is proportional for them because integration office and moreover sickness, 
pension and accident insurance authorities support the reasonable accommodation. 
So some jobs for disabled people can be secured, but according to the general lack 
of employment chances especially for the lower qualified even an equal chance 
would be a little chance in many parts of Germany. 
A substantial equality of chances has to start earlier for providing disabled and 
health impaired people with good and sustainable qualification and at the same time 
taking in account their special needs. In Germany between 5 and 7% of every age 
cohort visit special schools and are not integrated in the general education system 
(Cloerkes 2003). The social security system in the past provided basic qualification 
for many of them, compensating deficits of the educational system based on an 
outdated segregated school system. After the Hartz reforms vocational training and 
rehabilitation has changed and does not serve this basic qualification functions to 
the same extent.  
The employment framework directive 2000/78 according to its Article 3 covers 
not only the conditions of employment, but also the access to all types and all levels 
of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and re-
training. Germany has now in the context of the General Equal Treatment Law 
2006 (AGG) implemented this principle in several parts of the Social Security Code 
(§ 19a SGB IV; § 33c SGB I; Welti 2008). In German social and employment pol-
icy there is a contrast between elaborated instruments of a special disability and re-
habilitation policy and some kind of ignorance in the mainstream of labour market 
and activation policy. But the principles of equality and non-discrimination need to 
be integrated in the mainstream of society and legal system (Schiek 2002; Welti 
2005; Welti 2006). 
Conclusion 
European law and European coordination already have had a positive impact on 
German disability policy. But European and German law and policy making will 
have to take even more in account that the general employment strategy and the 
special strategy for integration and equality of disabled people have to be brought 
into convergence. Studying the European documents through the years it seems that 
also on this level the links between both areas not have been tightened. 
As a first step we should discuss seriously in Germany about the impact of the 
employment framework directive 2000/78 on social security system and we should 
not repeat the mistake of disability-blind reforms in our educational system. Social 
security and education have to prove their performance not for those who are al-
ready healthy, wealthy and wise. Also on the European level we may need more 
awareness that the employment situation of disabled people is situated at the inter-




face of the employment, the social security and the educational system. Disabled 
people should find their place not on the fringes but in the middle of a dynamic and 
open and integrative German and European society. 
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“From a given – into a task”   
Andreas Inghammar 
Aspects of labour market integration and employment strategies in relation to 
reasonable accommodation regulations and the individualized perspective of 
anti-discrimination legislation.1 
Introduction 
Since the introduction of disability anti-discrimination law, the legal and socio-
political debates in the field has been circling the very idea of access to employ-
ment through equal treatment legislation.2 The European Community adoption of 
this strategy is very obviously apparent in the directive 2000/78/EC.3 Since the dis-
ability part of the Directive already is, or is supposed to be, implemented, a number 
of national legislations or amendments to national legislation have been passed 
lately. This development represents an interesting and important shift in attitude to 
disability at work, from what could be argued to constitute a more paternalistic per-
spective of positive measures, subsidies and sheltered employment – to a more in-
dividualised perspective, where the disabled individual will be promoted to com-
pete in a free labour market, regardless of irrelevant attitudes towards disability. 
Disability might, however, have significant impact on the ability to perform the 
employment tasks, and if the description of the current development is correct, the 
focus on competitiveness and equal treatment of “equals” might leave many dis-
abled individuals outside the scope of the “equal” labour market. The individual-
ised perspective could, with parallels to the words of Bauman, be described as re-
sulting in the establishment of a “de jure autonomy (although not necessarily a de 
facto one)”.4 Disability discrimination law does, to some extent, react to this situa-
tion by stipulating an employer duty to make reasonable accommodations in order 
to make more disabled employees or applicants available for the “equality-test” of 
discrimination law.  
                                           
1 This article consists of aspects and perspectives developed among other things in my doctoral thesis at Lund 
University, Inghammar, Funktionshindrad – med rätt till arbete, Juristförlaget i Lund, 2007.  
2 I would say that this is particularly valid for the development in the UK, the European country most experienced 
with disability discrimination law.  
3 The development of disability law within the European Community is described in Waddington, From Rome to 
Nice in a Wheelchair, The development of a European Disability Policy, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 
2006. 
4 Baumann, in, Beck, Beck-Gernsheim (ed), Individualization, SAGE Publications, London 2002, p. XV.  




Disability discrimination law as we have seen it develop in Europe over the past 
10-15 years have been described as elitist,5 de facto focusing the most competitive 
disabled employees and job-applicants, leaving, I would say, a majority of persons 
with disabilities with no increased prospect of labour market integration. The very 
core idea of equal treatment has to do with a merit-based labour market selection, 
neither a means-tested nor a, for insufficient reasons, misguided selection based on 
irrelevant aspects like disability.6 Individual capacity and individual ambition seem 
to establish the individual employee or job-applicant at the heart of the labour mar-
ket and the discrimination legislation provides incentives, in form of damages for 
violation of the legislation, for employees or applicants to take legal action.7 This 
market oriented perspective could be argued to relate very closely to a development 
into a more individualised – and flexible – notion of employment relations. But 
then again, disability discrimination law also includes a specific feature – the duty 
to make reasonable accommodations. 
In this article it is argued that the duty to make reasonable accommodations 
constitutes the most fundamental opposition to an otherwise rather elitist perspec-
tive of non-discrimination law, but that this duty is still very much in line with the 
underlying individualisation of the labour market. The article pinpoints some dif-
ferences in the duties to make reasonable accommodations under national anti-
discrimination law, and discusses how these differences influences the possible 
outcome of the disability discrimination legislation. 
Duty to make reasonable accommodations under EC-
directive 2000/78/EC 
Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC clearly stipulates that reasonable accommoda-
tions shall be provided or at least taken into account in order to guarantee the com-
pliance of the equal treatment principle. Employers shall be obliged to take such 
appropriate measures as to enable persons with disabilities access to and participa-
tion in employment, as long as this does not result in a disproportionate burden for 
the employer. Support or subsidies provided as parts of the national disability strat-
egy will influence the perception of the proportionality of the employer’s duty. As 
argued in section 21 of the preamble to the directive, factors like financial resources 
and the scale of the organisation shall be taken into account, but at large, the very 
                                           
5 See for instance Inghammar, Discrimination of People with Disabilities, in Numhauser-Henning (ed) Legal Per-
spectives on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001, p. 348. 
6 As long as the disability is an “irrelevant” aspect and does not interfere with the performance of the duties under 
the employment contract. 
7 This constitutes indeed a shift from earlier generations of disability labour market ”rights” which were almost 
impossible for the individual disabled person to claim, I discuss this issue more in depth in, Inghammar (forth-
coming) 2007.  




definition of reasonableness and proportionality will be dependent on future EC, 
and national, case law.8 
…in Sweden 
The Swedish Disability Discrimination Act, (SFS 1999:132) includes a duty for 
employers to make reasonable accommodations.9 There is no statutory indication to 
tell what would be considered reasonable or unreasonable, and so far, since coming 
into force in May 1999, this aspect of the law has not been subject to any signifi-
cant guidance by case law from the Swedish Labour Court.10 At a first glance the 
duty to make reasonable accommodations under the Swedish act from 1999 seemed 
to correspond rather well to the EC-directive. However, since the discrimination 
law was introduced to a legal environment where accommodations to the work-
places used to be handled under the Safety at Work legislation (SFS 1977:1160), 
any accommodation for employees under an existing employment contracts was 
kept out of the Disability Discrimination Act. The regulatory field of adjustments 
was divided, and accommodations in respect to disabled job-applicants and em-
ployees applying for promotion formed part of the discrimination perspective, 
while similar accommodations for already employed disabled persons fell under 
Safety at Work provisions. Only under the discrimination law the individual could 
take legal action and call for damages in terms of loss of income or injury to feel-
ings under private (labour) law proceedings. Safety at Work issues were, and are 
still, a part of a public/administrative law area, where the individual employee are 
left with only indirect representation and administrative proceedings and no dam-
ages could be paid to the individual employee in these cases.11 Voices were raised 
implying that since accommodation is already to some extent obligatory under 
Safety at Work legislation any similar duty under disability discrimination law 
would be overlapping.12 
In December 2006, only days before the implementation of directive 
2000/78/EC was overdue, the Swedish parliament changed this situation by includ-
ing employees and not only job-applicants and employees seeking promotion under 
the reasonable accommodation section of the disability discrimination law.  
                                           
8 See also Waddington, Hendriks, The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in Europe: from Direct 
to Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination, in, The International Journal of Com-
parative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 403-427. 
9 6 § act law (1999:132) on disability discrimination. 
10 As a matter of fact the Labour Court have only tried the disability discrimination law on five separate occasions. 
In three cases the Court found that the employer had discriminated against the employee or the job-applicant, 
these where cases where the plaintiff suffered from early stage Multiple Sclerosis, Diabetes or Allergic reactions 
to some food. 
11 The former Swedish government made a proposal to rearrange these matters in order to better comply with the 
EC-directive, but the proposal was postponed until after the Election in September 2006 and how, and when, the 
new majority in Parliament will react to this is still unclear. 
12 See further for instance Proposition 1997/98:179 p. 53. 




I would argue that what we experience in the described legislative discussion is 
a collision between on one hand an individualised disability discrimination aspect 
and on the other a collectively oriented perspective expressed in the Safety at Work 
legislation. As we will see below, this collision is not a situation isolated to Swe-
den.  
…in Germany  
Since long, legislation on integration and labour market participation in German la-
bour law has been focusing severely disabled.13 Regulations covering a variety of 
instruments, such as the Quota-system, are still actively promoting the integration 
of persons with (severe) disabilities.14 This legislation does, however, only to a mi-
nor extent generate specific individual rights for the (severely) disabled, rights un-
der which the disabled person could bring charges against a neglecting employer.  
In August 2006, German Bundestag finally passed new discrimination legisla-
tion, the General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, 
AGG).15 The legislation is supposed to implement the EC-directive 2000/78/EC 
and outlaw discrimination in relation to, among other things, disability in the labour 
market.16 To a large extent the definitions within the EC-directive are implemented, 
most importantly is the old German concept of special protection for severely dis-
abled not adopted in the discrimination act but a broader, more inclusive, definition 
of disablement is used.17 Regardless of what is explicitly said, the German Act does 
not fully implement the EC-directive. The lack of a duty to make reasonable ac-
commodations under the discrimination act is one of the most appalling examples 
of this.18  
Despite article 5 of the directive 2000/78/EC, the German legislator shows re-
luctance to introduce any duty to make reasonable accommodations under the dis-
crimination and equal treatment legislation and neither the AGG nor the former 
                                           
13 In general, this perspective has influenced the field of law since 1923, the current legislation is since 2001 found 
in the Ninth Social Book of Law, Socialgesetzbuch IX (SGB IX). For a thorough analysis of the legislation see, 
Welti, Behinderung und Rehabilitation im sozialen Rechtsstaat, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2005. 
14 SGB IX. 
15 The legislation was announced in the Bundesgesetzblatt 17 August 2006 and the law came into force the day 
after that. For an early discussion about the AGG, se Bauer, Thüsing, Schunder, Das Allgemeine 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?, in, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht, 2006, Heft 14, 
p. 774-778. 
16 § 1 AGG, the second part of the Act focuses relations on the labour market. 
17 There is no legal definition of disability under the Act, but disability is explicitly covered, see, § 1 AGG. (“Ziel 
des Gesetzes ist, Benachteiligungen aus Gründen […] einer Behinderung […] zu verhindern oder zu beseitigen”). 
18 The other important example is the exemption of dismissal cases from the discrimination legislation, see fur-
ther, § 2 Abs. 4 AGG. This exemption does not cover disability alone, but all other ground for discrimination. The 
legislator obviously relies heavily on general employment protection legislation on unfair dismissal, see, 
Kündigungsschutzgesetz. 




disability equal treatment regulations in § 81 Abs. 2 SGB IX correlates to such du-
ties.19  
However, this it not the full picture of employer duties to accommodate dis-
abled individuals. A separate regulation already in the SGB IX generates a some 
what similar duty for the employer to actively try to adjust the workplaces to se-
verely disabled employees.20 To some extent, this statute might regulate the same 
or similar situations, but in some vital aspects this would not be the case. First of all 
would the duties under § 81 Abs. 4 SGB IX only relate to persons with severe dis-
abilities. This definition will exclude a great number of people with less than severe 
disabilities, individuals with even better opportunities (than severely disabled) to 
compete under discrimination law in the open labour market. Secondly, the defini-
tion will comprise employees only, leaving job-applicants without opportunity to 
raise the question of workplace adjustments. Thirdly, an employee bringing charges 
against his employers in this regard will not be able to follow the discrimination 
“route to justice”, with the concept of shared burden of proof, but will have to ar-
gue in the private law concept under § 823 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).21 At 
least the two first arguments, and possibly even the third, could undermine the im-
plementation of the Directive in German labour law.  
…in Great Britain 
The British Disability Discrimination Act 1995 already from the beginning estab-
lished the idea of reasonable accommodations and turned out to be a role model for 
at least the Swedish legislative process in 1999. A significant number of cases from 
Tribunals, and recently even from Court of Appeal and House of Lords, has moni-
tored the importance of this duty and the potential progression of disability law ly-
ing embedded in this very idea.22 The British concept of the duty to make reason-
able accommodations is, in my opinion, the only of the three national concepts that 
from the very beginning corresponded to article 5 of directive 2000/78/EC.23 There 
are no limitations in regard to the disabled individual’s status as job-applicant or 
                                           
19 Prior to the introduction of the AGG in August 2006, a discrimination statute was attached to the legislation on 
severely disabled in § 81 Abs. 2 SGB IX between year 2001 and August 2006. The structure of that legislation, 
with the focus on severely disabled, was subject to legitimate criticism, see Schiek, Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinien 
der EU – umsetzung im deutschen Arbeitsrecht, in, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 2004, p. 873-884. 
20 § 81 Abs. 4 SGB IX, see Kossens, von der Heide, Maas, Praxiskommentar zum Behindertenrecht (SGB IX), 
C.H Beck, München 2002, p. 367-368. 
21 See BAG 10.7.1991 AP Nr 1 zu SchwBG 1986, as well as Neumann, Pahlen, Majerski-Pahlen, 
Sozialgesetzbuch IX. Rehabilitation und Teilhabe behinderter Menschen, 14 Aufl. C.H. Beck, München 2005, p. 
211 f. and Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 62 Aufl. C.H. Beck. München 2003, p. 1245 ff.  
22 British employment cases are brought through Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal, with 
possibilities for appeal in the Court of Appeal and eventually House of Lords. 
23 Whether the DDA 1995 definition of disability – with the “normal day-to-day activities” parameter – is suffi-
cient or not is really another story. 




employee, and no separate disability definition applied to this duty.24 Nevertheless, 
or maybe for that reason, have the questions of reasonableness and potency of the 
duty been subject to discussions in case law and the duty’s “element of more fa-
vourable treatment”, has, indeed, been recognised.25  
Accommodating the individual 
If disability discrimination law can be described to be a part of an ongoing indi-
vidualisation of employment legislation, providing legal rights for the achievement 
of equal treatment, how would that correspond to the reasonable accommodation 
perspective? When discrimination law, as described above, focuses the equality of 
opportunity and in fact the rights for persons with disabilities to compete without 
regards to irrelevant attitudes to their disablement, what role is there for reasonable 
accommodations to play? In respect to that role, do the national standards for rea-
sonable accommodation fulfil these purposes?  
The reasonable accommodation duty is obviously something different from a 
fundamentalist definition of equal treatment. The employers might need to take into 
consideration and even make expensive adjustments in order to accommodate the 
disabled individual, resulting in some sort of more favourable treatment.26 In rela-
tion to the variety of positive measures for labour market integration, this more fa-
vourable treatment represents, I would say, a somewhat different perception of 
people with disabilities. Where most positive measures regulate favourable treat-
ment for disabled persons as a group, that could be quota-system, extraordinary 
employment protection, sheltered or supported employment, the rights for persons 
with disabilities developed under the duty to make reasonable accommodations fo-
cus the individual, providing an opportunity for the individual disabled job-
applicant or employee to state his or her special, individualised, requirements, leav-
ing to the employers – and in the end to the courts or tribunals – to examine the rea-
sonableness and proportionality of the adjustments. From my perspective this is 
something different from other regulations. The legal construction will, as dis-
cussed above, even if it does not perfectly relate to the equal treatment paradigm, 
most certainly form a good alliance with the concept of individualisation – which is 
strongly advocated through discrimination law.  
                                           
24 For a detailed description on the reasonable accommodation section, see for instance Doyle, Disability Dis-
crimination. Law and Practice, 4th edition, Jordans, Bristol 2003.  
25 Archibald v Fife Council [2004] IRLR 651 HL (House of Lords), citation by Baroness Hale of Richmond, p. 
657. See also Northampton County Council v Meikle [2004] IRLR 703 CA (Court of Appeal). 
26 See Archiblad v Fife Council [2004] IRLR 651 HL, especially p. 657. 





The Swedish and German disability discrimination legislations both, in the own in-
dividual ways, though, showed reluctance to implement a general and consequent 
duty to make reasonable accommodations all over the labour market. Only after 
some debate and in under the threat of not properly implementing the EC-directive 
Swedish legislation was given a wider target in December 2006. The German legis-
lation is however still not changed in this regard. The ambiguous applications of the 
duty in these two countries could be said to maintain a more absolute idea of equal-
ity of treatment or at least keeping more favourable treatments, such as accommo-
dation of the workplace, separated from discrimination law, which is especially true 
about the German legislation. To what extent this will be in accordance to EC-law 
will be a question for future decisions by the ECJ, but it certainly would turn out a 
little surprising if this explicit part of the discrimination directive could be more or 
less voluntary for the Member States to implement. The duty to make reasonable 
accommodations also relates perfectly well to an individualised concept of em-
ployment expressed in discrimination law, even though any accommodating strate-
gies might challenge the overall competitive perspective of equal treatment. Herein 
lies a deep and contradiction in the legislation. As part of the individualised concept 
the reasonable accommodation regulation could be argued to contribute to a strat-
egy were employment for disabled persons are turn from “a given – into a task”, 
with the notion that individual disabled will have to take on that “task” and be 
competitive enough to see the changes come through. 
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The Individual’s Rehabilitation – Possibil-
ity or Right? 
Lotta Vahlne Westerhäll 
Background 
The Swedish word rehabilitering (rehabilitation) is a general term covering all 
measures of a medical, psychological, social and occupational nature which may 
assist those who have been ill or injured to regain maximum functional ability and 
restore the conditions required for a normal life. Different authorities, or principals, 
are responsible for the various areas. 
The public health authorities are responsible for medical rehabilitation, while 
the municipal/social services are in charge of the social aspects. Responsibility for 
occupational rehabilitation is shared by the labour market authorities, the social in-
surance office and the employer. The responsibility for coordination rests with the 
social insurance office. 
Occupationally oriented rehabilitation refers to the measures required to assist 
an absentee to regain his or her capacity for work, thereby making it possible to 
support himself/herself through gainful employment. 
The employer is primarily responsible for identifying and determining the need 
for rehabilitation, for ensuring that rehabilitative action is taken, and for financing 
such measures. Financial responsibility is, however, limited to measures that can be 
taken within, or in conjunction with, the framework of the company’s operations. 
The employee should be offered continued employment by the employer, and other 
alternatives should be explored only when this possibility is exhausted. 
This chapter will examine the legal position of the individual insured person 
from the point of view of the insured person’s possibility of being, or right (in the 
legal sense, i.e. where there is a possibility of review) to be, the object of a rehabili-
tation programme and also from the point of view of her/his obligations in connec-
tion with the rehabilitation process. I will begin by studying the concept of “possi-
bility”. 




The “possibility” concept 
Under Chapter 22, Section 1, of the National Insurance Act an insured person who 
is registered with a social insurance office or who is entitled to sickness allowance 
under Chapter 3, Section 1, second paragraph, has the “possibility of rehabilitation” 
and the “right to rehabilitation allowance” under the provisions of Chapter 22 of the 
Act. In other words no lawful right to rehabilitation is written into the current word-
ing of the Act. The right is limited to apply to the actual benefit during rehabilita-
tion, which is described below. It is important to keep this distinction in mind.1 
Occupational rehabilitation is very closely connected to the question of the right 
to benefit. The close link between the right to rehabilitation allowance and the pos-
sibility of rehabilitation, which has meant that the basic concepts of sickness and 
incapacity for work have become very relevant to the possibility of obtaining reha-
bilitative assistance and rehabilitation allowance, is very apparent. 
What is meant by “possibility”? There is no explanation in the legislative mate-
rial for the choice in the formulation of the Act of the word “possibility” for what is 
available to the individual.2 In ordinary language the term “possibility” is taken to 
mean “an opportunity/a chance”.3 The concept is then seen almost as a situation 
that arises at random without the influence of the individual. But the legal meaning 
of the term “possibility” has to be seen as vague. It is difficult to determine from 
the term alone what the legislator intended. Questions which inevitably arise are 
which insured persons are to be given the possibility of rehabilitation and in which 
situations the possibility becomes reality. 
In practice it has turned out that many of those who need some form of rehabili-
tation do not obtain it. It has been possible to ascertain that factors such as which 
officer the insured person encounters and the individual’s own attitude are crucial 
to whether attempts to rehabilitate will be made or not, and to how successful these 
will be. Surveys also show that the type of measure offered depends on such factors 
as gender, age, place of residence, and occupation. Research so far carried out 
shows that older people and immigrants become the object of rehabilitative meas-
ures to a lesser extent.4 The fact that the unemployed sick are discriminated against 
in the rehabilitation process is shown in a thesis dealing with occupational rehabili-
tation for the unemployed sick in a Swedish rural area.5 In practice it therefore ap-
pears that the allocation of rehabilitation is not characterised by the principle of 
                                           
1 National Social Insurance Board general advice 1991:12 p 5 prescribed however that with the rehabilitation re-
form of the early 1990s the individual has the right to demand that rehabilitation resources are made available to 
the person concerned. This is not consistent with the wording of the Act. 
2 Government bill 1990/1991:141 and SOU (Swedish Government Official Report) 1988:41. 
3 Nationalencyklopedins ordbok, andra bandet [National Encyclopedia Dictionary, Volume Two], bokförlaget Bra 
Böcker 1996. 
4 SOU 1998:104 s 143 ff. 
5 Marnetoft, Sven-Uno (2000), Vocational rehabilitation of unemployed sick-listed people in a Swedish rural area. 




equality and similar treatment. In addition it is very difficult to determine which 
factors are relevant to whether the insured person is included in the offer of reha-
bilitative measures or not. 
The regulations contain little to indicate that the legislator wishes to see the in-
sured person as active at an initial phase, in the sense of taking the initiative in ar-
ranging rehabilitation and determining that it should come about. One thing that 
may appear to point in such a direction in the legal text is the provision that im-
poses on an employer an obligation to carry out a rehabilitation enquiry when the 
insured person requests it under Chapter 22, Section 3, of the National Insurance 
Act. However the employer has the right to omit to carry out such an enquiry if it is 
considered unnecessary.6 The fact that the decision on rehabilitation is now re-
garded as appealable in certain respects (see below) may be seen as a step towards 
the possibility of an increased activity on the part of the individual, which may in-
dicate a growing wish to see the individual become more active. 
The fact that the insured person has a possibility of rehabilitative assistance and 
not a right to it might almost be interpreted as meaning that rehabilitation is to be 
initiated without the collaboration of the individual. As from 1 July 2003 the em-
ployer has a duty to carry out a rehabilitation enquiry (in three stated situations). 
But it is only when the employer or the social insurance office presents a rehabilita-
tion programme that the individual is expected to take a positive part and cooperate 
actively. This state of affairs may of course be criticised, and so it has been. It has 
been asked whether it is right that the insured person should be at the mercy of the 
opinions of outsiders (e.g. the rehabilitation officer’s or the employer’s opinion) on 
the need for her/his own rehabilitation, and have no opportunity of initiating action 
herself/himself. This circumstance is not compatible with the prevailing view that 
great weight should be attached to the individual’s particular situation, needs and 
commitment, and that these should guide the rehabilitation process. The criticism is 
lent extra weight by the fact that the insured person is also expected to be active 
and to participate when the process has started (and then by someone other than the 
insured person herself/himself). 
Moreover there is today no consensus regarding the criteria on which the de-
termining of priorities in rehabilitation activities should be based. This naturally 
makes it very difficult for the insured person to work out in advance when he or she 
actually has a possibility of rehabilitation. This being so, a report on occupational 
rehabilitation (SOU 2000:78) presented an entirely new proposal for an ethical plat-
form, which would form the basis for setting priorities among rehabilitation pro-
jects.7 The report did not lead to any legislation. 
                                           
6 SOU 1998:104 s 74. 
7 SOU 2000:78 p 317 ff. 





Appeal against decisions on rehabilitation 
The fact that Chapter 22, Section 1, of the National Insurance Act speaks of the in-
dividual’s prospects of obtaining rehabilitation as a possibility used to be inter-
preted in previous adjudications as meaning the individual could not appeal against 
a decision not to plan or take rehabilitative measures. Decisions on rehabilitative 
measures were regarded as non-appealable decisions while being made and not as 
social insurance decisions under the National Insurance Act. 
The individual depended on either the employer or the social insurance office to 
be of the opinion that there was a need for rehabilitation and to choose to finance 
the measures decided upon. All that the individual wishing to receive such rehabili-
tative assistance as was available could do was to express a wish for a particular 
necessary action to be taken. If those in power decided that such action should be 
not taken, the individual had a problem, because he/she had no means in law of 
forcing rehabilitative measures to be taken.  
In the mid-1990s, however, it was laid down that certain decisions concerning 
rehabilitation may in fact be appealed against by the individual. A landmark deci-
sion of the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court examined whether a decision on 
rehabilitation was to be reviewed under Chapter 20, Section 10, of the National In-
surance Act. The Supreme Administrative Court decided in this case (22 November 
1996, case no. 10057-1995) that a social insurance office decision not to buy an oc-
cupational rehabilitation service for an insured person should be reviewed under the 
National Insurance Act, provided that this was requested by the insured person and 
the decision was appealable in the sense that it had gone against the individual. 
As grounds for the decision it was stated that at the time of making the decision 
the social insurance office had a duty to ensure that rehabilitative action was taken 
when there was a need for such, for which reason a decision on the rehabilitation 
concerned was statutorily a decision in an insurance case under the National Insur-
ance Act. For this reason it was considered that the decision could be reviewed if 
requested by the insured person. 
This judgement has implications both for the individual insured person and for 
the handling of rehabilitation cases by the social insurance offices. Where the social 
insurance office does not intend to buy a particular occupational rehabilitation ser-
vice which the insured person claims, the office now has to issue a decision giving 
instructions for application for a review. Whether the insured person really de-
mands that the office buy the disputed rehabilitation service, or is only discussing 
various alternative forms of rehabilitation, is, according to the information issued 
by the then National Social Insurance Board, to be considered in the individual 
case. However there should be a clear and distinct proposal, preferably in writing, 
of a specific action. 




Refusal to take part in rehabilitative programme 
The obligation to take part in a rehabilitative programme may undoubtedly be of a 
character that encroaches on personal freedom or integrity. The question of the ex-
tent to which an insured person is obliged to submit to rehabilitative measures is 
taken up in the preparatory material to the current National Insurance Act.  
Most people who are potential candidates for rehabilitation are already in a dif-
ficult situation, with sickness and incapacity for work interfering with the normal 
pattern of life. This may naturally tend to make it seem very dubious whether the 
situation may be allowed to be “aggravated” by the fact that the process also entails 
specific obligations. The rehabilitative measures suggested by, for example, the so-
cial insurance office or the employer are not infrequently of such a kind as to be 
seen as an infringement of integrity, if they are contrary to the individual’s wishes. 
Occupational rehabilitation may involve very varied measures. There may be 
requirements for the individual to undergo extensive examinations or treatments, 
receive physiotherapy etc. Implementation of rehabilitative measures of a medical 
nature may put the individual in an exposed position, both mentally and purely 
physically, where she/he may be in a position of dependency and subordinate to 
health care personnel. Other rehabilitative measures, too, that may be considered 
conducive to occupational rehabilitation may contain elements which are felt to be 
very “personal”. This may infringe personal integrity. The measures may be of such 
a nature as to lie within the area where the individual herself/himself ought to be 
allowed to decide.  
A withdrawal of benefit presupposes that the insured person is at the time of 
withdrawal entitled to financial benefit in the form of sickness allowance or reha-
bilitation allowance. This implies that the consideration of the requirement for 
sickness or incapacity for work in accordance with Chapter 3, Section 7, of the Na-
tional Insurance Act has previously taken place and that on the occasion of this 
consideration the insured person has been regarded as satisfying the requirements 
in this respect. Despite the fact that the person is entitled to financial compensation 
under the sickness insurance scheme following the customary assessment of sick-
ness and incapacity for work, the financial benefit is withdrawn on the grounds that 
the insured person is not meeting the requirements laid down for “active participa-
tion”. Herein lies the element of sanction. 
A number of test judgements8 emphasise that caution should be observed in 
withdrawing an insured person’s rehabilitation allowance.9 These instructive cases 
therefore indicate some restriction on the social insurance office’s freedom to apply 
the sanction in Chapter 20, Section 3, of the National Insurance Act. The rehabilita-
                                           
8 Since 1 July 1995 the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has been the highest forum for matters of sickness 
insurance and rehabilitation. 
9 See for example FÖD [Swedish Superior Insurance Court] 19 December 1994 Case no. 1729/92:9. 




tive action proposed to the insured person must for example be definite and unam-
biguous in substance,10 benefit may not be withdrawn as long as the attempt at re-
habilitation continues,11 reminders about the sanction must be given in an accept-
able manner12 etc. 
However these restrictions that have arisen in the application of the law do not 
prevent withdrawals occurring. The interventionist nature of the rehabilitative 
measures as described above ought therefore to be considered in relation to the fact 
that the consequences of a refusal to participate actively in rehabilitation may affect 
the insured person quite severely. Losing one’s sickness allowance may undoubt-
edly have serious consequences for the individual and rule out any possibility of 
self-support. At worst, withdrawal of benefit may result in having to resort to an 
application for financial assistance under the Social Services Act. It is not unusual 
for the person concerned to find herself or himself in a grey zone between different 
authorities. The situation may be such that the individual has no chance of obtain-
ing, for example, labour market support, study assistance or other possible benefit.  
One of the ultimate aims of sickness insurance – giving financial assistance to 
persons who as a result of sickness have suffered a reduction in their working ca-
pacity – becomes obscured in a withdrawal situation by another aim – namely that 
of promoting active rehabilitation from the point of view of the individual. The re-
sult of a withdrawal under Chapter 20, Section 3, of the National Insurance Act as a 
result of inadequate participation in a rehabilitation programme is that the person 
who does not take an active part in the attempts at rehabilitation is no longer picked 
up by the social insurance scheme either.  
In the social policy debate the question has often arisen of what requirements it 
is reasonable to impose on the individual to whom social benefits are granted. The 
financial benefit may be regarded here as a tool with which to motivate, control or 
influence citizens. The authorities set out certain demands and have the threat of 
sanctions as a means of countering undesired behaviour.13 
For natural reasons this approach may make for more efficient administration. 
The threat of losing the financial benefit may have the effect of putting powerful 
pressure on the individual to take the course desired by the administration. How-
ever there is a risk that the autonomy and personal integrity of the individual suffer 
from serious encroachment owing to the position of dependency in which the indi-
vidual often finds herself or himself in such situations. 
                                           
10 FÖD 22 November 1993 Case no. 2667/90:7. 
11 FÖD 29 October 1992 Case no. 1041/89:3. 
12 FÖD 19 December 1994 Case no. 1729/92:9. 
13 Kjönstad, Asbjörn m fl (1993), Sosial trygghet og rettssikkerhet – under sosialtjensteloven og 
barneverntjensteloven, p 115 ff. 
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Employment support – a normative step 
backward, forward or nowhere?  
Sara Stendahl 
 
The tramps called it The Mountain, the establishment where they were brought 
when convicted to forced labour for begging and tramping the roads. It was a 
hard place. A “harshfarm” in Sånga county. Apart from farming it had a stone-
quarry. There, surrounded by constables, the tramps pondered about why one, 
but not the other, ended up in this place. 
Harry Martinsson 
Vägen till Klockrike1 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the normative implications of “employment sup-
port”. The concept is used as a comprehensive label to include different legal 
strategies elaborated with the aim of moving recipients of social security cash 
benefits from benefits into paid work.2 Employment support described in this way 
is an essential aspect of what has been called the active welfare state or the work 
                                           
1 Martinson, 1950. The year is 1898 and the former cigar maker Bolle, betrayed in love and in disgust of what 
industrialisation does to humans and to craftsmanship, decides to look for freedom in tramping the countryside of 
Sweden. Still, fear of the authorities is ever present as vagabonding is forbidden. The penalty is a one year sen-
tence to forced labour. Martinson was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1974.  
2 The concept of legal strategies is used to capture the way legal constructs (rules, principles, practices) function as 
building blocs in the implementation of social policies, and how the different usage and combination of these will 
determine different modes of governance. Legal strategies are worked out and determined on different levels – 
locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. Thus, although national legislation (statutory law) would be a 
prime example of where to look for legal constructs, this is not an exclusive source. In the area of welfare law 
there is increasing awareness of the pluralistic elements of legal systems and the notion of legal strategies does not 
exclude such a perspective. Thus, legal strategies are not always coherent, they do not necessarily point in the 
same direction, not even on the ideal, normative, level. 




first welfare state.3 Depending on the strategy chosen, employment support measures 
can be designed in many different ways, and they can be targeted at different groups of 
welfare recipients.4 
The aim of this chapter is twofold, the first aim is to serve as a concluding chapter 
reflecting upon the different contributions made to the present volume highlighting im-
portant themes. The second, interlinked, aim is to explore the normative impact of work 
first welfare reforms in three different European countries using the theory of basic 
normative patterns.5 The empirical input is limited to the nine country reports constitut-
ing chapters in the present volume. My ambition at this point is neither to draw conclu-
sions nor to explain the normative route taken by European countries in their pursuit of 
work first welfare, but rather to formulate questions that could be worthwhile to pursue 
in future comparative legal studies.6 As stated by Cox, “welfare reform is more a strug-
gle over identity of a society then over the size of the public budget”,7 and what is sug-
gested in the present text is that an analysis of legal strategies could offer this sought af-
ter knowledge of the normative patterns of different societies.  
The material analysed, the previous chapters, was written in response to a request 
asking the researchers to: 
… contribute by describing and discussing legal strategies used to increase la-
bour market participation. By legal strategies we refer to the legislator’s choice 
of method to implement a specific policy, e.g. the creation of rights, the choice 
between using hard law/soft law, public/private law, statutory law/collective 
bargaining etc. The national analysis could thus include reflections on legal 
strategies for implementing activation policies for persons being sick, disabled or 
unemployed.  
                                           
3 The concept of “work first“ has mainly been used in a North American context (the US and Canada) to label 
welfare reforms that aim to move welfare recipients from benefits to private-sector jobs. In 1995, the Democrats 
introduced a Work First welfare reform bill for debate in the Senate and programs in this spirit have since then 
been institutionalised in the different states. The American way of activation through work first programs has be-
come associated with “work fare“, with an emphasis on work requirements that “lack training elements and op-
tions, and that implies inferior working conditions“ see Kildal, 2001. It is probably fair to say that the concept of 
work first is normatively biased, to the extent that it is commonly linked to a specific ideological package: “em-
ployability-based approaches to supply-side intervention in the labour market”, Peck and Theodore, 2000. The 
choice to use the concept here, in a European context, is a choice to underline that the implementation of what 
seems to be a common and fairly uncontroversial goal of “activation” is normatively impregnated. 
4 There are at least three different types of methods to effectuate employment support: 1) through the offer of ac-
tive services, ii) through requirements of conditionality and iii) through economic incentives. Another categorisa-
tion of employment support use the distinction “measures to stimulate demand” and “measures to create produc-
tivity”. In the first category we find measures such as lowered levels of benefits, while an the offer of labour mar-
ket education belongs to the second category, see for instance Swedish Government report ”Nya förutsättningar 
för arbetsmarknadsutbildning” [New conditions for labour market education], 2007.  
5 Christensen, 2000, pp. 285-324, Stockholm. 
6 Although this chapter is an explorative exercise, based on a limited number of texts and on observations made by 
a limited selection of researchers, it is an exercise that invites further reflections for comparative studies on the 
normative impact of work first welfare. Such a study is also in the making within the framework of the research 
project “Rehabilitation and the EU”, funded by FAS. 
7 Cox, Robert Henry, 2001, p. 498. And to further underline the importance of this kind of knowledge Cox con-
tinues: “Reform proposals that do not invoke an accepted idea of legitimacy stand little chance of success, while a 
sense of legitimacy can facilitate truly dramatic change” (ibid). 




The researchers approached were mainly legal scholars (Eischenhofer, Welti, Har-
ris, Westerhäll and Inghammar) but also researchers with a socio-legal background 
(Adler and Rahilly). For the purpose of providing a scholarly framework, refer-
ences are in the following also made to the work of other researchers in the field 
and in particular to the work of Johansson and Hvinden, as the latter contributed 
actively in our symposium.8  
The question of Europeanization will not be in the forefront as I proceed. Rather 
than exploring the possible impact of community policies on national activation 
programs this text probes into the enforcement of employment support using a 
slightly different angle. The examples from Britain, Germany and Sweden, picked 
up from the previous chapters, serve as a basis for reflections on the normative 
challenges raised by a strong emphasis on employment support. Thus, rather than 
approaching the question of convergence or divergence, this chapter aims to reflect 
on what is at stake. If the question of Europeanization is concerned with direction, 
whether or not European states move in a similar manner or not or if they respond 
in similar ways to regional directives or not, this chapter has the ambition of illu-
minating some implications of these strategic choices. What are the normative chal-
lenges of a work first welfare state?9  
Based on an analysis of laws regulating the social dimension (the social sector, 
working life and family life) Anna Christensen developed a theory of basic norma-
tive patterns and processes of legal change.10 The basic idea underlying her work is 
that the law of the social dimension reflects fundamental moral values and concep-
tions prevailing in society and thus that the study of law can provide access to 
knowledge about the normative setting of societies.11 She also claimed that such 
basic values formed patterns of some consistency and endurance. Christensen men-
tions three main “basic normative patterns” in her own work and focuses on two of 
them: the protection of established position and the market functional pattern. The 
                                           
8 See preface. 
9 The present text is thus situated in a long standing tradition of welfare state writing that has the ambition to inter-
pret the constant changes that is a characteristic of welfare policies, trying to discern consistent patterns on a more 
fundamental level. To explicitly frame such approach in terms of the normativity of the welfare state project is a 
bit more rare but has lately be done by for instance Kildal and Kuhnle, 2005. 
10 Christensen, 2000. Hydén has based some of his writing on Christensen’s work, see Hydén, 2000 and more 
extended, 2002. I will later return to the work by Hydén. 
11 The theoretical and philosophical literature on the relationship between law and morality and between law and 
prevailing values in society, is far too extensive to connect to for the purpose of this chapter. This delimitation 
could arguably be defended by the fact that the aim of this text is distinctly interlinked with the implementation of 
welfare reforms. Legal literature combining an interest in hands-on welfare law regulation and in the relationship 
between law, society and basic normative values - is less abundant. Christensen’s work provides one such rare 
example. Still, maybe it should be emphasised, given that the UK is one of the countries discussed in this volume, 
the topic of the relationship between law and morality, although often problematised in civil law countries, is also 
under debate in common law countries, see for instance Cotterell, 2000.  




third pattern – just distribution – is less developed in Christensen’s work.12 Accord-
ing to Christensen the different patterns either attract or repel legal regulation and 
in her work the patterns tend to appear in a bipolar fashion, balancing each other. 
Through the identification of different, coexisting clusters of values, policy reforms 
can be discussed in terms of how they interact with these clusters. The framework 
allows for a discussion of change and has explanatory value in identifying conflicts 
and developments that exist on a basic normative level. 
In previous work I have discussed reforms of the Swedish sickness insurance using 
three clusters of values to describe the normative setting of potential change: social 
stability, individual freedom and social equality.13 Each cluster contains interacting, 
and possibly conflicting, conglomerates of values that are (or have been) important for 
the development of the Swedish welfare state.14 Values linked to social stability pre-
serve status quo, support established positions and focus on those with positions to 
lose. It supports the idea of ownership of social positions acquired through paid work. 
The extent to which “the protection of established position”, through legislation in the 
social dimension, has marked the Swedish welfare state has been shown by Christen-
sen. Your wage, your trade or profession becomes an established position that is pro-
tected by the welfare state. This cluster is conservative as it preserves achieved posi-
tions and it forms a hindrance to reforms and changes that challenge the present order. 
Values linked to social equality, on the other hand, are concerned with the distribution 
or redistribution of wealth, with solidarity and with equal respect. Redistribution in 
this sense is about levelling the injustices caused by differences in capabilities people 
should be given access to resources that to some extent – at a basic level – will com-
pensate for original or acquired differences.15 To achieve social equality there is a need 
for a strong state capable of creating (re)distribution of resources and, in its prolonga-
tion, a democratic society constituted of people able to make autonomous decisions. 
Such a broad - participatory and democratic - approach to welfare is firmly rooted in 
the value cluster of social equality. The third cluster is values linked to individual 
freedom, favouring the rationalities of the autonomous individual as well as the market 
economy.16 The individual is a key actor demanding a welfare state allowing for indi-
vidual choices and adaptation to specific circumstances, but also one that takes respon-
sibility for risk-management. Compared to the value cluster favouring social stability 
                                           
12 For a study that has explored the notion of “just distribution” further, see Stendahl, 2004. See also Olson 2007, 
Olson has identified what he calls the “conceptual crisis” of the welfare state – “leaving the welfare state without a 
clear normative understanding of the goals it should be pursuing in modern society” (ibid, p.4). The answer Olson 
provides is “reflexive democracy”, understood as politics rooted in practices that support capability promotion, 
equal opportunities and participatory politics. Thus, in the terminology used in this chapter, an extrapolation of 
values linked to “social equality”. 
13 Stendahl, 2004. 
14 The ”clusters” I use are strongly influenced by the notions of patterns introduced by Christensen, although 
while she looked for the normative content of patterns in legal sources only, the identification of clusters feed 
from a broader input. The aim is similar though, to identify shifts and movements in the moral foundation that 
finds its way into the construction, interpretation and practise of law.  
15 Sen, 1999. 
16 This cluster corresponds to some extent to Christensen’s market functional pattern. To this pattern Christensen 
linked the concept ownership, the freedom of association and the freedom to enter agreements. 




these are values promoting dynamic shifts and social positions are no longer status po-
sitions (to be owned and protected) but rather understood as changeable, flexible, con-
tractual positions. 
Hydén uses Christensen’s theory as a platform for discussing normative move-
ments over time.17 According to Hydén, increased or decreased strength in the way 
that the normative patterns work their way in law could be signs of a dialectic devel-
opment leading towards paradigmatic changes. Thus, Hydén argues that the protection 
of established position is likely to be strong in certain periods of time, until pressure 
for change grows too strong and other values, less conservative, are prioritised. Still, in 
the new phase other positions will be considered established and worthy of protection 
and so there will be a shift again. This analysis underlines the bipolar character of the 
normative field, a bipolar situation where basic values remain fairly intact but where 
emphasis and context change as societies develop. Hydén describes a continuing his-
torical flow where different types of societies grow and decline in what he illustrates 
through the use of S-curves. In transition periods, where one type of society is in de-
cline and the new society has not yet matured, there will be less protection of estab-
lished positions. 
In addition to the rise and decline of protection of established position Hydén iden-
tifies a number of other cyclic changes in law depending on the maturity of societies. 
Thus, Hydén claims that in periods of change law will become more formal, more in-
dividualistic and more repressive, while the need for repressive law diminishes in a 
mature society, in favour of substantive justice. Hydén writes: 
If we apply the reasoning on legal changes, in the form of movements between bipo-
lar points in the normative field, we would find ourselves today at a point in time 
heading towards a new phase of increased repressive elements /…/ Apart from the 
fact that a change of social system in itself means a shift of social codes and thus 
shifting assessments of what is right and wrong between those who base their as-
sessments on the normative pattern from the old society and those who use the nor-
mativity of the new developing society, it is today it is about globalisation and all 
that it carries with it in terms of influences from different directions.18 
In my conclusion I will return to the normative clusters introduced above as a way 
to structure my reflections on national responses to activation policies.  
The modern notion of employment support and the old fear 
of idleness  
The notion of employment support, or activation, is interesting as it simultaneously 
reflects conceptions that are deeply rooted in the historic legacy of different states 
of Europe, yet seems to contain elements that are distinctly challenging to the wel-
fare models as we know them.  
                                           
17 Hydén, 2000, 2002. 
18 Hydén, 2000, p. 153 f. Translation to English made by author. 




All three countries in focus share a tradition of fear of idleness. The social secu-
rity models worked out in Sweden, Germany and Britain are all based on a demar-
cation between the deserving and the undeserving.19 What is characteristic of the 
undeserving could be understood as a position of self-inflicted poverty, a choice of 
not working to the best of one’s ability. The fear of encouraging the idle or the ma-
lingers has provided social security systems with elaborated regulations and tests to 
secure that benefits do not support what is conceived of as deviant behaviour. The 
economic relief provided through social security has in these countries not been 
conceptualised as charity given to all poor or needy, but as a right that somehow 
has to be earned. The individual citizen earns a moral right to become a beneficiary 
through fulfilling the obligation to work towards becoming self-supporting. Against 
this background the strong impact of a new policy of activation is understandable. 
It rolls along smoothly on an already paved road. 
Still, the different reforms launched during the past decade, be it the German 
Hartz-reform, the British Welfare to Work programs or the Swedish efforts to cre-
ate efficient work-focused rehabilitation, all contain elements that raise the question 
of shift or change on a more fundamental level. What is the role of the state in the 
work first welfare state? And how should the rights and obligations of citizens be 
characterised in this new setting? It seems as if the activation agenda, if pursued 
strictly, also leads to new crossroads. 
The academic debate on whether or not European welfare states are facing a 
paradigmatic shift has been quite vivid at least since the beginning of the 1990s and 
the economic downturn of that decade. The response to the “new crisis” of the 
1990s was discussed in terms such as dismantling and retrenchment,20 but as the 
decade came to an end, and the economy stabilised, conclusions also pointed at 
persistence.21 Although there were also sceptics, more gloomy in their assessment 
of the future warning about a creeping disentitlement that would lead to increased 
poverty over time,22 the welfare state as we knew it seemed to have survived.23 
One of the responses to the crisis of the 1990s was an increased an emphasis on 
activation, and also, as one aspect of the implementation of the active welfare state 
– on employment support. The looming discomfort that the present mode of activa-
tion policies seem to feed, not least among academics, could at least partly be ex-
plained through the distinctions made between workfare and welfare, as well as the 
distinction between de- and re-commodification.24 
Workfare is, according to Kildal, a quite distinct form of activation policies 
originating in the US.25 The concept became popular during the 1990s, and in the 
                                           
19 See the chapters by Neville Harris and Eberhard Eichenhofer in this collection. 
20 Kautto (et al.) 1999, p. 5 f. with a reference made to Pierson, 1994. 
21 van Kersbergen, 2000, p. 20 f., see also Kautto (et al.) 1999, p. 7. 
22 van Kersbergen, 2000, p. 28. 
23 See for instance Kauto (et al.) eds. 1999, p. 7. 
24 Examples of concerned writing that use these concepts in their analysis of the ongoing changes of the welfare 
state are Dingelday 2007, Handler 2004, and Ryner 2002. 
25 Kildal, 2001. 




process less distinct, but in an effort to distinguish again a more precise content 
Kildal defines workfare programs with the help of four criteria: “Workfare pro-
grams 1) oblige able-bodied recipients 2) to work in return for their benefits 3) on 
terms inferior to comparative work in the labour market, and 4) are essentially 
linked to the lowest tier of public income maintenance systems.”26 Apart from 
workfare policies, Kildal also identifies two other types of activation policies: ac-
tive labour market policies and welfare to work policies. The workfare option dif-
fers from the other two by a lack of training elements as well as lack of options for 
the individual.27 It seems as if the categorisation used by Kildal is based on two 
main variables: one concerns the inclusion or exclusion of training and education 
aspects within the programs: the other focuses on the autonomy of the welfare re-
cipient and on the possible mix of rights and obligations bestowed upon them.  
The concept of de-commodification has been widely spread as it was used by Esp-
ing-Andersen as a way to distinguish what he identified as a strong characteristic of 
the social-democratic welfare regime.28 The concept has been defined in terms of “the 
extent to which individuals and families can uphold a normal and socially accepted 
standard of living regardless of their performance on the labour market.”29 A de-
commodifying welfare state provides the individual with a relative freedom as an actor 
in the labour market: “citizens can freely and without potential loss of job, income, or 
general welfare opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary.”30 Thus, 
a de-commodifying strategy functions in way that empowers the individual (through 
providing an opt-out choice) at the same time as it puts pressure on the supply-side of 
the labour market to offer positions that are attractive to potential employees. The 
1990s crisis, the tightening of benefits, along with a growing interest in activation 
made way for analyses that challenged the alleged de-commodifying attributes of the 
social-democratic welfare regime and underlined the re-commodifying function.31 
Thus, the state no longer offered an opt-out position, but a temporary solution, facili-
tating transfer from one social position to another, expecting individuals to adapt, re-
train, rehabilitate and re-educate themselves. 
This fear of an ongoing paradigmatic shift, that would lead to a dystopian two 
thirds society, was raised by researchers during the crisis years, but as the economy 
turned, employment figures rose, and activation policies strengthened their position 
in the social security systems, the message somehow appeared less alarming.  
                                           
26 Kildal, 2001, p. 3. 
27 Kildal, 2001, p. 4. See also Dingelday who makes a distinction between workfare policies and enabling policies 
where workfare stand for the negative aspects of activation ambitions (an emphasis on obligations, conditionality, 
pressure and even compulsion) while enabling policies stand for the positive aspect (expansion of indivdiualised 
services in order to improve employability). She also concludes, based on a comparative study, that different wel-
fare state types contain both kind of policies, although mixed differently. Dingelday, 2007, p. 823 f. 
28 Esping-Andersen, 1990.  
29 Lindqvist, 1987, p.12. 
30 Drøpping, et al., 1999, p. 157. 
31 Ryner, 2002. 




Maybe now it is time to reflect again on where we are heading.32 Considering 
the long history of shunning idleness in the countries in focus one might wonder if 
activation policies are best understood as a step backwards, a return to the norma-
tive roots or the result of a circular movement? Or do they indicate a direction for-
ward, towards a new interpretation of welfare? Or are maybe things more or less 
the same because activation policies mean nothing in terms of a deep set change but 
are more to be understood as rumblings on the surface? 
In the previous chapters scholars from Germany, Britain and Sweden bring for-
ward their reflections on activation policies and measures of employment support 
from a national perspective. To me they seem to raise a number of themes and is-
sues related to the questions asked above.  
One clear and common feature linked to the introduction of activation policies 
in all three countries is an increased pressure on new groups that are expected to be 
at the disposal of the labour market. While pressure traditionally, in all three coun-
tries, has been quite distinct and harsh on those categorised as unemployed, we now 
see an increased focus on the sick and disabled (in Sweden and the UK), on lone 
parents (the UK), and on the older part of the workforce (Sweden and Germany). 
The issue of employability, given whatever hindrances there might be in the indi-
vidual case, is the main target. 
A second theme concerns the driving forces behind the behaviour of benefit re-
cipients that somehow lingers below the different policy reforms aimed to “make 
work pay”. In all countries, and certainly in Sweden and in Britain, the methods 
used to fight idleness are based on a conception of recipients as potential cheats 
(and resources are made available to scrutinise and survey the behaviour of citi-
zens). Sanctions of different kinds are common (for instance benefits are made 
conditional on active participation in different programs). It appears to be accept-
able to base arguments on the assumption that people avoid work if possible, and to 
create policies that make it less attractive, less possible, to be outside the labour 
market. There is also, as one side of the moral pressure interwoven with the ideol-
ogy of activation, a moral failure to be carried by those who in the end do not find a 
way to secure their own subsistence through work on the open labour market. 
A third theme that the topic of employment support raises is the role of law as a 
method of governance in the work-first welfare state. Does the implementation of 
reforms lead to a welfare state where law is more or less prominent? Some argu-
ments could be made for a development of a more legal rights-based approach to 
social security, but again, arguments could also be made for claiming that adminis-
trative discretion has increased. Do we see a process of juridification in the social 
sphere linked to a process of individualisation? Or, is the main strategy for imple-
                                           
32 In an article published in 2008 Taylor-Gooby contributes to this discussion by claiming that we are heading 
towards a new welfare settlement (after a period of uncertainty). Still in spite of the shared vision of an active wel-
fare state, the character of this new settlement is still in the making and according to his study states seems to pre-
fer “negative activation” to the detriment of “positive activation” (deregulation and restrictions rather than invest-
ments in programs to increase skills and safeguard social mobility). Taylor-Gooby, 2008. 




menting the work first welfare state to move out of law? Below these themes will 
be further elaborated and discussed. 
New groups targeted (new conception of risk developed?) 
It used to be that a number of social risks excused those subjected to them from the 
obligation to work and support themselves. Examples of such risks were sickness, 
disability and the assumption of care responsibilities. The content of the protection 
provided by social insurance, the risk insured against, was perceived as an eco-
nomic back-up for individuals who had legitimate reasons to withdraw from the la-
bour market. 
As the work-first welfare state develops one of its most obvious characteristics 
is the diminishing scope for legitimate opt-out of paid work. Where prevailing con-
ceptions would previously have excused those with impaired health, older or those 
responsible for the care of small children or disabled relatives, from the obligation 
to work in the labour market, it seems now as if concern for these groups is trans-
lated from the opt-out solution into efforts to increase their employability, discard-
ing opt-out as a solution. In Germany recent reforms have included a new definition 
of “ability to work” and according to Welti the new definition “declares a lot of 
even severely disabled people able to work”.33 It has been estimated that as many as 
25 per cent of the German unemployed have limiting health problems.34 Hvinden 
and Johansson have made similar observations35 and also Rahilly, Adler and Harris 
provide examples of how activation policies have had the result of expanding the 
obligation to work to new groups. 
What is happening is thus to some extent a process of redefinition. That unem-
ployed citizens have a duty to be active is well established, what is new is who is 
included in the definition of being unemployed. From Britain, Rahilly reports how 
demands faced by unemployed claimants have progressively been introduced for 
new groups.  
Whilst unemployed claimants have always been required to be available for 
work, it is only in the last decade or so that the labour market conditions re-
quired of this group have been considerably extended. Benefit conditions are 
now also being progressively introduced for other claimants of working age. 36 
                                           
33 Welti, p 146, above. 
34 Welti: “In 2002 the Federal Agency had found out that one quarter of all unemployed were limited by health 
condition. It can be taken for granted that those who came out of the social welfare system were even worse off in 
their health status.” p 146, above. 
35 Johansson and Hvinden write, “However, while the Nordic governments originally had portrayed the male 
working class as the primary target for active labour market policies, the activation programs introduced after 
1990 explicitly embraced a broad range of groups: men and women, people with impairments, single mothers, 
immigrants and young people with low qualifications. Hence all unemployed Nordic citizens receiving social 
benefits now have a general duty to be ‘active’ according to the interpretation that the public authorities give the 
term.” See, IJSSP, Vol. 27, No. 7/8, 2007, p. 340. 
36 Rahilly, p. 79, above. 




Adler points to the fact that in order to make life as a lone parent less attractive, 
benefits have been lowered and lone parents encouraged to “… take work, live with 
relatives or find a new partner”.37 Also Harris identifies the questioning of the right 
of non-working lone parents to be exempted from the work-search requirement as 
part of a new approach: “there is growing pressure to shift the boundary so that 
more claimants are subjected to a JSA [Job Seekers Allowance]- type regime.”38 
While poverty used to be the ultimate social risk, what is most shunned in the 
work-first welfare state seems to a state of worklessness. While the risk of poverty 
could be avoided through distribution and redistribution of resources, lack of work, 
reframed as a risk of social exclusion, can only be avoided through individual par-
ticipation in the labour market.39  
As a way to make paid work a more attractive lifestyle choice, compared to de-
pendency on state benefits, benefits are lowered, sanctions implemented and work 
ethics strongly promoted. All three British contributions report a risk of increased 
poverty and social stigmatisation for groups previously protected by the welfare 
state. Adler fears stigmatisation of people on benefit.40 Rahilly puts out a warning: 
“Many of these work activation provisions are supported by sanctions and therefore 
have the potential to further intensify the poverty of the benefit claimant.”41 Harris 
writes: 
There was evidence that sanctions had caused hardship, since many claimants 
had already been struggling on the rate of benefit they received. The reported 
that their children often lost out, as pocket money or treats were denied. Some 
had become indebted to friends or family, who would need to be repaid out of fu-
ture benefit. Stress and anxiety had been exacerbated.42 
As the traditional conception of social risks is subordinated the new work ethic, 
there is also a trend towards creating new organisational structures, so called “one-
stop-shops” or, at least, an emphasis on coordination and cooperation. In Britain as 
well as in Germany such reforms could be noted.43 Although Sweden has so far not 
followed this trend, at least not on a national scale, Johansson and Hvinden make 
clear that in a Nordic perspective this kind of change on an institutional level is 
well represented.44 As common entrances, in a physical sense, are created the dis-
tinction between the sick, the disabled, the lone parents, the older or youngsters is 
                                           
37 Adler, p. 103, above. 
38 Harris, p. 69, above. 
39 See for instance Erhag in this collection. 
40 Adler, p. 107, above. 
41 Rahilly, p. 79, above. 
42 Harris, p. 66, above. 
43 Welti: “So for example after an application for sickness allowance the sickness insurance has to examine not 
only if medical rehabilitation as a benefit in kind from itself or from the pension insurance should be given but 
also if vocational rehabilitation from the pension insurance or from the federal agency could be successful. On the 
other side the federal agency has to take in account medical rehabilitation, if disabled people apply for job-seekers 
allowance. This would be some kind of revolutionary for the strictly segmented German system of welfare.” See 
p. 149, above. See also Eichenhofer, p. 132 f., above. 
44 Johansson and Hvinden, IJSSP, Vol. 27, No. 7/8, 2007, p. 343 f. 




diminishing. Access to state benefits is available only to those willing to knock on 
the door to the world of activation, once inside there are different kinds of, more or 
less, individualised services created in order to help each and everyone to overcome 
the obstacles that create hindrances to labour market participation.  
Benefit recipients - active and responsible or idle and in need 
of “responsibilization” 
Another strong and recurring theme in the chapters to follow, and maybe especially 
in the chapters concerned with Britain and Sweden, is the ambiguous image of the 
benefit recipient that several authors comment on. At one and the same time there 
are programs built on the notion of an active individual, participating in a coopera-
tive process together with the authorities towards a shared goal of increased em-
ployability, but there are also frequent descriptions of practices that reflect harsh, 
authoritarian procedures where individuals are penalised for not accepting the acti-
vation agenda laid down by the administration.  
From a Nordic perspective Westerhäll is in this context concerned with the in-
tegrity of individuals pushed into different measures with no real option to de-
cline.45 Westerhäll finds examples of this kind of practices in sickness insurance 
and Johansson and Hvinden broaden the scope to also include practices linked to 
the distribution of unemployment insurance and social assistance.46 
It seems as if below a surface level of correctness, where the tone is more re-
spectful, the notion of the unwilling, idle, benefit recipient lingers as strongly as 
ever. In social policies words such as “user-participation”, “co-determination” and 
“choice” are used frequently along with the introduction of a notion of a contract. 
Recipients and the authorities agree and sign a contract, a plan, where recipients put 
their names under a commitment to be active in their search for work. Still, the 
freedom to choose, embedded in the notion of the contract, might from an individ-
ual perspective appear to be non-existent, as access to cash benefits is made condi-
tional on participation.47  
From a British perspective a similar trend is emphasised by all three authors. 
Harris makes a connection between an image from the old days where unemploy-
ment was a moral failure to present times where being in unemployed is a personal 
                                           
45 Westerhäll: “The rehabilitative measures suggested by, for example, the social insurance office or the employer 
are not infrequently of such a kind as to be seen as an infringement of integrity, if they are contrary to the individ-
ual’s wishes.” 
46 Johansson and Hvinden, IJSSP, Vol. 27, No. 7/8, 2007. Giertz claim (on the basis of a study on Social Assis-
tance and Activation programs in Sweden) that activation policies for the poor would more clearly brake with the 
old tradition of workhouses if the unemployment insurance became more inclusive (not excluding those now on 
social assistance (Giertz, 2004). Thus there seem to be clear empirical indications that the present system of acti-
vation differentiate between categories of unemployed, and for those at largest risk for marginalisation and social 
exclusion elements of “responsibilization” increases and employment support measures become more workfare-
like. 
47 On the process of creating individual action plans, see for instance Hvinden and Johansson, 2007b, p. 217. 




responsibility.48 As welfare systems are increasingly guided by a method of gov-
ernance described by Harris as “managerialistic”, we have seen an increased use of 
contractual arrangements and control measures.49 In Britain this is a development 
not to far from the Beveridigan heritage, “…in exploring ways in which work in-
centives might be maintained, Beveridge proposed not only the maintenance of a 
gap between basic benefits and wages, but also discouragement of idleness through 
benefit sanctions /…/ and requirements to attend courses of training as a condition 
of receipt of benefit.”50 That sanctions, in line with a long tradition, is widely used 
in the British interpretation of a work-first welfare state is noted by Harris, along 
with reflections on the efficiency of this strategy.51 
The impression that there is a mismatch between the setting of the stage and 
what is actually performed is strengthened by the reflections made by Harris: 
The contractual element reflected in the notion of “agreement” implies mutuality 
and voluntariness, but the jobseeker’s agreement is very one-sided. As Lundy ar-
gues, “The official’s hand which shakes on this agreement is truly a hand of vel-
vet masking a fist of steel, since failure to sign up to the agreement will result in 
the claimant being denied benefit”. Entry into an agreement can, in this regard, 
be seen as part of the process of “responsibilization”, involving state governance 
of behaviour intended to make people behave as “responsible” citizens.52  
As legal rights to benefits are made conditional and sanctioned, the strength of hav-
ing “legal social rights” is deteriorating.53 There is a right to benefits, but it cannot 
be claimed. Both Harris and Adler voice a fear that as “activity” as such is made 
the prime target, quality of work is not safeguarded. In some cases this means that 
instead of an expected right to benefit the insured will have a duty to work in “in 
low status, low income employment.”54 
The question put at the beginning, asking whether employment support is a step 
backwards or forward, is based on the recognition of a long history of acknowledg-
ing the primacy of work, but there may also be something in the present methods, 
in the mix of sticks and carrots, and where sticks tend to outnumber the carrots, that 
provide some resemblance to a long-gone period of Poor Laws. Or maybe it is in 
                                           
48 Harris, p. 50, above.  
49 Harris, p. 50, above. This is also a trend noted by Eichenhofer who writes in positive manner about the in-
creased scope of discretion in the administration and a shift from an authoritarian and bureaucratic tradition to a 
more managerial approach, see  p. 139, above.. 
50 Harris, p. 53, above. 
51 Harris, p. 63 f. and p. 71 f., above. 
52 Harris, p. 62, above, with a quotation from Lundy, L. 2000, ‘From Welfare to Work? Social Security and Un-
employment’, in Harris, N., Social Security Law in Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 304, and a refer-
ence to Ican, S and Basok, T, ‘Community Government: Voluntary Agencies, Social Justice, and the Responsibi-
lization of Citizens’, 2004, 8 Citizenship Studies pp 130-133. 
53 Westerhäll: Despite the fact that the person is entitled to financial compensation under the sickness insurance 
scheme following the customary assessment of sickness and incapacity for work, the financial benefit is with-
drawn on the grounds that the insured person is not meeting the requirements laid down for “active participation”. 
In here lies the element of sanction. See p. 169, above. 
54 Rahilly, p. 90, above. 




the moral undercurrents of the argument to invest in methods to expose cheaters 
and to increase efforts to change an alleged culture of benefit dependency.  
The primary role of the state in the workfirst welfare state is to facilitate transfer 
from periods of unemployment back in to employment. Some of the strategies 
evolved for this purpose aim to create incentives, to make work pay, to make it 
hard not to be working. As Eichenhofer writes in his description of the German re-
forms: “The benefit should not pamper the recipient to stay unemployed, but be 
frugal enough to give an incentive to take on also badly paid work.”55 For those dis-
carded by the market, living conditions tend to become harsh. For those tradition-
ally defined as unemployed this tends to always have been the truth, but in the 
work-first welfare state all should work to the best of their capacity. 
There seems to be some differentiation, based on social risk, on the use of sanc-
tions. Thus, how severe the demand for activation is, how forceful the emphasis on 
obligatory participation, is made dependant of the cause for non-participation on 
the labour market.  
There is an inbuilt dilemma in the pursuit of strategies for the implementation of 
work-first welfare that morally, legally and economically are to the disadvantage of 
those in most need. The moral blame falls hard on the individual, failing, not 
wanted by the market and penalised by the state (in order to ascertain that staying 
out of work is not an option). The dilemma is that while work (for as many as pos-
sible) is a way to combat poverty and social exclusion, the implementation, if not 
attentive to the needs of those discarded by the market carries the risk of creating a 
new group of welfare state outcasts – the unemployable. 
The role of law, the role of the state 
The third theme to be picked up from the selection of texts in this volume has al-
ready been touched upon, but could be explored further. There are indications that 
law, at one and the same time, is becoming both more and less important as a regu-
lator in the field of social protection, as activation makes its way. Arguments can be 
raised for both increased and decreased juridification.  
It could be argued that the emphasis on implementing non-discrimination legis-
lation to safeguard the position of the disabled in the labour market is an example 
of how a legal approach is relied upon. Individuals are granted a claimable legal 
right not to be discriminated against and employers are, in addition, given a duty to 
make reasonable accommodations at the place of work. Thus, as individuals with a 
disability are expected by the social protection system to be active in the labour 
market, legal rights are bestowed upon them in order to deter employers from dis-
criminating behaviour that would exclude the success of such a strategy. Still, the 
chapters written by Inghammar and Welti, in which the situation of the disabled is 
in focus, cast some doubt on the real strength of this approach. As emphasised by 
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Welti, in order to reach the goal of non-discrimination towards the disabled, there is 
need for positive action in order to even out possible effects of disability status: 
The items mentioned especially for non-discrimination in the European and na-
tional law are not equal in function and impact. Regarding equality of sex, race, 
colour, language or religion in most cases we call the state as well as the actors 
in society to be like the goddess of justice with a blindfold on: just to ignore 
prejudice regarding these special topics. Regarding the equality of disabled peo-
ple, in many cases we want the goddess of justice to be the goddess of equity and 
to have a good look at the special conditions people are living and suffering with. 
The concept of considering disability in equality means not a formal equality of 
rules but a material equality of chances and even of results.56 
What is needed is thus not only the avoidance of discrimination but efforts, invest-
ments, resources, to even out the effect of the hindrances to labour market partici-
pation that exist as a consequence of a disability situation. According to Ingham-
mar, the non-discrimination regulation does not really provide for such claims from 
the perspective of a majority of the disabled, and to a large extent those with more 
severe hindrances are in reality excluded from the protection provided by law: 
Disability discrimination law as we have seen it develop in Europe over the past 
10-15 years has been described as elitist, de facto focusing on the most competi-
tive disabled employees and job-applicants, leaving, I would say, a majority of 
persons with disabilities with no increased prospect of labour market integra-
tion.57 
According to Inghammar anti-discrimination law in itself is thus not the legal in-
strument that makes a difference for these groups, except for the one positive obli-
gation put on employers, namely the duty to make reasonable adaptions. This legal 
right of the disabled, and duty of the employer, can, depending on how it is imple-
mented, make a difference in individual cases where rights are claimed. 
In the chapters by Westerhäll and Adler, the scope of law is again a theme of its 
own. As work-first policies are implemented, there is an increased sphere of ser-
vices provided by authorities created in order to support employability. While cash-
benefits in most cases are legally secured through distinct legislation and with cor-
responding rights to appeal for individuals, the existence of rights in the new sphere 
of services is less prominent. Westerhäll writes about the concept of “a right to a 
possibility” introduced in Swedish legislation and Adler notes the increased sphere 
of administrative discretion in the British setting: 
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What is meant by “possibility”? There is no explanation in the legislative mate-
rial for the choice in the formulation of the Act of the word “possibility” for what 
is available to the individual. In ordinary language the term “possibility” is 
taken to mean “an opportunity/a chance”. The concept is then seen almost as a 
situation that arises at random without the influence of the individual. But the le-
gal meaning of the term “possibility” has to be seen as vague. It is difficult to de-
termine from the term alone what the legislator intended.58  
Westerhäll points to the possible disadvantages of letting activation policies be im-
plemented through the discretionary practises of local social security officers and 
questions the selection processes claiming there are discriminating practices.59  
It seems as if there is in all countries a growing “individualisation of the rela-
tionship between the state and the unemployed citizen”60 and although juridifica-
tion, through the exploration of individual legal rights, tends to contribute to such 
developments, it seems as if there is no simple conclusion that the legal position of 
individuals in the work-first welfare state has been strengthened. At least not in 
general. 
As has been noted above, there is in the three countries a long history of making 
distinctions between the deserving and the non-deserving. These processes of de-
marcation, used to identify who are legitimate beneficiaries and who are not, are 
surrounded by more or less detailed legal safeguards. As the effects of the adminis-
trative decision-making, exclusion or inclusion in the social security schemes, have 
a major impact on the life conditions of the individual, the guarantee of making de-
cisions legitimate has often included an element of juridification. Often what has 
been at stake has been some kind of cash benefit, a replacement or compensation 
for loss of income. Decisions on entitlement to cash-benefits are in all countries de-
fined as conditional rights. If requirements are met, the individual has legally based 
rights to benefits, and decisions can be challenged. There is a possibility of redress. 
Still, as concluded by Adler, it seems as if along with an increased emphasis on 
active interventions the possibility of redress has become substantially weakened61. 
To effectuate the ambitions of the work-first welfare state, new programs, new ac-
tors, new institutional arrangements have been created. The payment of cash bene-
fits is not at the heart of the work-first conceptualisation of welfare, at its heart we 
find different interpretations of activation. There are differences, of course, be-
tween the different mixes and designs of employment support elaborated in Ger-
many, Britain and Sweden, but there are also common tendencies. For those 
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60 Harris, p. 50, above 
61 Adler, p. 126, above. 




deemed to benefit there is an increasing range of services offered (educational pro-
grams, professional or social skills programs, training opportunities and so forth), 
there is also an effort to provide more individualised support – as exemplified by 
the personal advisor in the British system. There is also, at least in Sweden and 
Britain, a tendency to increased local variations, programs may be launched in se-
lected regions or local authorities may be given the responsibility to work out pro-
grams that respond to the specific needs of a very local labour market. 
While cash benefits are usually legally embedded and secured, the same cannot 
be said about the wide variety of services that are a vital part of the work-first wel-
fare state. The decision about who is to benefit from these investments in re-
education and skills training is mainly within the discretion of the local officer. The 
lack of national homogeneity in the implementation of activation underlines this 
sense of de-juridification. There seem to be indications, noted by several of the au-
thors in this volume, that the legal scope is diminishing in the effectuation of the 
work-first welfare state. 
Conclusion 
The question asked in the title of this chapter is concerned with normative devel-
opments. Will the choices made to implement the work-first welfare state cause 
tensions between different sets of core values embedded in the welfare state pro-
ject? If Anna Christensen’s notion of basic normative patterns is imposed on the 
different themes brought to the fore above, a couple of different scenarios appear. 
A first impression is that the implementation of work-first welfare distinctly 
provokes the bipolar tension between the protection of established position and a 
more market functional approach. Through the implementation of policies that 
change our conception of who is unemployed, in a direction that entails an obliga-
tion on more individuals to change profession, occupation, place of residence, level 
of income etc. in a process of (re)gaining a position in the labour market, the pro-
tection of established position is deteriorating. At the same time responsibility for 
self-support is individualised, rights and obligations are made contractual, sanctions 
are harsh and the role of the state is becoming increasingly preoccupied with sur-
veillance. All in all it seems as if the predictions made by Hydén are being fulfilled. 
In that case what is at stake is a transition, a paradigmatic shift, from one type of 
society to another. In Hydén’s words, the welfare state of the industrial society is 
reformed in order to accommodate to the demands of information society.62  
A possible objection to the seemingly obvious fact that the protection of estab-
lished position is becoming weaker in the work-first welfare state, is that it is not 
clear if the demands for re-adaptation hit everyone in an equal manner. Policies and 
regulations are formulated in a neutral way but are the well-to-do, the middle-class, 
the university educated, facing the same demand for re-adaptation and flexibility as 
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those in blue-collar work? It seems as if in order to speak of a paradigmatic shift – 
of a normative step forward to something new – the overall impact of work-first 
policies needs to be determined. The answer is not provided here but seems to be 
important in order to understand the normative impact of employment support. If 
there are exceptions, in practice, from the re-conceptualised obligation to work, 
then it could be argued that the protection of some established positions has in-
creased at the expense of others. This is not a new society, just an extrapolation of 
already existing differences that can be understood as rescue project in defence of 
social stability. The cost is increased social inequality. 
There are other possible interpretations that could be supported by the different 
chapters in the present book. In order to discuss them I would like to shift from the 
bipolar analysis of Christensen and Hydén and return to the three clusters of values 
social stability, social equality and individual freedom.63 
In a Swedish setting, different legal strategies within the field of social security 
law have created a tradition of strong protection for established position, in combi-
nation with an extensive and fairly generous universal system responsive to de-
mands of social equality.64 Somehow, the redistributive state, providing basic social 
protection for all citizens, made the conservatism linked to policies securing social 
stability possible. If what we witness is a development that favours the dynamics of 
a market economy more than the stability of the status quo, the question remains, 
what happens to the values linked to social equality?  
The demarcation made by Kildal between employment support measures de-
fined as workfare, welfare to work measures or active labour market policies is one 
indication that the normative challenge for the active welfare state is visible in the 
capacity of the state to secure redistribution of capabilities.65 From a reading of the 
texts included in this volume it would seem that some of the core tensions in pre-
sent reform policies circle around this issue.  
The three themes discussed in the present chapter all raise questions that could 
be discussed within the framework of a theory of normative patterns. The first 
theme was concerned with a notion that social risks, as they are usually conceptual-
ised, are being reframed. In law this development is visible as changes in the con-
struction and interpretation of the legal criteria used to control entry into different 
social security schemes. As different cash benefits tend to be linked to a mix of 
rights and obligations, the elaboration of the criteria that regulate access is at the 
core. Choices of legal strategies in this field have, as has been stated, a clear impact 
on whether the system as such protects stability and status quo on the one hand or 
the promotion of re-adaptation and re-education on the other. Still, both positions 
could be enforced with more or less concern for social equality. In law, concern for 
social equality can be looked for in efforts made to safeguard individual autonomy 
as well as in positive actions created to diminish differences in capabilities. 
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The second theme was based on the identification of a tendency to effectuate 
the implementation of activation policies through different disciplinary measures. 
In law such developments are identifiable, for instance, in constructions that allow 
for sanctions and where access to what is labelled legal rights is linked to more or 
less far-reaching obligations. To the extent that this is a pattern that, in reality, has 
the effect that state administrations deliver non-negotiable dictates leaving little 
room for individual choice or participation in decisions regarding activation meas-
ures, this pattern is quite contrary to values linked to individual freedom and to so-
cial equality. There is also, as noted above, a concern that the character of activa-
tion policies differs between groups and that the risk of being the target of respon-
sibilization processes is not equally distributed among benefit recipients. To the ex-
tent that employment support measures similar to workfare are provided mainly to 
those furthest away from the labour market, this could lead to a segmentation of 
present systems rather then the opposite. 
The third theme was concerned with the role of law and the role of the state and 
one reflection made was that in implementing activation policies the scope of law 
may be strengthened and weakened at the same time. To have legally protected 
rights, and access to means to enforce them, is evidently something that strengthens 
the individual in case of a conflict with the administration. In this respect strong le-
gal rights can be a means to safeguard the autonomy of the benefit recipient. Still, if 
what is strived for is individualised solutions, specific to both person and local en-
vironment, detailed regulation could be a hindrance. In this respect, given that ad-
ministrative practices are non-discriminating and include positive action, lack of 
detailed regulations could make the system less rigid, more dynamic, and more able 
to respond to individual needs. It could also be argued that reliance on individual 
legal rights as a means to secure the quality of decisions made in the administration 
of social security is to hand over to individuals a responsibility that could be more 
efficiently dealt with by other means (less burdensome for the individual). This 
said, it should also be emphasised that without distinct legal backing, individuals 
who feel abused by the system have small chances to challenge decisions made. 
Thus, knowledge about the scope of law, clarifying if law is constructed in ways 
that provide individuals with tools to claim their rights or if such constructions are 
lacking, provide essential information on normative preferences. 
Based on the assumption that law offers an opportunity to study the underlying 
normative structures of society, Anna Christensen’s theory constitutes a promising 
point of departure for comparative studies on normative change. Following the rea-
soning above it can be concluded that a legal study of the normative implications of 
work-first welfare can be found in the regulations surrounding employment sup-
port. In order to respond to the three clusters of values referred to above as social 
stability, social equality and individual freedom, such a study should pay attention 
to choices of legal strategies that have an impact on ownership, individual auton-
omy, legal rights, legal obligations and access to justice.  
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Is there a European Work-First Welfare 
State? In search of a legal answer 
Concluding remarks 
Thomas Erhag, Sara Stendahl 
Work has become the centre of most modern welfare policies. It is the primacy of 
work, as the proposed key-aspect of welfare sustainability, which has created no-
tions of work-first welfare. A main political concern of most European countries in 
the last years has been to develop strategies that will increase the level of labour 
market participation of the workforce.  
Comparative welfare state research has provided us with knowledge of some of 
the systematic, structural, differences existing between western welfare models. 
Still, in spite of differences, a widely spread concern for the economic sustainabil-
ity of social security systems seem thus to have led to a common response: an am-
bition to turn passive recipients of benefits into active participants on the labour 
market. We used the notion of “employment support” as an overarching notion to 
describe this phenomenon. One or the main goals of this study was to find a legal 
answer to the question on whether there is a specific response in European states to 
this challenge. Is there a “European work-first welfare state”? What are the norma-
tive implications of it – both on the EU and on the national level? Can we identify 
legal strategies and normative patterns that would enable us to compare the impact 
of “employment support” in different legal systems? 
”Work-first” in EU-law? 
An important question dealt with our research project was about the possible effects 
of the interplay between national and EU employment and welfare legislation in 
Europe. Although much of the positive measures that are possible to take on an 
EU-level in the area of welfare are soft law, it is apparent that this soft law has de-
veloped into less soft structures. From notes by the Commission in reports in the 
early 1990s, to an organized governance structure with a firm legal basis in art 128 
where both Council and Commission are dominant actors. Additionally, the EC-
treaty in art 137 express that questions on most aspects of working life are ques-
tions where the EU has (a limited) competence to legislate or at least use the OMC-
method. Seen together with the EMU, the OMC can be seen as a complement to the 
traditional EU-method of hard law.  




This expansion of the use of soft law and the new techniques for governance is 
often characterized as symbols of a development where member states seek new 
methods of integration without pre-emptive effect. A response to the fact that ever 
widening competences at EU-level have provided for a more heterogeneous effect 
of Community law on national law. But seen in relation to the diversity of national 
welfare states, e.g. the differences found in the construction of legal instruments 
(benefit levels, personal scope etc.), level of economic development and normative 
aspirations and institutional structures, there are minimal chances to be successful 
in harmonization of European social policies.  
Even if the European Employment Strategy has connections to traditional EU-
lawmaking, it is still a “neo-voluntary”1 legal method which can be characterized as 
an intergovernmental rather than a supranational procedure. There are supranational 
features in the sense that the Commission holds a central position and that the 
guidelines are decided upon with qualified majority voting in the Council. How-
ever, the member states have the last saying as it is up to them whether they want to 
follow the guidelines or not. This of course effectively limits the possible achieve-
ments of the open method of coordination. 
After stating that the combined efforts of soft and hard law regulation at an EU-
level have at least a potential impact on national social policies, the next question 
of concern is what the normative contents of this impact is?  
Already in the late 1990s critiques pointed out that the values of national wel-
fare state regulation were not reflected in the forming of the employment strategy. 
Looking at the development of the EES within the Lisbon-process, it seems evident 
that the EU has retreated from promoting social citizenship and moved towards a 
narrower work-line oriented conceptualization of social security. This would mean 
that there is an expressed common EU normative structure within the OMC gov-
ernance method. However, it must be stressed again that the commitments are free 
of clearly defined obligations for the Member States. Still, the development at na-
tional level also seems to emphasise work-oriented models in reshaping social se-
curity models. 
When exploring the impact of the EES and OMC more closely, there seem to be 
very little (if any) evidence of real legal impact on national legal reforms, even if 
the policy formation and debate is carried out in an institutionalized European con-
text. Still, national policy choices are defined as matters of common concern and 
governments are willing to present their plans for joint discussion. Although the 
OMC system is without sanctions, the joint discussions on national choice with the 
goal to set common indicators of achievement and objectives mean that the system 
is exposed to peer-review. However, one should also note that the OMC develop-
ment is joined with a, however modest, development of the “hard” Community 
competences in the field of social law. Substantially, the OMC cannot be consid-
ered to contribute to the development of a common social policy with a direct im-
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pact on national social law. But as a procedure it is new and complementary, and 
receives a position in law-making on the national level.  
Legal strategies and normative patterns as a comparative 
point of departure 
The complexity of social security law is well-known among those who work in or 
with the field. This is a kind of law that is often very technical, that is prone to 
change and where the changes made are inconsistent. It is a legal field where laws 
tend to end up a patchwork of different agendas and interests and often with an aim 
to steer people’s behaviour, a field where the interdependences between different 
regulations are many, and where the results of administrative as well as judicial de-
cision-making often is hard to anticipate. Still, efforts have been made to describe 
these complex systems in a structured way for comparative purposes. Examples of 
structuring elements that have been used are: “concepts and sources of social secu-
rity, administrative organisation, personal scope of application, risks and benefits, 
financing and judicial review”.2 This study takes a slightly different approach. 
Our aim was to capture the way legal constructs (rules, principles, practises) are 
functioning as building blocs in the implementation of social policies, and how the 
different usage and combination of these will determine different modes of govern-
ance. One example of a set of legal strategies important in the field of social secu-
rity is to be found in the area of demarcations. The issue of demarcations seem to 
be at the core of social security law, to separate the worthy from the non-worthy 
and always keeping an eye out for malingerers (real and imagined). In social secu-
rity the working are separated from the non-working, the sick from the un-
employed, the disabled from the sick, the needed child carer from the working child 
carer or the unemployed or sick child carer, and so on. Demarcations are often im-
portant from an individual perspective as living conditions might improve or de-
cline quite drastically depending on classification. Also from the perspective of the 
provider (for instance state, local authorities, unions or a contracted private sector 
actor) demarcations are important. From a governance perspective they can be used 
to influence behaviour and from a more pecuniary on an administrative level they 
can serve the function of pushing expenses to budgets “elsewhere”. The present 
study also indicated other such areas where differences or similarities in legal 
strategies are of core importance for the normative character of a social security 
system. 
What is provided by this study from a mere legal perspective is this suggestion 
to identify and use the legal strategies and normative patterns that mark social secu-
rity law as the much cherished “functional elements”, cutting through the diversi-
ties of social security systems and making them possible to compare. From the per-
spective of welfare state research, more important might be if the suggested ap-
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proach leads to knowledge that lay bare the impact of legal regimes on the elabora-
tion, development and legislative implementation of social policies.  
Social security law is, as has been mentioned above, as a field of regulations in 
most systems marked by many and quick changes. This is indisputable, yet al-
though Governments change, and schemes are re-labelled, benefits are raised and 
lowered and institutions re-organise… there is also in social security law some 
normative structures that hold a firm grip on the systems as such. 
This stability of the models or systems has been noted in welfare state research. 
The economic crises of the 1990s and the reforms that followed, resulted in aca-
demic analyses discussing the dismantled welfare state, but also the surprisingly 
strong institutional consistency that could be concluded in its aftermath. In this 
field of analysing change and consistency, law has something to offer. As most 
lawyers are aware, rules rule on the surface, but to apply them, to understand them, 
to make them work in the context where they are set to have meaning, they must be 
linked to the deeper levels of prevailing normative structures. While the surface is 
prone to change easily, the underlying structures will safeguard continuity and se-
cure against any fast leaps. In cases where surface changes do not relate to the 
deeper levels, the use of the legal system might well turn out a policy-obstacle 
rather than as an efficient tool for reform. 
On a fundamental normative level it could be argued that most European wel-
fare states are in tune. A basis for this kind of argument could be made by refer-
ences to the European Social Charter or the case-law produced by the European 
Court of Human Rights. So while the surface level is often marked by constant re-
forms, a characteristic of the fundamental level is relative consistency and coher-
ence. In the midst of such a scale, running from consistency on one end and con-
stant alterations on the other, legal strategies, it is argued, might be found some-
where in between. To make legal strategies the focus of this study is thus to look 
for elements in legal systems that are more persistent than “rules” yet more adapt-
able to shifting circumstances than basic values. In the identification of the legal 
strategies used to implement measures of employment support in different legal 
models there might thus be an answer not only related to whether systems tend to 
converge or diverge but also some normative explanations as to why this is happen-
ing or not.  
 
 
